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Abstract
This thesis explores the link between human capital accumulation and the functioning of
marriage markets.
The first chapter studies the effect of marriage market conditions on pre-marital investment.
After showing how a change in the sex ratio can alter incentives for investments, I test this
prediction using exogenous variation in the marriage market sex ratio, brought about by im-
migration, exploiting the preference of second generation Americans for endogamous matches.
I find that a worsening of marriage market conditions spurs higher pre-marital investments,
measured by years of education, literacy and occupational choice. Overall, the results suggest
that there are substantial returns to education in the marriage market, and that both men and
women take these returns into account when making education decisions.
The second chapter studies the role played by caste and other attributes in arranged mar-
riages among middle class Indians. Using interview data from a sample of parents who placed
matrimonial ads in a popular Bengali newspaper, we estimate preferences for each attribute. We
then compute a set of stable matches and find it quite similar to the actual matches observed in
the data, suggesting a relatively frictionless marriage market. There is a very strong preference
for in-caste marriage but, because this preference is horizontal rather than vertical and because
the groups are fairly balanced, in equilibrium, the cost of insisting on marrying within one's
caste is small which allows castes to remain a persistent feature of this marriage market.
Finally, the third chapter estimates the effect of marriage delay on fertility by exploiting
state laws that restricted age of marriage in the first half of the 20th century. These state
laws strongly predict the age at first marriage for both males and females. Moreover, they also
influence the age of one's spouse. Using these laws to instrument the age at first marriage for
both spouses, I find that delaying marriage of a female by one year reduces fertility by 0.35.
The effect of male's timing on fertility outcomes is smaller. Ignoring the effect that these laws
have on one spouse's age would lead to an overestimate of the effect.
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Chapter 1
Making Yourself Attractive:
Pre-Marital Investments and the
Returns to Education in the
Marriage Market
1.1 Introduction
Several studies have shown that marriage market conditions (such as divorce laws and sex
ratios) affect post-marital behavior (Chiappori et al. 2002 and Angrist 2002). These results are
generally interpreted as a rejection of the so called "unitary" model of the household where
households, once formed, behave like a single individual. Because marriage market conditions
change the outside option of each spouse, they alter bargaining weights and lead to modifications
in the way household surplus is shared. However, there is little empirical work on the impact
of these factors on pre-marital investments. This is surprising, since if individuals are forward-
looking, these conditions should be anticipated and potentially modify pre-marital decisions.
For example, if one foresees having a lower share of the post-marital output, one could increase
one's pre-marital investment in order to compensate for this loss. Moreover, several studies have
demonstrated that educational investments appear to respond to perceived returns in practice
(see Foster and Rosenzweig 1996 and Nguyen 2007 for returns to education in the labor force
and Foster and Rosenzweig 2001 for returns to education in marriage markets). Changes in
marriage market conditions may thus impact upon agents' behavior before the union is formed.
This paper investigates theoretically and empirically how changes in sex ratios (here defined as
the ratio of males to females) modify incentives for pre-marital investments.
Theoretically, a change in the sex ratio can be expected to affect pre-marital investments
through two channels: its effect on the probability of matching (which would hold even in
a unitary model) and its effect on anticipated bargaining power. To better frame these two
channels, I present a simple model. The timing of the model is as follows: first, pre-marital
investments are undertaken by each individual, random matching then pairs individuals into
couples and finally the output is shared according to rules that may depend on pre-marital
investments and external conditions.
Sex ratios affect whether and with whom one can match. The model shows that for any
relative risk aversion parameter larger than one, an increase in the sex ratio will lead men to
increase and women decrease their pre-marital investments because of the matching effect. If
the sex ratio is higher, a man has a higher probability of remaining single. The income effect
of having no partner dominates the effect that a partner has on one's returns for high enough
risk aversion. Thus, when one's marriage prospects get poorer, one's investment incentives are
increased.
Secondly, sex ratios may also alter incentives for pre-marital investments because they modify
the balance of power within a household. The model assumes that the division of the marital
output occurs such that the bargaining leads to an ex-post Pareto optimal allocation, in the same
spirit as in the "collective model" of the household. The bargaining weights may depend on an
external determinant of bargaining power, as suggested by Browning and Chiappori (1998) and
Chiappori et al. (2002). However, this paper also allows individuals' pre-marital investments
to influence the way the output is shared. I restrict the way these investments influence one's
bargaining share by assuming that only the ratio of one's own investment to that of one's spouse
influences the sharing factor.
The standard framework linking bargaining power and investments draws upon the work
of Grossman and Hart (1980), in which agents with linear utility functions are engaged in a
contractual arrangement. In that framework, an increase in one's bargaining power always leads
one to invest more since the additional bargaining power translates into a larger share of the
returns on that investment. Since the utility is linear, there is no income effect stemming from
obtaining a bigger proportion of the surplus. However, while risk neutrality may be a good
approximation in the context of contracting between firms, it may not be appropriate in the
context of spouses engaging in marital bargaining where risk aversion is likely to be present.
When the utility function is concave, a rise in the sex ratio decreases the incentives for male
investment through a lower bargaining power (and hence return) as emphasized by Grossman and
Hart (1980). This corresponds to a substitution effect. However, because the lower bargaining
power also translates into smaller incomes, this increases the incentives for investment due to
decreasing marginal utility. In the context of the model, this income effect is found to dominate
the substitution effect if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one. Finally,
the change in the sex ratio also modifies the incentives for one's spouse and in order for that
response not to undo the direct effect of the bargaining power, it suffices to assume that the
investments are gross substitutes in consumption.
Most estimates of either the relative risk aversion parameter or the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (which in this case are the inverse of each other) in the literature suggest that the
restrictions mentioned above will hold (see for example Hall 1988, Beaudry and van Wincoop
1996 and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio 2003) .
Note that if pre-marital investments modify post-marital outcomes, one would observe that
the sex ratio affects post-marital outcomes, even outside a bargaining model. Furthermore,
even within a bargaining framework, the estimated effect of marriage market conditions on
post-marital outcomes may not properly measure the full impact of changes in bargaining power
because part of this shift in bargaining is anticipated and counteracted by a change in pre-marital
investments.
The model implies that for realistic values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a
rise in the sex ratio leads men to increase their pre-marital investments and (by an analogous
argument) women to decrease them. This paper explores whether there is evidence of this
pattern in the context of ethnic marriage markets in the United States around the turn of
the twentieth century. Did second generation Americans modify their human capital acquisition
decision when faced with a plausibly exogenous shift in the sex ratio of their state-level marriage
market?
To answer this question, I exploit the fact that a large fraction of the children of immigrants,
here referred to as second-generation Americans, tend to marry within their own ethnicity.
Therefore, waves of newly arrived immigrants impact on their ethniticy's marriage markets (as
in Angrist 2002). While Angrist looks at national ethnic markets and instruments using flows
at entry, this study focuses on state-level, within ethnic group variation, which allows one to
control for many potential confounders of the effect of a change in sex ratios. The variation in
sex ratios of immigrants at this level is large and influences significantly the marriage market
conditions of second-generation Americans. Since immigrants may select their location based on
labor and marriage market conditions which also affect the second generation, this shock may
be endogenous. To control for endogeneity, this paper constructs an instrument based on the
fact that immigrant flows by country within a larger ethnic group are persistent. Each country
within a group has located, in the past, to various destinations. Furthermore, over the course
of the early twentieth century, the sex ratio of new immigrants has varied substantially and
differently across countries. Consequently, one can construct an instrument that allocates shifts
in the flows of immigrants to different states using past shares, akin to the strategy used by
Card (2001). This variation proves to be highly predictive of both the flow of newly arrived
immigrants and their gender composition.
Using this strategy, this paper finds that shifts in sex ratios influence pre-marital investment
decisions of men, whether defined in terms of years of education, literacy or occupational choices.
In states and ethnic groups where the number of males per female increases in their state of birth
due to gender-biased immigration, young adult males acquire more formal education, are more
literate, and pursue higher ranked occupations. A change from a balanced sex ratio among
immigrants to one where men are twice as numerous as women leads men to increase their
educational investment by 0.5 years and women to decrease it by (an insignificant) 0.05 years.
These results are robust to various changes in the start and end dates of the period observed,
in the states selected and to variations in the instrument.
As in previous studies (for example, Angrist 2002, Chiappori et al. 2002, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Grossbard 2007 and Oreffice and Bercea 2006), this paper also finds that post-matching
labor supply decisions are affected by a change in the sex ratio, although the estimated impact is
weaker and less significant than previously estimated, possibly due to the difference in empirical
strategy. In particular, women's labor force attachment is reduced. A doubling in the sex ratio
of newly arrived immigrants from a balanced level leads to a fall of about 4 percent in female
labor force participation, of 1.4 hours worked per week, and of 1.3 weeks worked per year. The
labor supply response for men appears to be generally positive, but smaller in magnitude and
insignificant. The indirect effect of the sex ratio on labor supply through educational attainment,
however, appears significant, particularly for males, which suggests that using marriage market
conditions as proxies for ex-post bargaining power may lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding
the importance of bargaining power.
Finally, this paper combines the model developed and the empirical estimates obtained to
calibrate the returns to education in the marriage market. The fact that marriage market
conditions influence educational decisions suggests that there are some returns to education in
the marriage market, whether stemming from a joint production function or through the effect
of pre-marital investments on bargaining weights. Defining returns to schooling on the marriage
market as any returns that would not be captured if one was single, I find that these make up
around 40 to 60 percent of total returns. These returns are thus important in magnitude and may
help to explain why, in this context and many others, women are as educated as men although
they have very low rates of labor force participation. It may reflect both the importance of
education as an input in household tasks such as child rearing as well as a method to strengthen
one's position within the household.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the existing literature. Section
1.3 then introduces the model and derives comparative statics, while Section 1.4 presents the
data and explains the empirical strategy. The subsequent section presents the results of the
regressions and section 1.6 then uses both the estimates and the theoretical model to separate
the returns to education stemming from the labor market vis-a-vis those from the marriage
market. The last section concludes and suggests avenues for future research.
1.2 Literature review
This paper is related to the growing theoretical literature linking education and marriage
markets in order to address changes in the educational attainment gap between genders (Chiap-
pori et al. 2007 and Pena 2006). In contrast to this literature, the model in this paper assumes
symmetry in the production function in order to focus more closely on the effect of the sex ratio.
The theoretical work most related to this paper is that of Iyigun and Walsh (2007) who construct
a model where the sex ratio can generate gender gaps in educational attainment. They assume a
competitive marriage market where consumption levels are independent of spousal investments
and this implies that investments are Pareto efficient. This means that their model cannot gen-
erate monotone comparative statics for investments with respect to the sex ratio. By contrast,
under the specification used in this paper, bargaining may lead to inefficient investment levels
and parameters can be selected to ensure monotone comparative statics.
Empirically, this paper relates to a wave of new studies that have explored effects of changes
in sex ratios on non-labor outcomes, mostly marital and fertility decisions (Porter 2007, Brainerd
2006, Kvasnicka and Bethmann 2007). They all use large shifts in fertility or mortality rates
which altered sex ratios and find that when the sex ratio increases women tend to marry more
and to be less likely to have out-of-wedlock births. Porter (2007) also finds that higher sex ratios
lead women to marry "better" mates in terms of health, age and height. Angrist (2002) studies
the effect of a national shock to the ethnic sex ratio brought about by immigration and uses as
an instrument for the gender composition of immigrants the sex ratio at entry. If immigrants
leave their home country for reasons that are exogenous to the local marriage and labor market,
this instrument identifies the causal effect of changes in sex ratios on post-marital behavior.
Using this strategy, he finds that both men and women are more likely to get married and that
women's labor supply is reduced while overall incomes are increased when the sex ratio rises.
However, no study has yet explored pre-marital investments as a potential outcome.
Finally, this study also contributes to existing work exploring the returns to education in
the marriage market. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show in a general equilibrium framework
that agricultural productivity growth raises the demand for educated wives and confirm it em-
pirically. Behrman et al. (1999) suggest that much of this response is due to the capacity of
better educated mothers to teach their children. An older branch of this literature has looked at
earnings correlations with own and spousal education. Some studies found positive correlation
between own earnings and spousal education (Benham 1974 for the United States, Tiefenthaler
1997 for Brazil, Neuman and Ziderman 1992 for Israel) suggesting that in particular in the case
of entrepreneurs, one's earnings tend to rise with spousal education. Also, marriage market con-
ditions seem to influence human capital acquisition (Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984 for example).
However, no study has yet quantified the return to education in the marriage market.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 General model set-up
Let us assume a setting where each man (m) and woman (f) is endowed with an initial
wealth w. Individuals have an additive utility function over two periods':
U(Cl, c2) = u(cl) + E (u(c2)).
For simplicity, assume that the utility function has constant elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution/constant relative risk aversion given by the parameter a:
S(ck) = 1 a > 0, k = 1,2.
In the first period, an individual can invest in a productive asset i at a cost of 1. Her
consumption in the first period is thus given by:
1 = W - i.
1It is assumed for simplicity that the discount factor is 1; none of the results derived below depend on this
assumption.
In the second period, individuals pair and can share resources. The joint output is given by
the function h which is assumed to be increasing in both investment levels, twice-continously
differentiable and symmetric:
A (i, i') h h(i', i)
ai ai
In addition, the production function is always positive when one individual has positive
investments and offers positive returns even at very low levels of investment:
h (iJ, 0) > 0, j = m, f
lim > 0, = m, fi3 ---,o BiJ
oh (ij, o)0) > , j = m, f.
BiJ
Notice that these restrictions exclude the Cobb-Douglas production function, for example, but
are perfectly compatible with a constant elasticity of substitution function.
Once paired, individuals, through post-matching bargaining, arrive at a Pareto optimal
sharing (as in Browning and Chiappori 1998, Chiappori et al. 2002). This implies that the
post-matching division of the total output will be given by the maximization of the following
program:
Max (im, if, z) (cM) + ( - (i m i f , )) u(c s.t. c+ c=h(im if)
Pareto weights are allowed to depend on 3 elements: male and female pre-marital investments
and potentially the sex ratio denoted by z.
One can show that the optimal allocations are given by:
cM = c (im, if, z)= 1- h (im if)
f = f is a saeot tt l (m f2 c2  - 1
(1i- z)- + p
which imply that one's consumption is a share of the total output and that these shares are
determined monotonically by the Pareto weight iL. Further assume that the following conditions
for these weights:
S(0, if , z  = 1 - L (im , O, z) = 0
ia > 0 > (1.1)
The first condition indicates that when one is paired with a partner who does not invest (that
is when one is single), one captures the full output of the pair. The third imposes that one's
investment increases one's share of the output.
Finally, weights will always be such that one always consumes at least what they can obtain
from being single. If it was not the case, individuals would elect not to marry and thus this
would not be an equilibrium. Formally,
c >ik, k = f,m.
The main assumption of this model is that the consumption exhibits constant returns to
scale in the investment levels, that is
c (im, Aif , = (im, if, z), j = m, f.
This will imply that the household production function also has constant returns to scale. More
intuitively, this also implies that the Pareto weights (ip) will be homogenous of degree zero in male
and female investments: only the ratio of investments influences the share one receives. Thus, in
a couple where the male has twice the amount of investment as his wife, this man captures the
same share of the total output, no matter what are the absolute levels of investments of both
parties. Finally, imposing that consumption must rise at a decreasing rate with own investment
2< 0, j =m,fiJj2
implies, because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, that
> 0, j = m, f.
aimail
In the first period, spouses decide their optimal investment level based on the following
maximization problem
Max u(w ik) +E(U(C (im,if, ))), k = m,f
taking the sex ratio (z) and the future spouse's investment as given.2
Once the investments have been made, individuals match randomly. This can be rationalized
by the existence of search frictions that prevent individuals from finding their perfect partner.
This excludes the possibility of using investments to capture a better spouse. Because of this,
the probability that males and females will stay single is independent of the investment level
and given by
zz-1
pm (z) = z! if >0 if z<_1
pf (z) = 1-z if z < 1
0 if z > 1
One can also see this p (z) as the fraction of period 2 one will spend being single if there are
frictions once matched and one can possibly lose one's partner. The first order conditions to
this maximization are given by
w - ik k (Z) (h (ikO) + (1 p (z)) (c) ,2  k= m, f (1.2)
Notice that because the matching is random, one cannot invest in order to capture a higher skilled
wife which is why there is no term in the first order conditions that relates own investment to
2From our assumptions that c > i~k and that > 0, we know that the return to investment will always
be at least 1 and so that savings will not occur.
that of one's spouse.
Investments would be ex-ante Pareto optimal in this case if one was to be the full residual
claimant of the returns since the total output available to the household would be maximized in
that case. However, in this model, the investment will never be Pareto efficient since =~
cannot hold simultaneously for both spouses, as in Acemoglu (1996). There are two factors
that distort the decision away from the optimal one. First, one only receives a share of the
total output and thus does not capture the full return to one's investment because part of the
benefits of this investment will be captured by one's spouse. This would lead one's investment
to be below the Pareto optimal level. On the other hand, because investments can be employed
to obtain a larger share of the output, overinvestment may also occur. The investment levels
selected are thus not ex-ante Pareto optimal unlike in Peters and Siow (2002) or in Iyigun and
Walsh (2007). The bargaining process here does not eliminate the "public good" nature of the
pre-marital investment as suggested by Bergstrom et al. (1986).
Lemma 1 There exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to this game.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A. m
The existence of a Nash Equilibrium depends on the assumption that the consumption
function exhibits constant returns to scale (which bounds the degree of complementarity between
inputs in the consumption function) and that single individuals receive a positive return (which
prevents the existence of a "no-investment" equilibrium).
1.3.2 Comparative statics
A change in the sex ratio modifies the incentives for pre-marital investment through three
distinct channels: changes in the probability of marriage, in the relative bargaining weight as
well as in the anticipated investment level of one's spouse.
Effect of a change in the probability of matching
First assume that spousal Pareto weights are independent of the sex ratio. The only effect
that the sex ratio has is then through the probability of one matching. Formally,
=aik P ( ( k = f, m. (1.3)
z k a( u-iw)-1)lpk(a(h(ik,o))--1)+(1-pk)(Ck)-a-1 82_ k
Importantly, this will only affect the investment level of an individual who is on the short
side of the market. That is
8im
aim = 0 if z<1
-if = 0 if z >1.
Proposition 1 The investment level of the individuals on the short side of the market will
increase as the number of potential spouses available to them decreases if a > &, where & < 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A. m
This result can be explained intuitively. When an individual is single, she has a lower
income which would entice her to invest more. On the other hand, the return to her investment
is lower because she does not have a spouse to increase the value of this investment. If the
agent is sufficiently risk averse, her desire to insure her consumption in case she remains single
dominates the substitution effect.
Effect of a change in bargaining power
Now, adding in the effect that the sex ratio has on investments through bargaining power,
assume that
< 0.
8z
Thus, z is a factor that decreases the consumption of men and increases that of females given
investment levels. Furthermore, assume that the sex ratio is limited in the way it can decrease
the return to male investment by:
ai'oz a~i > ai4jz' j = m, f. (1.4)aimz aif aiim ail z'
This implies that the effect of the sex ratio on the return one receives from the spouse's invest-
ment must be significant enough in magnitude compared to that on own investment.3 Thus,
it cannot be that the sex ratio penalizes greatly the return that can be obtained from own
investment but not from that of the spouse.
In this case, the effect of z on pre-marital investment through the channel of bargaining,
conditional on spousal investment, is given by
i p -- 1 k k 2 kik ( )() + k = f, m. (1.5)
TZ ik' =.(W-ik) --- 1 p"((ik) -&-)+(1-p )(C2) -a-i --C2_ --
Proposition 2 Conditional on spousal investment, an increase in bargaining power will lead
an individual to decrease their investment level as long as a > d, where & < 1
Proof. From (1.5),
d o-c - 0 +  ci-V 0z)
az ik aik ( ac a8ika
Appendix 1.A demonstrates that when (1.4) holds, a sufficient condition for i, > 0 and
vice-versa for females is that a > 1. m
A rise in the sex ratio as a shift in bargaining power towards females influences the investment
decision through two channels. Males have lower consumption for any value of investment
which increases their incentives for investment through this income effect. On the other hand,
this increase in z also reduces the return to investment and through this channel, leads to a
lower investment level. For the income effect to dominate and thus for males to increase their
investment when the sex ratio rises, a must be sufficiently large. This is akin to the effect of a
productivity shock on investment decisions in a macroeconomic model.
3 r2C -1 &a aa 1 aa ac3 This can be shown to be equivalent to the conditions imrz < min ~, -where is defined
as cm = a(i m , i, z) * h (im , if). Thus, the effect that the sex ratio has on one's ability to modify their weight in
the decision process through education cannot be too large in magnitude.
Spousal response
Finally, it must also be that the spousal response will not undo the effect of the bargaining
power as presented above. A sufficient, although not necessary, condition for this to occur is
that investments be strategic substitutes. That is when one is faced with a spouse who has
invested more, the income effect brought about by this is larger than the incentives embedded
in the complementarity of investments and this leads one to reduce one's investment. Formally,
investments will be strategic substitutes if
9 (1- k) ( 2+_. < O<, k = f, r<
k' - a (W - <) + pk (k)- ) + (1 p ) - I , ~ -  92 • C-2
7"k •ak,' 7 2 ikaik'
This implies that investments cannot be so highly complementary that the substitution effect
dominates the income effect. This translates into a fairly intuitive condition
1
Pc (im, if)
where Pc (im, if) is the elasticity of substitution of investments within the consumption function.
If investments are gross substitutes, a > 1 is then a sufficient condition. This rules out the
possibility that individuals are the full residual claimant of their investment or receive a return
above the return they produce on the couple's output (as in Wells and Maher 1998). In both
these cases, investments are strategic complements.
Thus, for a > 1 and when investments are gross substitutes, an increase in the sex ratio
will lead to a decrease in female investment and an increase in male pre-marital investments.
Appendix 1.B presents a special case of the model presented above: one where individuals Nash
bargain over the surplus.
1.3.3 Perfect competition
One could remove the assumption of random matching and turn to a model where there
is assortative matching. However, in that case, because there are no search frictions, one's
consumption will be determined by market forces rather than bargaining. If even one man with
a given investment is single, all the other men with the same investment level as his will earn
a single man's payoff. If that was not the case, a single man could offer to any woman to pair
with them and offer him only e more than his current pay-off and every woman would accept.
This also means that the individual is the full residual claimant on his marginal contribution
since:
C( = h (im, if) -c
and c' is a price outside the control of the agent himself. I will further assume that when
z = 1, the output is shared equally between spouses (any share E [0, 1] would be an equilibrium).
Assume again that the output function h has constant returns to scale and has positive marginal
return when own investments are 0 and that one receives c = i if single.
Proposition 3 Under perfect competition, when the sex ratio increases, men increase their
investment and women decrease their investment as long as a > 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A. n
Thus, the result obtained above also holds in a context where there is assortative matching
and perfect competition.
1.3.4 A different outside option
The previous sections assume that a higher sex ratio will lead males to be more likely to
be single. However, in the empirical context that follows, it may be more relevant to think of
individuals as being pushed to another marriage market (that of natives). Assume that the
second period utility of a member of an ethnic group is given by consumption minus a fixed
penalty y if he marries someone from another ethnic group. An increase in the sex ratio leads men
to be more likely to marry native women. This gives them less utility which creates an incentive
for higher investment levels. Furthermore, in this particular application, the investment levels
in this native pool are higher and this encourages further investment due to complementarity.
In this case the size of the preferred marriage pool would be also important since the impact of
the sex ratio within your own marriage market may depend on the likelihood of marrying within
one's group. Thus, even in this case, tighter marriage market conditions will lead to higher
investments, whether or not the sex ratio influences post-matching bargaining.
1.3.5 Ex-post outcomes and the sex ratio
This analysis also highlights that if the sex ratio affects pre-marital investments, the effect
of the sex ratio on post-marital consumption levels will not represent the effect of bargaining
power. It is a mixture of the bargaining power effect, the effect of one's investment level on
post-marital outcome and the effect of one's spouse's. Formally,
dck a4c+ ac2 ik ac~ 9k'
dz Oiz Bikc a aic9 0 k
1.4 Data and empirical strategy
Having established a framework where changes in the sex ratio modify individuals' pre-
marital investments, I now investigate empirically the link between sex ratios and pre-marital
investments.
As in Angrist (2002), this paper uses data from second-generation Americans born around the
turn of the century (from 1885 to 1915). This identification strategy is based on the observation
that second-generation Americans tend to marry within their ethnic group (40 percent of second
generation males and 45 percent of females among a slightly older cohort marry within their
own ethnicity). Thus, for this population, the relevant marriage market includes new waves
of immigration. Because marriage markets are fairly local, I focus on state-level within ethnic
group marriage markets. From 1900 to 1930, the sex ratio of newly arrived immigrants varied
greatly transforming the balance of power within each state's ethnic marriage markets. These
waves occurred at the moment when the sample of second generation individuals was making
educational and marriage decisions. Because location choices of immigrants may be endogenous,
this paper instruments for both the flow and the sex ratio of new immigrants using the fact that
immigrants locate near existing networks (as in Card 2001 and justified by Munshi 2003), which
leads past immigrant stocks in a particular state to predict current immigrant flows.
1.4.1 Basic specification
The basic regression of this study relates pre-marital outcomes of second generation Ameri-
cans to two characteristics of their marriage market: its sex ratio and its total size. The second
variable provides an estimate of the effect of market thickness which may influence decisions as
explained in Section 1.3.4. In addition, it captures any effect that overall own-ethnic immigration
has on local conditions, either through the marriage or the labor market.
In order to control for potential confounding factors that affect sampled individuals, the
regressions include fixed effects for cohort, state and ethnic group as well as for cohort*state,
cohort*ethnic group and state*ethnic group. They also include dummies for age, year of birth,
year of the Census and for nativity of parents. The estimation equation is given by
Ykjst = a * sexratiojt + • * flowjt + 0 * Xkjst + o'j + -st + yjt + ekjst (1.6)
where the left hand-side variable is an outcome for an individual k, of ethnic group j, born in
state s, of cohort t. Conceptually, this regression contrasts the change in outcomes over time
among individuals from a given state of two different ethnic groups.
The marriage market size and sex ratio may be endogenous. Immigrants potentially select
their state of residence based on labor and marriage market conditions. Female immigrants
may choose to immigrate to a state where women's bargaining power is larger. Males may elect
locations where there are good work opportunities. Since these factors influence choices made
by second generation Americans, it introduces a bias in the estimation of Equation (1.6).
To alleviate this problem, I construct an instrument in a similar spirit as that of Card
(2001). Since individuals from the same country of origin tend to form networks, they also tend
to migrate to similar locations (Munshi 2003). Past location choices are thus a good predictor
of future immigration decisions. As long as past waves of immigrants did not select the state
of migration based on future marriage market conditions for their children, using these shares
provide an exogenous source of variation. Various countries of birth are included within each
ethnic group and each had previously selected different locations. Since over the period, the
sex ratio of immigrants within an ethnic group varied by country of birth, the combination of
this variation and differences in past location shares provides the source of variation that the
instrument will exploit. In short, this instrumental variable strategy assumes that individuals
tend to locate where their fellow countrymen live but marry within the entire ethnic group. If
all countries of birth within one ethnic group selected the same locations, there would be no
geographical variation to exploit.
More precisely, two instruments were constructed as follows. All male and female immigrants
were allocated separately to a given state for each period and country of origin based on the
1900 concentration of that country in that particular state. If 10 percent of all Norwegians were
located in Minnesota in 1900, 10 percent of all men and women immigrants from Norway arriving
after 1900 are assigned to Minnesota. This generates a predicted flow of males and females by
country of birth. Summing for all countries within an ethnic group, one obtains a measure of
the predicted flow of immigrant of each gender for each state, ethnic group, and immigration
period cell. The instrument for the flow of immigrants of a given ethnic group is then obtained
by adding the predicted flow of males and that of females. The sex ratio instrument is built
by dividing the predicted flow of males by that of females. Equations (1.7) and (1.8) define
formally the instruments:
(immjs1900oo * malesj t
predsexratioist = irnmj slO (1.7)(zm( jsl900 femalesit
Spreiflo9it = (malesjt + f emalesjt) . (1.8)
The strategy can best be illustrated by an example using the Scandinavian ethnic group in
two key states: Illinois and Wisconsin. In 1900, Illinois had 10.2 percent of the Danes, only 1.3
percent of the Finnish, 8.9 percent of the Norwegians but 17.3 percent of all Swedes. Wisconsin,
on the other hand, had a similar fraction of the Danes (10.5 percent), slightly more Finnish (3.5),
a much larger share of the Norwegians (18.2) and only 4.6 percent of the Swedes. Figure 1-1
presents the evolution of the sex ratio among all four countries over the period studied and the
predicted sex ratio of this ethnic group in both states. Because Illinois had a high concentration
of Swedes in 1900, the evolution of its predicted sex ratio is highly influenced by the changes in
the sex ratio of Sweden immigrants. On the other hand, Wisconsin follows much more closely
that of Norwegians. Figure 1-2 shows that the same argument holds for flows.
This identification strategy relies on one key assumption: that immigrants before 1900 did
not select these locations because they anticipated the changes in marriage and labor market
conditions for that particular ethnicity after 1900. This assumption will not be violated if
immigrants select locations that were more attractive for their ethnic group before 1900 but
remained similarly attractive over the next 30 years. It will also not be violated if immigrants
anticipated shocks for their ethnicity that were short-lived so that by 1905, no remnants of
these shocks were found. Finally, it would also not violate the exclusion restriction if pre-1900
immigrants selected states in anticipation of better conditions for all ethnic groups but not
particularly for their particular ethnic group because regressions control for state-time fixed
effects.
In addition, it must also be the case that, once controlling for the total number of immigrants,
no other characteristics of the immigrants change at the same time as the sex ratio by location.
This could be violated if when more men than women enter the United States, these men tend to
be of lower/better quality. Little information on immigrants' quality is available to test whether
this is violated, except for immigrants' literacy as measured by the Census. No correlation was
found between that measure for either gender and the actual or the instrumented sex ratio of
immigrants.
1.4.2 Data
Outcome measures
All outcomes, obtained from IPUMS files between 1900 and 1970, are presented with a
detailed description in Appendix Table 1.C.1. First, marital outcomes are collected: marital
status, measures of marital stability (divorce rates and number of marriages) and country of
birth of one's spouse. Unfortunately, ethnicity of spouse's parents is not available in either 1940
or 1950 so it is difficult to classify spouses as second generation Americans of a particular group
and thus measure this broader definition of endogamy. Because pre-marital investments may be
modified because marriage is delayed when the marriage market is tight, leaving more time to
acquire education, age at first marriage is also measured. To alleviate the problem of sample
selection (age is only measured if one is already married), this variable is restricted to individuals
older than 35, for whom most first unions have already been entered into.
Various measures of human capital investment as proxies for pre-marital investments are
considered: literacy, years of schooling and occupational choices. Literacy should be acquired
before marriage and could affect post-matching output (see Behrman et al. 1999 for an example
in India). A more continuous measure of human capital investments is the highest grade a person
has attained. While it provides a more detailed categorization of the level of skills acquired,
schooling may also be obtained partially after marriage although there is little evidence of this
in my sample. First, this sample has an average schooling level below high school completion
(9.5 years for females and for males) and the average age at first marriage is 23 for females and
27 for males. Also, while 22 percent of the individuals aged 15-25 attend school, only 1 percent
of the married males and 3 percent of the married females report being in school. Finally, two
occupational indices measuring the "quality" of the current occupation are available. These
variables could reflect pre-marital investments because the quality of an occupation is correlated
with on-the-job training and past human capital accumulation although it could also reflect
some labor supply decisions. To alleviate potential problems linked to these measures capturing
post-marital investments, they are measured only for those aged 15-25 except in the case of
education where education was only available at later ages.
To measure post-matching outcomes, this paper uses labor supply of all individuals aged 25
and above. I do not restrict the analysis to married individuals because this would potentially
introduce selection bias. For all individuals, a variable indicating labor force participation and
employment is available. In addition, measures of weeks worked last year and hours worked last
week can be obtained.
Table 1.1 gives the main summary statistics for each outcome. The rate of non-marriage
after age 35, around 10 percent, is much above that of natives (about 5 percent).4 Divorce rates
are low but widowhood is not uncommon for women. The age at first marriage is around 23 for
women and 27 for men. About 8 percent of second generation women and 3 percent of males
are currently married to first generation immigrants from their ethnic group (which accounts
for most marriages between second generation and immigrants). This is somewhat low but the
denominator includes all singles and widows, to avoid selection bias. This is also lower than the
total endogamous marriages which include all marriages within second-generation individuals
as well. Literacy is very high among second generation Americans (close to 99 percent of them
are literate) but varies considerably across ethnicities, with non-European groups having much
lower levels. Men and women are both achieving about the same level of schooling (9.5 years)
and if anything, women are more educated than men. This is a fact that holds for natives as
well. Labor supply attachment by woman is quite low. Slightly more than 30 percent of women
were in the labor force compared to 79 percent for men. While 61 percent of men worked full
time, only 18 percent of women did.
Marriage market measures
A key decision in implementing the above framework is the appropriate empirical definition
that should be used for a "marriage market". In this setting, a marriage market is assumed
to be a given ethnic group within a state in a particular cohort. This definition of marriage
market is quite restrictive but as long as what happens to one's market is more relevant than
what occurs in another group, this approximation will capture relevant variation.
The marriage market is first defined within an age cohort. The second generation sample
born between 1885 and 1915 is divided into 5 year intervals. I maintain the assumption that
people marry within their age cohort.5
Marriage markets are fairly local with more than 65 percent of sampled individuals married
to someone who was born in the same state as them.6 State is the lowest geographical unit for
4Previous studies have noticed that second generation immigrants have the lowest rate of marriage (Groves
and Ogburn 1928, Haines 1996 and Landale and Tolnay 1993).
5Around 50 percent of married individuals younger than 40 are matched to someone of the same age group.
6This is almost as large as the proportion of individuals still living in their state of birth. One finds very small
proportion of "out-of-state" marriages for individuals who are still living in their state of birth.
which place of birth is available in the IPUMS files. Furthermore, mobility is limited: more than
70 percent of individuals in this sample still live in their state of birth and this figure increases
to 85 percent among those less than 20.
Marriage markets must also include a definition of ethnic groups. From 1900 to 1970, the
IPUMS files include information on parents' country of origin. Using this variable, each second
generation individual is associated with a particular ethnicity based on father's ethnicity.7 Using
all countries of birth, the sample was divided into 9 ethnic groups, summarized in Appendix
Table 1.C.2. This division was inspired by that used by Angrist (2002) and based on Pagnini and
Morgan (1990), with required modifications. s Using marriage patterns of previous immigration
waves, these groupings were found to correspond closely to the patterns observed in the data.
In almost all cases, the percent of individuals marrying someone within their ethnic group but
not from their own country of birth was much higher than the prevalence of those countries in
the sample. The regressions below were performed with slight differences in the allocation of
ethnicities to ethnic group with very similar results.
Two sets of marriage market conditions were constructed using the IPUMS files for 1910,
1920 and 1930: one for immigrants only, the other incorporating second generation individuals
as well to which we will refer to as "foreign stock". The former were classified by their country
of birth, year of immigration (grouped into 5-year periods) and state of current residence. The
latter were classified by their state of birth, their father's place of birth and grouped with
immigrants such that these immigrants arrived while the second generation individuals are in
their late teens (age 15-19), an age at which schooling and marriage decisions are made. 9 Only
immigrants arriving between the ages of 10 and 25 are included since they are more likely to
7While Angrist (2002) uses mother's ethnicity, I employ father's ethnicity because in 1960 and 1970, only
father's ethnicity is reported when the father is foreign born. This is of little importance, however, because 95
percent of foreign born parents share a common country of birth.
8East European .Jews are grouped by nationality because it is difficult to identify them after 1930. Also, two
countries of birth per ethnic group were required since the instrument relies on differences in 1900 location choices
within ethnic groups across countries of birth. Immigrants from Ireland were joined with other British Isles.
Italians were grouped with other Catholic Southern European countries: Spain and Portugal. Finally, Mexicans
were included with other immigrants from the Caribbean, Central and South America.
9To avoid double-counting for the flow indicator, only the 1910 Census is used to compute the flow of immigrants
between 1900 and 1909, the 1920 Census for immigrants arriving between 1910 and 1919 and so forth. However,
since the sex ratio may suffer more from measurement error because it is a ratio, all three waves of the Census
were employed to construct that measure.
be part of the marriage pool of the cohort of second generation Americans.10 For each ethnic
group-state-immigration period, the above methodology produces a measure for the number of
immigrants and their gender. Measures of total flow of immigrants and total flow of foreign stock
are then built by summing all individuals in each state-ethnic group-period cell. Sex ratios were
defined as the number of males per female in each cell."
Instrument construction
Equations (1.7) and (1.8) employ as national flow measures the sum of all state flows as
defined previously. Location shares were obtained from the 1900 Census tables (United States
Census Office 1901).12 Ideally, the 1890 shares would have been used but a few key countries
were only tabulated starting in 1900 and for countries which were similarly identified in both
periods, shares are almost identical.
Immigrants were concentrated in some key states with 72 percent of all immigrants locating
in 10 states in 1900-see Appendix Table 1.C.3. The location of immigrants varied importantly
by ethnic group, the traces of which can still be found in the ethnic composition of today's
population. The relative concentration of ethnicities also varied from the most concentrated
(Hispanics, with 94 percent living in 10 top states) to the least concentrated (British ancestry,
at 75 percent).
More importantly for the instrument, variation in location choice across countries of birth
and within ethnicity arises. For example, among those of British ancestry, English Canadians
located mostly in Massachusetts and in Michigan while Australians elected California, the Welsh
primarily settled in Pennsylvania and the Irish, in New York and Massachusetts. Even between
Poles and Russians, where the same three states are preferred locations (New York, Pennsylvania
and Illinois), the Poles were distributed equally across the three states while the Russians were
much more concentrated in New York.
Table 1.2 summarizes the distribution of the endogenous variables and of the instruments.
1'Also, a variant using different age distribution by gender such that females are between 10 and 22 but men
between 13 and 25 was used to better match spousal age differences and produced very similar results.
"If the cell is empty, the sex ratio is set to 1. If there are only men, the sex ratio is equal to 1.5 times the
number of males. Neither adjustment is crucial; similar results were obtained with various modifications.12Because these shares are computed using the full population of immigrants and not just a small public-use
sample, they are robust to the "small cell bias" as argued by Aydemir and Borjas (2006).
As can be seen, the major immigrant groups over this period were the Russians, Poles and
Romanians, followed by Southern Europeans and Germans. Including second generation indi-
viduals, those of Germans and British descent are far more numerous, reflecting the importance
of past immigration waves. The sex ratios of Others (mostly Asians) and Italians were among
the highest at almost two men per women while the Francophone and those of British ascendance
had close to a balanced sex ratio. The sex ratios of the total foreign stock are more balanced
but the same differences across ethnic groups emerge.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 First stage
The instruments are very highly predictive of their respective endogenous variable. An
increase of one in the predicted flow leads to an increase of about 0.87 in tile actual number of
immigrants arriving over that period and of about 0.57 for the total foreign stock. Similarly, an
increase of one in the predicted sex ratio measure is linked to an increase of about 0.84 among
immigrants and about 0.43 among total foreign stock. These are all significant at 0.1 percent
level. These results are presented in Table 1.3.
The robustness of the first stage is tested through various specifications presented in Table
1.4.13 To verify that the share of immigrants not only predicts the behavior of immigrants
shortly after 1900, column (1) ignores the first two periods of immigration and finds that this
omission does not change the robustness of the first stage. Column (2) restricts itself to the first
four periods of immigration and again finds similar results. Although the relationship between
the instrument and the actual marriage market measure is stronger for some ethnic group than
for others, removing any ethnic group does not alter the significance of the first stage. The
first stage is also robust to the transformation of the instruments and the endogenous variables
in logarithmic form. Finally, removing the key immigration-receiving state over this period
(New York) does not change the results. All empty cells where the sex ratio was imputed were
dropped without significantly altering the coefficient on the sex ratio. To ensure that this result
1 31t only presents the results for the marriage market measures based on immigrants but very similar results
were obtained for the ones based on total foreign stock.
does not stem from correlated measurement error in the flow of immigrants, another source of
data was used to construct the flow of immigrants for the instrument. This measure included
all immigrants (irrespective of their year of birth and their age at arrival) by country of birth,
arrival period and gender but only for Foreign Born Whites. As can be seen in column (6), the
instrument conserves predictive power, although the precision goes down due to the imperfect
measure of flows it constitutes.
1.5.2 Outcomes
Marital outcomes
I first explore the causal effect of marriage market conditions on marital outcomes. The first
panel of Table 1.5 presents regressions where marriage market variables are defined to include
only immigrants while the bottom section relates to conditions measured for the total foreign
stock. Surprisingly, both men and women are more likely to have ever been married when the
sex ratio rises (although this is similar to Angrist 2002). The probability of a man ever having
been married rises by 3.3 percent when the sex ratio of immigrants doubles from a balanced
level. The next two columns shed some additional light on this result. Men are also more
likely to be divorced and more likely to have been married more than once (the opposite being
true for women). The rise in the probability of having been married more than once is almost
comparable in size with the effect of the sex ratio on the rate of marriage. Thus, the effect of the
increased sex ratio among this population appears to be more linked to marital stability than
to the formation of relationships.
As presented in the last section of the model, marriage rates may also be unaffected if the
outside option is not to remain single but rather to elect a less desirable marriage market.
Column (4) of Table 1.5 indicates that men are significantly less likely to marry an immigrant
of their own ethnicity when the sex ratio is higher. A change from a balanced sex ratio to one
where there are twice as many male as female immigrants decreases the probability of a man
to be married to a female immigrant of his own ethnicity by 1.7 percent. The effect is smaller
and imprecisely estimated for females. Marriage market size strongly increases the probability
of marrying an immigrant as predicted from the model. Also, age at first marriage does not
appear to be modified suggesting that any effect of the sex ratio on pre-marital investments will
not mechanically stem from a delay in marriage timing. Marriage market sizes appear to hurry
the timing of marriage of women but delay that of men. When one's preferred marriage market
expands, it may be easier to select optimally the timing of one's marriage. If females prefer
marrying earlier than men, this could explain these results.
Pre-marital investments
The main outcomes of interest relate pre-marital investments to marriage market conditions.
Table 1.6 first presents correlations obtained from an OLS regression. The effects observed here
are in the predicted direction and significant in some cases for females but the coefficients are
extremely small. The OLS results should be biased towards zero if immigrants elect locations
where they have more bargaining power and more mating possibilities. Then, locations with
a larger number of male immigrants are also those in which second generation men have less
incentive to invest in human capital. There is weak evidence that this is the case, as immigrant
men elect states where there are more second generation females and fewer second generation
males of their own ethnic group. Also, the correlation between the sex ratio and the probability
that a female marries an immigrant of her ethnic group is fairly strong while the IV result pre-
sented above is small and insignificant, which may be indicative that immigrants select locations
where the marriage prospects are good.
Once one purges endogeneity using instruments, the coefficients are larger in magnitude for
both genders (except for literacy). The results now indicate that a marriage market favoring
women leads men to be more literate, to have more years of completed education and select
more highly paid occupations. All these are significant at least at 10% significance level. The
coefficients for females are negative except for literacy but are neither very large nor significant.
This suggests that a shift from a sex ratio among immigrants of 1 to 2 (more than two
standard deviations in the sex ratio) leads to a 1.7 percent point increase in the probability
that a male is literate and, on average, to about half a year more of education. Furthermore,
young men were selecting much more highly ranked occupations when faced with higher sex
ratios. Women's responses are smaller in magnitude, except for occupational choices. Marriage
market size appears to lead both genders to select much more highly paying occupations, in
particular for women. This is surprising but may reflect the fact that immigrants fill low-paid
occupations and push second generation Americans to higher-paying ones. Overall, omitting
the flow measure usually renders the effect of the sex ratio more significant.
Table 1.7 tests in various ways the robustness of these results.14 The first column removes
the first immigration period and finds very similar results, indicating that the result is not
driven by the early years of the period in question. Dropping the last period does not modify
the point estimate for education by much but does increases the standard errors while it greatly
increases the size of the effect of the sex ratio on the occupational ranking variable. Removing
the major immigrant-receiving state over this period (New York), if anything, strengthens the
relationship. Adding dummies for each country of origin (rather than ethnic group dummies as
in the base specification) does not weaken the pattern observed. Restricting attention to older
or younger respondents leaves the results unchanged. Similarly, ignoring a particular Census
year does not affect the results.'5 Although not presented here, variants of the instrument were
explored with similar results. For example, although gender-specific shares by country of birth
were not available from the Census tables, overall immigrant sex ratios by state were obtained.
If one allocates immigrants based on the interaction of a state's attractiveness for a particular
gender and its attractiveness for a particular ethnicity, the results are very similar to the ones
presented above.' 6
Labor supply
The model presented above argues that the change in pre-marital investments due to altered
sex ratios stems from a desire to offset partially the expected effect of the sex ratio on post-
marital outcomes. Having found a significant effect of marriage market conditions on human
capital decisions, this paper now turns to proxies of post-marital outcomes. The OLS regressions
presented in Table 1.8 suggest that higher sex ratios among immigrants are correlated with higher
14It focuses on males and on two specific measures, years of education and Duncan Index of occupational
choices, although the results are similar for females and other outcome measures.
15These last two variants are only presented for the educational variable because the occupational score was
restricted to individuals between the ages of 15 and 25.16An interesting data set including the intended state of residence of immigrants at the port of entry was also
collected. Unfortunately, the first stage using this data proved to be too weak to be of use for this paper.
labor force participation of both men and women. This could be either an overestimate or an
underestimate of the real causal effect. It would be an overestimate if male immigrants select to
locate in states where the labor market is booming. On the other hand, if men tend to locate
in areas where they have more bargaining power, they would select locations where males are
working less and the OLS would be a lower bound on the magnitude of the causal estimate.
The right-hand side panel of Table 1.8 presents the results of the instrumental variable
regressions. The causal effect of the sex ratio appears to lead women to reduce their labor
inputs while men increase theirs. These results indicate that a doubling of the sex ratio (from 1
to 2) lead women to be 4 percent less likely to be in the labor force and 3 percent less likely to
be employed. This is smaller than the 9 percent found by Angrist (2002) which included females
aged 16-33, an age at which labor supply is much more variable and potentially influenced by
pre-marital decisions. A rise in the sex ratio of immigrants from a balanced level to one where
immigrant men are twice as numerous reduces hours worked per week and the number of weeks
per year by about 1.3. These results are significant only at 10 percent significance. For males,
a change from a balanced sex ratio to one where men are twice as numerous leads to no effect
for either employment or labor force participation and raises hours worked per week and weeks
per year by about 0.5, although these are very imprecisely estimated and insignificant. The
OLS results are usually lower, although not significantly so, than the IV for males and higher
for females as expected if immigrants locate based on the bargaining conditions of the marriage
market. 17
1.5.3 Labor supply, pre-marital investment and mate selection
The previous section found that the sex ratio had modest albeit imprecisely measured effects
on labor supply. One could conclude that this implies little evidence of ex-post bargaining.
However, one must also take into account that the effect of the sex ratio measured by the above
regression includes not only the ex-post bargaining effect but also any effect that the sex ratio
may have had on post-marital outcomes through its effect on education. Economic theory does
not predict whether education increases or decreases labor supply. The income effect decreases
"
1 Selecting only married females would show a much clearer pattern where females greatly reduce their labor
supply. However, it is unclear whether this would stem from selection or ex-post bargaining.
labor supply. On the other hand, the substitution effect increases the number of hours spent
working.
To isolate the effect of education on labor supply in this population, I use compulsory school-
ing laws as tabulated by Lleras-Muney (2002) as instrument for education in a sample of in-
dividuals born between 1900 and 1924, a slightly younger cohort than the one studied above.
Labor supply and education are measured in the 1940-1970 IPUMS files. Two sets of results
are obtained: one for the full sample and another for second generation Americans. The results
presented in Table 1.9 use as instruments a set of dummy variables for each minimum number
of years of schooling required by the state."8 The first stage suggests that each additional year
of compulsory schooling leads men to increase their level of schooling by about 0.05 years and
women to do so by about 0.8 years. 19 The IV estimates suggest that education decreases labor
supply, whether measured in terms of labor force participation rates or hours worked. The esti-
mates are fairly large suggesting that one more year of education reduces hours worked per week
by about 0.5 hours for females and 1.5 hours for males, but are only significant for males. Among
females, the results are stronger when the sample is restricted to second generation individuals,
increasing the magnitude and the significance of the effect to about 1.5 hours. The first stage
is much weaker in this subsample for males and the effect for hours worked falls to about 0.5.
Results for labor force participation are much smaller and weaker, in particular for males.
The next set of regressions attempts to measure the overall effect of both spouses' education.
It is restricted to married individuals for that reason. The instrument is based on the compulsory
schooling that affected each spouse in his or her state of birth. Two caveats must be mentioned.
First, the first stages are much weaker in this context than before, simply because there are a
few spouses who were subject to different compulsory schooling laws (since individuals tend to
marry within their state and within a relatively close age cohort). The compulsory schooling
laws affecting females tend to be a better predictor of the education of both spouses. Second,
even if both educational levels are instrumented, this regression does not control for the potential
endogeneity of the match. Nevertheless, these results are presented as a robustness check on the
previous estimates. They suggest that for both genders, one's own education decreases labor
1'Similar results were obtained by using a continuous measure of the minimum number of years of schooling.
19This is very similar to the first stage presented jointly for both genders by Lleras-Muney (2002).
supply while that of one's spouse tends to attenuate this effect.
Combining these estimates with the ones from the above section, a doubling of the sex ratio,
through the educational channel itself, decreases the number of hours worked by males by about
0.5-0.75 hours per week. 20 The effect for females is in the same direction albeit much smaller.
This suggests that the effect of the sex ratio on labor supply obtained in the previous section
is underestimating the true effect of the sex ratio on post-matching outcomes, as predicted by
the model presented above. The effect of the sex ratio on post-matching outcomes, once purged
of the effect it has through changes in pre-marital investments and matching patterns, then
provides an estimate of the effect of an external shifter in bargaining power on post-marital
labor supply.
Furthermore, in a case where only matching influenced the choice of pre-marital investment,
the effect of the sex ratio on labor supply, for example, is entirely driven by its effect on one's
own and spouse's education because the sex ratio does not alter ex-post decisions. These results
are thus not in accordance with a hypothesis where only matching is at play.21
This exercise is meant as an illustration of the importance of considering the link between
pre-marital behavior and post-marital decisions. It suggests that using changes in sex ratios as
proxies for ex-post bargaining power without taking into effect the potential link that marriage
market conditions have on pre-marital behavior and matching patterns may lead to misleading
inference. It would have been best to include education in the above labor supply regressions
and use another source of exogenous variation to instrument for it. Unfortunately, the sample
of second generation Americans employed in this study was too small to use a measure of
compulsory schooling as an additional instrument for the educational attainment of an individual
in the labor supply regression.
20A similar range of values would be given for males if using the effect of both own and spousal education on
labor supply decisions.
21Other evidence that matching is not solely driving the results was obtained. First, while the above matching
model suggests that the effect of the sex ratio is largest when one is on the short side of the market, no evidence of
this was found. Second, the effect of the sex ratio appears to be larger in larger communities, which is inconsistent
with a matching model since a similar change in the sex ratio implies many fewer potential mates in a small than
in a large community.
1.6 Returns to education in the marriage market
The results presented above suggest that marriage market conditions influence pre-marital
investments. Assuming this is due to a reaction to changes in the incentives imbedded within
the marriage market, these results can be used to infer returns to education in the marriage
market.
1.6.1 General framework
Let us define the returns to education in the marriage market as any additional benefit
that is given by one's human capital investment that would not be observed if one were single.
First, there could be additional benefits captured once married simply because the educational
investments of each spouse are complementary in the household production function (from utility
derived from conversations, from the role of parental education in child-rearing or even because of
learning spillovers). Because those benefits are shared between spouses, the "public good" aspect
of this return may lead individuals to underinvest compared to the optimal level. Secondly,
marriage market returns could arise if one's bargaining weight depends on one's educational
level. Thus, if single, one's education simply affects the output produced but if married, it
affects both the output and the share of it one can capture. In this setting, the spouses simply
play a zero-sum game where education does not have any additional productive element but
serves as a negotiation tool. This would lead individuals to overinvest.22
Disentangling the various sources of incentives for human capital investment is not easy.23
Nevertheless, as an illustration, this section attempts to derive some estimates of the importance
of marriage market-related returns to education by combining the empirical estimates found
above with the model developed in Section 1.3. I fit the parameters of the model to be the
most consistent with the observed educational choices of males, females and their spouse and
the measured effect of the sex ratio on education. The estimated parameters are then used to
22Finally, marriage market may also stimulate investments through competition between individuals of the same
gender if the matching is not random. It can be shown, however, that in this case, a rise in the sex ratio would
lead to a fall in males' investment because as the sex ratio rises, the value of the benefit of more education (i.e.
a spouse) falls because fewer females are available. Nevertheless, in this case, the gender who is on the short side
of the market may over invest in education simply to compete with one another.23Studying the effects of a policy that increases education of only one gender on the other gender's investment
decision would be a key input in this analysis.
compute the fraction of returns to education in the marriage market. Formally, let me define
total returns to education as
8 log z (im, i f ) _ 1 ack
ik k y f(im, i ) ik'
To separate marriage and labor market returns, I take the marriage market returns to correspond
to returns not captured by a single individual, that is
1 Oa (im, ji) _ k (ik,o)
c (im, if) oik oik
Notice that in the models presented below, ck (i k, 0) = ik and thus the labor market returns will
be given by 1/c2. I further parameterize the model by assuming that the household production
is given by
h (im7 if)= (im + if) a1
a constant elasticity of substitution function (CES) with an elasticity given by 1
1.6.2 Spouse selection model
Let me first consider a model where the sex ratio affects the matching patterns but not the
way the household surplus is shared. Formally, male and female consumption are given by
cm = im + A im a + ifa ) - im - if (1.9)( 1
c2 =) a (1A) +i C -im if
In addition, if one matches outside one's preferred marriage market, one receives a penalty
of y in utility terms. Notice that in this case, the first order condition is given by
m_ -ima) - I = P (Z)(C; _ a acm -cmo(wim :- i = p (z) (cmN -_ Y) im 2 + (1 - p (z)) (c2 O ) - (1.10)i m  
where p (z) is the probability of marrying a native, c2N corresponds to the consumption when
married to a native female, c;o to the consumption level when married to a female of one's own
ethnicity and y the utility cost of marrying out of one's ethnic group. In this case, one can also
find the effect of a change in z which is given by
, -a EcmN ( mmO \ _,WmO 8 cmO 8 2cmO 8@fO
ozm -o, .+( )( O7 `. (1.11)
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where the denominator simply corresponds to the second order condition. Using Equations
(1.10) and (1.11), the mean value of im , ifN, if O from the data and the computed estimate of
and ' from above, I find the set of parameters a and a that offer the best fit. 24 An
assumption must also be made about the average initial wealth of each individual (w). Since
educational investment ranges from 0 to 18 with an average slightly above 9, the results below
will use variations in the average wealth ranging from 22 to 30 since one should never want
to invest more than half of one's wealth based on the model presented above. Three values of
bargaining weights (A) are also evaluated. Finally, two more parameters are required in this
case. I must calibrate the cost of marrying outside one's ethnic group and impose that this cost
be 9, slightly less than the consumption level one would receive if there were no complementarity
between investment levels. Similar results were obtained with other values. Finally, an estimate
of 2 was computed to correspond to the estimated effect of the sex ratio on spousal education
level since the effect of the sex ratio on the probability of marrying a member of one's own ethnic
group (immigrant and second generation Americans) could not be estimated.
The top panel of Table 1.10 presents these results. Both for males and females, estimates
of the parameter a are very comparable and vary between 0.26 and 0.49. This is somewhat
surprising because females modified their education by a much smaller fraction in response
to a change in the sex ratio in the estimates presented above. The reason for this result is
that despite the fact that they have barely modified their behavior, they are now facing men
who have changed their behavior substantially (- is large and positive). In response to this
females would want to decrease their investment decision by a large fraction. To match the
small decrease observed in the data, men and women must be fairly high complements in the
24Formally, the parameters selected minimize the sum of the squared errors in the two equations. Imposing
that the first order condition holds with equality and then finding the set of parameters which offers the best fit
for the comparative static equation offers very similar estimates of a although lower estimates of a.
production function. Men's effect operates mostly through a change in probability of marrying
a native and this leads to similar estimates.
These parameter estimates then imply fairly substantial returns to education when married
(between 2 and 5 percent). These estimates suggest that about 40-60 percent of all returns are
obtained because of the role education plays within the household production function.
1.6.3 Bargaining power model
For purpose of comparison, let me now assume that the sex ratio only affects one's bargain-
ing power within the household and that the sex ratio has no influence on marital patterns.
Consumption levels are now given by
cm = mi + 3 (z) ima + - im - if (1.12)
c2 = + (1 -(z)) ((ima+ ifi)
Further assume that the sharing factor is 3 (z) = exp ((ln A) * z) , A < 1. This is a suitable
parameterization since it implies that 0 (0) = 1 and / (oo) = 0.
Using this framework, the first order conditions for each gender is given by
(w - im)- ' = (cm) -  aC2 (1.13)
and the effect of the sex ratio on investments given by
+ CM a2 m )c + (_ m +a. c 02cm aif
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Equations (1.13) and (1.14) are then used as above to find the parameter values of a and a most
consistent with the empirical results obtained.
Although not shown here, the sex ratio increases the investment levels of the spouses of
both second generation males and females. Because of this, the direct effect of the sex ratio on
male investment in this setting is partially counterbalanced by the fact that they are now paired
with higher investment females. Females, on the other hand, experience both the direct and
the spousal effect in the same direction. Because of this, the algorithm must estimate men and
women's investment to be fairly complementary similar to the case where only matching was at
play.
Estimates of the key parameters are shown at the bottom of Table 1.10. The first two panels
include the estimates obtained from individual calibrations for both men and women. Those
results suggest that the parameter of the CES function is fairly close to 0.4 which implies fairly
high rates of return to education in the marriage market. Although obtained from different
sets of estimates, the results for men and women are surprisingly consistent with each other.
Panel C thus solves simultaneously for the four sets of restrictions and finds similar results,
except for the case where men have more bargaining power where the returns to education in
the marriage market are estimated to be much larger. On average, results from Table 1.10 imply
that marriage market returns to education are of the order of about 2-5 percent and correspond
to about 50 percent of total returns with slightly larger shares for women than for men. Thus,
this model, while making very different assumptions, generates very similar results to the ones
presented above where no bargaining power was assumed.
Furthermore, one can, in this case, compare the level of investment observed (about 9.5 years
of schooling for both men and women) to the one that would maximize the sum of male and
female utility if education decisions could be made jointly. The optimal estimated investment
levels, in this case, are well above the observed level. This implies that individuals invest less
than would be optimal because of the "public good" nature of the household production. Also,
the use of education as a bargaining tool which would lead to over-investment is dominated by
this effect. However, this is driven by the assumption of Nash Bargaining, which imposes that
returns to investments are lower than optimal.
Despite the fact that these estimates stein from calibrations and would benefit greatly from
being refined using more empirically-based techniques, they nevertheless point to substantial re-
turns to education related to the marriage market. Furthermore, they emphasize that household
production may produce human capital externalities, a channel that is yet to be explored.
1.7 Conclusions
Overall, the results of this paper suggest that substantial returns to education derived from
the marriage market, whether it be through household production or bargaining power effects.
Furthermore, men and women appear to understand, and respond to, the incentives for human
capital accumulation embedded in marriage market conditions.
I first derive a framework to explore the relationship between marriage market conditions
and pre-marital investments. The model shows that the usual effect of bargaining power on
investment within the incomplete contracts framework does not hold for fairly reasonable values
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In addition, because sex ratios may affect both
bargaining power and matching patterns, a change in the sex ratio would have a similar effect on
pre-marital investments under both a unitary framework and a bargaining model. Finally, the
model highlights that using marriage market conditions as proxies for ex-post bargaining may
not be appropriate as post-marital outcomes will be influenced by marriage market conditions
even without any effect through a change in bargaining power.
Empirical support for these conclusions was found in the data. Using shocks to one's marriage
market coming from immigration, this paper shows that an increase in the sex ratio increases
pre-marital investments for males and lowers them for females, although only significantly so
for males. This is confirmed by a variety of outcome measures and is robust to changes in
specifications. It appears to stem, at least partially, from changes in bargaining power. In
addition, the magnitude of these shifts combined with estimates of the effect of education on
labor supply suggest that the interpretation of the effect of marriage market conditions on post-
marital outcomes is difficult, in particular for the case of males. Finally, these empirical estimates
merged with the structure of the model suggest that returns to education in the marriage market
are substantial.
These results provide interesting insights into the determinants of educational decisions.
The importance of incentives linked to returns received once married may partially explain why
the educational gap by gender is not always correlated with either difference in labor force
attachment or differences in wages between men and women. Furthermore, while conventional
wisdom maintains that women's educational attainment will increase as their bargaining power
in developing countries, the results of this paper indicate that this may not be the case.
The conclusions of this paper also suggest that our understanding of the household would
be enhanced by a more careful analysis of how marriage market conditions may affect both the
process of household formation and pre-marital decisions as well as post-marital outcomes. For
example, while divorce laws have been previously envisaged as strong determinants of ex-post
bargaining power within the household, little is known about how these may modify matching
patterns and other decisions undertaken before the union is formed. More research is warranted.
Furthermore, the fact that marriage market conditions may affect post-marital outcomes through
modifications in pre-marital conditions even when no post-matching bargaining occurs cautions
the use of such measures as tests of the unitary framework.
Finally, these findings may also shed light on the persistence of skewed sex ratios. Willis
(1999), for example, suggests that out-of-wedlock births may be more likely when the sex ratio is
lower and when men have fewer economic opportunities. This has been used to explain the high
rates of single motherhood among inner city African-Americans where the bias in the marriage
market sex ratio in favor of males is due to high male incarceration rates and fast population
growth (Guttentag and Secord 1983). This paper suggests that this low sex ratio would lead
males to invest less in their human capital and thus offer them even worse economic outcomes.
This would reinforce the existing gap between male and female economic opportunities and thus
generate even worse marriage pools for African-American females. Similarly, markedly high
sex ratios in the context of Asian countries would be predicted to induce lower educational
attainment by females. Because of this, parents may be less likely to rely on their girls for
future economic support and this could reinforce a pre-existing cultural bias for boys. These are
fruitful topics left for further research.
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1.9 Tables and figures
Table 1.1: Summary statistics-Outcomes
Males Females
N. Obs. Mean Sd N. Obs. Mean Sd
General characteristics
Age 203954 40.31 16.66 219800 41.26 17.22
Mother foreign 203954 0.79 0.41 219800 0.78 0.41
Father foreign 203954 0.88 0.32 219800 0.88 0.32
Pre-marital investments
Literate 59946 0.99 0.10 62272 0.99 0.09
Duncan Index 59946 19.99 19.64 62272 15.82 22.48
Wage Index 59946 16.71 12.37 62272 9.14 11.15
Years of education 109252 9.44 3.34 121352 9.45 3.08
Labor supply
Employed 127283 0.81 0.39 157528 0.30 0.46
In the labor force 144008 0.86 0.34 139844 0.29 0.45
Hours last week 105985 34.61 20.95 119725 10.73 18.06
Weeks last year 107553 39.53 18.61 119752 14.31 21.41
Marital status
Never married (after 35) 113709 0.12 0.32 123310 0.11 0.32
Divorced 203954 0.02 0.14 219800 0.02 0.14
Widowed 203954 0.03 0.16 219800 0.11 0.31
Married more than once 87070 0.09 0.29 104453 0.09 0.29
Age at first marriage (older than 35) 48712 26.92 6.33 59017 23.33 5.80
Married to an immigrant of own ethnic group 203679 0.03 0.18 219564 0.08 0.26
All summary statistics are weighted by Census sample-line weights
Table 1.2: Summary statistics-Marriage market conditions and instrument
Ethnic group Immigrants Foreign stock Instrumented
Flow (000s) Sex ratio Flow (000s) Sex ratio Flow (000s) Sex ratio
British Ancestry 0.138 0.941 0.605 0.918 0.124 0.851
[0.136] [0.546] [0.483] [0.158] [0.108] 10.067]
Francophone 0.029 1.012 0.112 0.948 0.027 0.882
10.033] [0.734] [0.102] [0.424] [0.030] [0.174]
South Europeans 0.252 1.536 0.451 1.347 0.256 1.427
[0.294] 11.118] [0.396] [1.010] [0.317] [0.365]
Hispanics 0.129 1.306 0.195 1.174 0.162 1.375
[0.113] [0.783] [0.163] [0.594] [0.180] [0.185]
Scandinavian 0.059 1.724 0.274 1.142 0.069 1.330
[0.056] [1.425] [0.239] [0.347] [0.075] [1.127]
Germanic 0.183 1.404 0.704 1.038 0.177 1.262
[0.220] [0.697] [0.555] [0.260] [0.225] [0.104]
Russians and others 0.407 1.068 0.707 1.065 0.399 1.044
[0.495] [0.429] [0.635] [0.314] [0.520] [0.271]
Other Europe 0.095 1.410 0.175 1.329 0.093 1.252
[0.101] [1.337] [0.131] [1.215] [0.112] [0.643]
Other countries 0.043 2.609 0.058 2.191 0.036 2.257
[0.039] [2.249] [0.055] [1.800] [0.040] [1.323]
Standard deviations in brackets. All summary statistics are weighted by the size of the foreign stock in each cell.
Table 1.3: First stage
Sex ratio of Sex ratio of Flow of Flow of
immigrants foreign stock immigrants foreign stock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted sex ratio of immigrants 0.835*** 0.434*** -0.011 -0.007
(0.179) (0.084) (0.007) (0.023)
Predicted flow of immigrants 0.165 0.051 0.868*** 0.573***
(0.199) (0.069) (0.041) (0.059)
N. Obs 2343 2343 2343 2343
R-squared 0.379 0.362 0.986 0.967
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, ethnic
groups, immigration period fixed effects and all double interactions. All regressions are weighted by
the size of the total foreign stock in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 1.4: First stage-Robustness checks for immigrant measures
1910-1929 1900-1919 In logs Without NY No missing Census table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Sex ratio
Predicted sex ratio 0.916*** 0.798*** 0.693*** 0.867*** 0.867*** 0.571**
(0.246) (0.197) (0.126) (0.187) (0.159) (0.201)
Predicted flow 0.130 0.098 -0.046 0.619 0.170 -0.100
(0.212) (0.226) (0.078) (0.403) (0.241) (0.142)
R-squared 0.273 0.442 0.529 0.360 0.366 0.341
Panel A: Flow
Predicted sex ratio -0.010 -0.013 0.013 -0.013* -0.012 -0.009
(0.006) (0.012) (0.194) (0.006) (0.009) (0.023)
Predicted flow 0.907*** 0.846*** 0.466*** 0.801*** 0.861*** 0.648***
(0.034) (0.065) (0.104) (0.138) (0.045) (0.035)
R-squared 0.989 0.986 0.966 0.951 0.984 0.967
N. Obs 1556 1606 1748 2289 1748 1909
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, ethnic groups,
the size of theimmigration period fixed effects and all double interactions. All regressions are weighted by
total foreign stock in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 1.5: Marriage market outcomes
Ever Divorced Ever Married to Age at
married married own ethnic first
twice immigrant marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrants
Panel A: Males
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
0.033*
(0.014)
0.002
(0.013)
203954
0.001
(0.009)
0.008
(0.011)
219800
0.005
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
203954
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.004)
219800
0.026*
(0.011)
0.004
(0.012)
87070
-0.004
(0.010)
-0.010
(0.016)
104453
-0.017
(0.009)
0.020*
(0.009)
203679
-0.002
(0.015)
0.026*
(0.011)
219564
Foreign Stock
Panel A: Males
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
Standards errors clustered at
0.081*
(0.034)
0.020
(0.034)
203954
0.003
(0.029)
0.016
(0.021)
219800
the state
0.011
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.006)
203954
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.007)
219800
0.145
(0.094)
0.011
(0.028)
87070
-0.012
(0.032)
-0.021
(0.031)
104453
level in parentheses. All
-0.050*
(0.024)
0.035
(0.018)
203679
-0.036
(1.091)
1.700**
(0.590)
48712
-0.006 -0.063
(0.051) (1.023)
0.048* -0.817*
(0.022) (0.369)
219564 60276
regressions include state,
ethnic groups, immigration period fixed effects and all double interactions. Also includes
age, year of birth and year of Census fixed effects and dummies for parents' nativity. All
regressions are weighted by the Census sample-line weight.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
-0.027
(0.371)
0.881**
(0.296)
48712
-0.009
(0.301)
-0.463*
(0.210)
60276
Table 1.6: Pre-marital investments
Literacy Duncan Wage Highest Literacy Duncan Wage Highest
Index Index Grade Index Index Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Immigrants
Panel A: Males
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
OLS
0.000(0.000)
0.003
(0.005)
59946
-0.001*
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.005)
62272
-0.015(0.130)
2.761*
(1.224)
59946
-0.116
(0.082)
3.700**
(1.529)
62272
0.085
(0.069)
1.382**
(0.445)
59946
-0.106*
(0.049)
1.821*
(0.749)
62272
0.026
(0.017)
0.049
(0.145)
109252
-0.001
(0.010)
-0.037
(0.157)
121352
0.017*
(0.008)
0.001
(0.007)
59946
0.008
(0.010)
-0.002(0.007)
62272
2.351*
(0.971)
1.887
(1.684)
59946
-0.596
(0.697)
3.562*
(1.401)
62272
0.788
(0.398)
0.960
(0.614)
59946
-0.696
(0.490)
2.077**
(0.758)
62272
Foreign Stock
Panel A: Males OLS
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
Standards errors clustered at
0.000
(0.001)
-0.009
(0.006)
59946
-0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
62272
the state
0.387
(0.200)
0.785
(1.121)
59946
0.412
(0.556)
-0.677
(1.027)
62272
0.226
(0.118)
0.682
(0.662)
59946
0.0446
(0.250)
0.508
(0.597)
62272
-0.037
(0.032)
-0.284*
(0.133)
109252
-0.007
(0.027)
-0.291
(0.168)
121352
0.039
(0.021)
0.004
(0.011)
59946
0.051
(0.062)
-0.002
(0.010)
62272
level in parentheses. All regressions include state,
5.542
(2.968)
3.793
(2.490)
59946
1.862
(1.147)
1.895
(0.980)
59946
1.789*
(0.874)
-0.022
(0.578)
109252
-3.484 -4.333 -0.164
(4.454) (3.345) (0.282)
6.682* 3.817* -0.212
(3.145) (1.701) (0.398)
62272 62272 121352
ethnic groups, immigration
0.443*
(0.173)
-0.039
(0.208)
109252
-0.052
(0.085)
-0.101
(0.207)
121352
period fixed effects and all double interactions. Also includes age, year of birth and year of Census fixed effects and
dummies for parents' nativity. All regressions are weighted by the Census sample-line weight.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 1.7: Pre-marital investments-Robustness checks for males
All Excluding Excluding Without With Younger Excluding
oldest youngest NY ethnicity than 1940
cohort cohort dummies 65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Highest grade attained
Sex ratio of immigrants 0.443* 0.409* 0.538 0.470** 0.510* 0.431* 0.465**
(0.173) (0.170) (0.525) (0.165) (0.224) (0.177) (0.164)
Flow of immigrants -0.039 0.036 -0.336 0.584 -0.028 -0.130 0.182
(0.208) (0.220) (0.307) (0.422) (0.186) (0.208) (0.221)
N. Obs 109252 101195 79446 89533 109252 86807 92703
Duncan Index
Sex ratio of immigrants 2.351" 2.390* 5.576* 1.809 2.768*
(0.971) (0.935) (2.647) (0.949) (1.114)
Flow of immigrants 1.887 1.725 -1.254 -2.111 1.755
(1.684) (1.661) (2.588) (2.861) (1.715)
N. Obs 59946 49068 53005 49818 59946
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, ethnic groups,
immigration period fixed effects and all double interactions. Also includes age, year of birth and year of
Census fixed effects and dummies for parents' nativity. All regressions are weighted by the Census sample-line
weight.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 1.8: Labor supply
In LF Employed Hours Weeks In LF Employed Hours Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Immigrants
Panel A: Males
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Sex ratio of immigrants
Flow of immigrants
N. Obs
OLS
0.002
(0.001)
0.012
(0.014)
144008
0.001
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.010)
157528
0.002
(0.001)
0.009
(0.012)
127283
0.001(0.002)
-0.007
(0.011)
139844
0.145*
(0.065)
1.504*
(0.616)
105985
0.038
(0.062)
0.579
(0.710)
119725
0.145*
(0.065)
1.504*
(0.616)
107553
0.004**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.023)
119752
-0.003
-0.007
0.004
(0.012)
144008
-0.038
(0.019)
-0.003(0.015)
157528
-0.004
(0.009)
0.003
(0.012)
127283
-0.028
(0.018)
-0.005
(0.015)
139844
Foreign Stock
Panel A: Males
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
Sex ratio of foreign stock
Flow of foreign stock
N. Obs
OLS
0.002(0.002)
-0.014
(0.011)
144008
-0.001
(0.004)
0.008
(0.013)
157528
0.001
(0.003)
-0.012(0.011)
127283
-0.001
(0.004)
0.008
(0.014)
139844
-0.158
(0.225)
-0.433
(0.822)
105985
-0.272
(0.181)
1.052
(0.679)
119725
-0.000(0.004)
-0.020
(0.024)
107553
-0.003
(0.006)
0.000
(0.015)
119752
-0.009
(0.021)
0.007
(0.022)
144008
-0.109*
(0.051)
-0.018
(0.019)
157528
-0.015
(0.027)
0.005
(0.021)
127283
-0.084
(0.046)
-0.018
(0.020)
139844
0.534
(0.690)
1.412
(0.735)
105985
-1.387
(0.827)
0.520
(0.846)
119725
0.523
(0.359)
0.494
(0.773)
107553
-1.308
(0.771)
0.367
(1.142)
119752
Panel B: Females
2.504
(3.755)
2.993
(1.758)
105985
2.242
(1.943)
1.053
(1.713)
107553
-4.398
(2.323)
0.775
(1.243)
119725
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, ethnic groups, immigration
period fixed effects and all double interactions. Also includes age, year of birth and year of Census fixed effects and
dummies for parents' nativity. All regressions are weighted by the Census sample-line weight.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
-4.113
(2.149)
0.481
(1.806)
119752
Table 1.9: Effect of education on labor supply
In LF Hours In LF Hours In LF Hours In LF Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample
OLS OLS
Own education
Spouse's education
F-test (instruments): own
F-test (instruments): spouse
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
Own education
Spouse's education
F-test (instruments): own
F-test (instruments): spouse
N. Obs
0.007*** 0.688*** -0.014 -1.439** 0.006*** 0.531*** -0.026 -3.665**
(0.000) (0.032) (0.013) (0.521) (0.000) (0.023) (0.029) (1.352)
0.003*** 0.370*** 0.024 2.833**
(0.000) (0.019) (0.018) (1.007)
11.79*** 10.20***
28.29***
682362 658532 682362 658532 510355 491396 510355 491396
0.016*** 0.669*** -0.018 -0.511 0.024*** 0.966*** -0.030 -1.926
(0.001) (0.038) (0.015) (0.659) (0.001) (0.029) (0.044) (1.849)
-0.010**" -0.345*** 0.034 2.546
(0.001) (0.025) (0.051) (2.159)
9.40*** 16.48***
7.54***
655981 647750 655981 647750 499269 492756 499269 492756
Only second generation Americans
Panel A: Males
Own education
Spouse's education
F-test (instruments):
F-test (instruments):
N. Obs
Panel B: Females
OLS
own
spouse
Own education
Spouse's education
F-test (instruments): own
F-test (instruments): spouse
N. Obs
OLS
0.003*** 0.517*** 0.008 -0.575 0.004*** 0.473*** -0.005 -3.236
(0.000) (0.044) (0.027) (1.349) (0.000) (0.042) (0.034) (2.181)
0.001*** 0.311"** 0.017 3.087
(0.000) (0.026) (0.027) (1.874)
5.58*** 11.31***
20.44***
104819 102015 104819 102015 76478 74340 76478 74340
0.010*** 0.380*** -0.045** -1.695** 0.019*** 0.695*** -0.087 -2.664
(0.002) (0.058) (0.014) (0.535) (0.002) (0.057) (0.044) (1.553)
-0.009*** -0.323*** 0.091 2.243
(0.001) (0.040) (0.060) (2.080)
14.03*** 6.05***
4.75***
99519 98201 99519 98201 74828 73789 74828 73789
Panel A: Males
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, year of birth and Census year fixed
effets as well as age and age squared. All regressions are weighted by the Census sample-line weight.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 1.10: Calibration results
A = 1/3 A = 1/2 A = 2/3
w=22 w=26 w=30 w=22 w=26 w=30 w=22 w=26 w=30
Spouse selection model
Panel A: Males
a
Returns in marriage
Panel B: Females
a
Returns in marriage
0.36 0.32 0.29 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.46 0.41 0.37
4.88 4.96 4.75 4.93 4.83 4.86 4.82 4.98 4.59
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
0.34 0.29 0.26 0.40 0.34 0.30 0.45 0.38 0.33
5.00 4.98 4.77 4.95 4.93 4.99 5.00 5.00 4.99
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Bargaining model
Panel A: Males
a
Returns in marriage
Panel B: Females
a
a
Returns in marriage
Panel C: Joint
a
Male returns in marriage
Female returns in marriage
0.40 0.30 0.27 0.51 0.39 0.33 0.63 0.47 0.39
8.44 7.81 8.32 8.03 8.41 8.03 7.06 8.31 8.40
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.45 0.36 0.31 0.42 0.34 0.29 0.39 0.31 0.27
8.48 8.08 8.17 8.33 8.29 7.47 8.50 8.17 8.14
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
0.30
4.46
0.03
0.04
0.23
3.83
0.04
0.05
0.20
3.67
0.05
0.05
0.51
8.05
0.02
0.39 0.33 0.18 0.13 0.11
8.50 8.50 2.56 2.22 2.00
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Figure 1-1: Sex ratios of Scandinavians by country and state
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Figure 1-2: Flows of Scandinavians by country and state
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1.A Omitted proofs of results
Proof of Lemma 1. There will be no strategic behavior between men or between women
since the matching is random: thus men do not compete against other men to capture the best
females. Assume without loss of generality that the sex ratio is above 1. Thus, pm (z) > 0 and
pf (z) = 0. Let p = pm (z). The first order conditions (1.2) define best response functions if (im )
and im (if) for both husband and wife.
Define a Nash Equilibrium as
if* = if (im (if*
The function
- if (im (Tf))
is strictly increasing iff
aif ai m
1> Bi m Oil
which implies
)-a--1 -a--1 ( 2 a2 cm \
S +P +(-p) im - C i
-1_ ac 82c2 ai
A+(1-p) -or c2 2i +
where A> 0
This will hold because male and female consumption exhibits constant returns to scale which
imply
2Cnna2cf ( if 82  i-m a2Y a2Cm a2C cf
&im 2 &if2 im aimaif jif im aif = aimgif imif
and also
c~ c2 c2 222C dC2  fC im dC 2 D2c iff mc 2  2c•m
aim oif2 aif oim 2 ~ 2 aim aimaif + ijT if jif aim
( 1c, 2c f
2 Di m dimdif
fc i m 2c imi2Cf
< im aif aimaif
and by our assumption that
this ensures that
0>
aim Dii
acy ac acT ac4
aim 9if dif di m
if ai f J
There will be a unique Nash Equilibrium if in addition
0 < if (im (0))
w > if (im (w))
which holds since by the concavity of the utility function and the fact that the return to invest-
ment is strictly positive, one always wants to invest a strictly positive amount and consume a
strictly positive amount in the first period. *
Proof of Proposition 1. From Equation (1.3) it follows that
Dik
8z dz
which can be rewritten as
c•<k
< 2
1 In < In
a l ik/ <k
In
nc f a2c~
+ aif aif aim im dim))
Dca acf a 2cmdi+ f dmdifaim Bif aimaif
-1
if i<k c4 (cik '
°
ac
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Using the fact that c has constant returns to scale
- -( k i 2 - kk =+irIn ik
<1
As long as - > 0 since - > 1.Jik/ ai•
Proof of Proposition 2. To show that a > 1 is a sufficient condition for
Let me use the fact that the consumption functions exhibit constant returns to scale and thus
this is equal to
im 9 + i f 0)2m
m + if '
8cy 829m1& <1 if 2 C _
Bil Bim9z
2ci a2cz
> 6i Oifaz
A similar derivation would lead us to conclude that a > 1 is a sufficient condition for a iz <
f 82 Ccý -O~7•. •
Proof of Proposition 3. When an individual is single, he will invest
w
2
(1.A.1)U > 
-= 2m~c Mz
az
When the sex ratio is 1 and each individual is matched with someone identical to them and the
surplus is shared equally. The Nash Equilibrium exists and is unique and, given the fact that
the production function is symmetric, is equal to
- (w - i)- + h (i, i) = 0 (1.A.2)
2 )i=
+ h(1, 1)1+ - -
This will be less than - if r > 1 since
1+ (> 2
a-1( h(1, 1)' >
Di >
If the sex ratio is in one's favor (z > 1 for women, z < 1 for men), one is match with a partner
who invests like a single individual (and thus more than when z = 1) and can be offered the
single individual pay-off. Their first-order condition is given by
- (w - i) + (h (i, i') - i') h (i) = 0 (1.A.3)Di
Because the second order condition is negative, the solution to (1.A.3) will be a lower
investment level than that to (1.A.2) if
- (w - i)-0 + (h (i, i)) > ( i) (h(i( i , i) i ) i
using the fact that h (im, if) has constant returns to scale this implies
( ) (" h (i, i) > i + (i," Vh 
(i, i')
di J i Di di' di
and because > 1 this will hold if
a i >ai
which will hold if a > 1 since i' > i and thus > h.
1.B Nash bargaining
A special and traditional case of the model presented above is one where the sharing decision
is made through Nash bargaining and thus where consumption levels will be given by
cm= i m + (Z) (h (im, if -i - if
S if + (1 - P (z))(h (im, if ) - im- if
We will assume that the sharing parameter is influenced by bargaining power. It is easy to show
that in this case, returns to investments when single are equal to 1 and thus positive. Define
the surplus to be shared as
g(im, if) = h (im, if) im - if
Assume h (-) displays constant returns to scale and thus g (.) also does.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique pure strategies Nash Equilibrium in this setting.
Proof. Since g exhibits constant returns to scale in investments, so will cy'and c~. It is easy to
show that conditions (1.1) are satisfied since
cm (im, O, z) = im - (im, 0, z) = 1
c (O, if, z = if Ip (0, if, z) =0
and defining
c im, if, z) = a im, if, z) h (im, if)
71
where
i (1 - p (z)) - (z) if
a (im, if, z=P (z) + h (im, if)
dim p (1 - p (z)) (h (im, if)2  •
ai m 8a h (im , if)2
dp if
-if = -0 (z) (h (im, if)
>0
-if) - i m (1- (z)) 0
h (im, if)'
A rise in the sex ratio will lead to an increase in men's investments if (1.A.1) holds which in
this case implies
And this is satisfied since g (im, if) exhibits constant returns to scale.
strategic substitutes if
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for which a sufficient condition is
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where pg is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs in the surplus function g (im, if).
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1.C Appendix tables
Table 1.C.1: Data description
Variables Census Age Details
years sampled
Marital outcomes
Ever married
Currently married to
immigrant
Currently divorced
Number of marriages
Age at first marriage
same ethnic
1900-70 15+
1900-70 15+
1900-70
1910
1940-60
1930-40
1960-70
15+
15+
35+
Pre-marital investments
Literacy
Highest grade achieved
Duncan index
Wage index
Post-marital labor supply
In the labor force
Employed
Hours worked per week
Weeks worked per year
1900-30 15-25
1940-70 25+
1900-30 15-25
1900-30 15-25
1910-70
1910-10
1930-70
1940-70
1940-70
25+
25+
25+
25+
Literacy in any language
Only available from 1940, when the
youngest cohort is 25
Based on a measure of prestige linked
to wage and education
Based on 1950 wages
Transformed from intervals to a
continuous variable by selecting the
mid-point of the interval
Table 1.C.2: Ethnic group composition
Ethnic group Countries of Birth
British Ancestry Australia, English Canada, English, Ireland, Scotland and Wales
Francophone Belgium, French Canada and France
South Europeans Italy, Spain and Portugal
Hispanics Mexico, Cuba, Other West Indies, Central America and South America
Scandinavian Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Germanic Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland
Russians and others Russia, Poland and Romania
Other Europe Bohemia (Czechoslovakia), Greece, Hungary and Other Europe
Other Countries Africa, Atlantic Islands, China, India, Japan, Other Asia, Pacific Islands,
Turkey and Other countries
Table 1.C.3: Spatial distribution of immigrants by ethnic group, 1900
Ethnic group 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th TOP 10
British ancestry NY MA PA IL MI NJ OH CA CT MN 75.4
(19.4) (14.5) (11.2) (6.9) (6.6) (4.5) (3.9) (3.4) (3.0) (2.1)
French MA MI NY NH IL RI ME WI CT NJ 75.6
(21.9) (10.7) (9.2) (7.0) (6.8) (5.1) (4.9) (3.6) (3.4) (2.8)
South Europeans NY PA MA NJ CA IL CT LA RI OH 86.3
(34.8) (12.7) (8.0) (8.0) (6.8) (4.5) (3.7) (3.4) (2.2) (2.2)
Hispanics TX AZ FL CA NY NM PA MA LA NJ 93.9
(51.9) (10.3) (8.6) (7.4) (6.5) (4.9) (1.2) (1.2) (0.9) (0.9)
Germanic NY IL PA WI OH NJ MI IA MN MO 77.1
(18.7) (11.8) (9.4) (8.4) (7.4) (4.6) (4.4) (4.2) (4.2) (3.9)
Scandinavians MN IL WI IA NY MI ND MA NE SD 76.3
(21.9) (12.9) (9.4) (6.4) (6.0) (5.3) (3.8) (3.8) (3.6) (3.1)
Russians and NY PA IL MA WI NJ MI OH CT MN 83.6
others (29.1) (15.8) (12.0) (6.0) (4.5) (4.2) (4.0) (3.1) (2.7) (2.1)
Other Europeans NY PA IL OH NE NJ WI MN IA TX 85.9
(20.1) (16.1) (14.4) (9.7) (5.1) (5.1) (4.7) (4.2) (3.5) (3.1)
Other countries HI CA MA NY OR WA MT PA AK IL 86.4
(34.6) (24.5) (5.6) (5.5) (5.3) (0.42) (1.9) (1.9) (1.5) (1.4)
For each ethnic group, the first row represents the states with the highest concentration and the second, the actual
concentration in each state. The last column measures the share of all immigrants from that ethnic group located
in the ten most popular states for that ethnic group.
Chapter 2
Marry for what? Caste and Mate
Selection in Modern India
This chapter is joint with Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Maitreesh Ghatak.
2.1 Introduction
Marriage is a crucially important economic decision. In developing countries, where many
women do not work, marriage is arguably the single most important determinant of her and
her offspring's economic welfare. In India, the setting for this study, several studies have shown
that marriage is indeed taken as a very serious economic decision, managed by parents more
often than by the prospective spouses.' Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that parents marry
daughters in villages where income co-vary less. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that demand
for healthy women in the marriage market influence investments in girls.
Yet, despite the economic importance of this decision, "status"-like attributes, such as castes,
continue to play a seemingly crucial role in determining marriage outcomes in India. In a sample
of married couples we interviewed in Kolkata in 2005-2006, 70 percent were from the same caste.
In a recent opinion poll carried by CNN-IBN (the Indian subsidiary of CNN) in a representative
sample 15141 individuals across India, 74 percent of respondents declared to be opposed to
'For example The CNN-IBN opinion poll mentioned below found that more than 72% of Indian parents think
that parents should have the last say in marriage decisions. 69% oppose dating.
inter-caste marriage. The institution is so prevalent that matrimonial ads in Indian newspapers
are classified under caste headings, making it immediately obvious where a prospective brides
and groom can find someone from their own caste.
Cole et al. (1992) analyze marriage as a matching institution which gives men the ability to
enjoy a non-marketed non-storable endowment which women possess in return for sharing his
income with the woman. They show that an "aristocratic equilibrium" can exist, in which both
men and women marry based on "status" (a rank which is initially exogenously assigned) rather
than on income (on the man's side) and the endowment (on the woman's side). This rank is
inherited from father to son as long as a man of a given rank in status marries a woman who
is of the same rank. The equilibrium is sustained by the fear that the offsprings of mixed rank
couples will lose their status.
The aristocratic equilibrium in this model has a clear similarity to the caste system, where
offsprings of an inter-caste couple are supposed to lose their caste. 2 Cole et al. (1992) suggest
that this equilibrium may be characterized by low productivity, because the incentive to work
hard in order to marry a "high quality" woman is suppressed.
Such an equilibrium will however not exist when the distribution of wealth is such that a
low-status/high-wealth person finds it sufficiently profitable to deviate from the social norm and
marry a woman with high endowment (the woman may agree in order to consume more) at
the cost of their offspring's future status. Economic growth and the diversification of earnings
opportunity has significantly lowered the correlation between caste and income in India. In
other settings, such as occupational choice, the traditional role of castes is eroding, and there is
a distinct tension between the social pressure to continue to act according to caste rules and the
incentives provided by the modern world (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). Will the same forces
also progressively lead to a decline in the role of caste in marriage decisions, as the constraints
it imposes become too costly to be sustained in equilibrium? Or to reverse the question, is it
the case that the "aristocratic" (caste hierarchic) equilibrium is still in force and constitutes a
significant drag on the process of growth?
This paper sheds light on these questions. We analyze an unusual data set on the arranged
2 The formal rule may be that the children of an inter-caste couple inherit the caste of the father, but in
practice, they tend to be discriminated against.
marriage market we collected in Kolkata, the capital of the state in West Bengal, India. We
interviewed a sample of 783 people who placed matrimonial ads in the major Bengali newspaper,
Anandabazar Patrika, which, with its circulation of 1.2 million is the largest circulated single
edition daily newspaper in India.3 All ad-placers are parents who are placing an ad on behalf of
their sons or daughter. The sample is representative of the educated urban upper-middle class:
85 percent of both the prospective grooms and brides have a college degree, and average income
of 9800 rupees per month compared to 1935 rupees per month for the country at current prices
during the year 2004-05. Fathers who report an occupation have on average a log occupational
wage of 5.8 compared to the median NSS for formal sector workers of 4.5 in 2004.4 Only 7
percent of parents are from different castes although about 30 percent of their siblings married
someone from another caste.
At the first interview, we collected information on the prospective groom or bride, as well
as information on the responses they received to their ad, their subjective ranking of those
responses, and with which ones they were planning on following up. We also asked them which
ad in the newspaper they were planning to respond to themselves. At a second interview, a year
later, we asked them whether they were married or engaged, and the characteristics of their
(prospective or actual) spouses if they were married.
The responses received to their ad, the ads they were planning to respond to, and the ranking
they gave to the letter they received, provide three independent ways to assess the relative
importance given to different attributes (caste, education, beauty, proxies for wealth, etc...).
For example, using either a linear probability or a fixed effect logit model, we estimate how
the probability that an ad placer decides to give further consideration to a response he received
depends on a series of attribute of the ad placer, the response, and the interaction of the two.
An advantage of this data set is that the entire information set available to the ad-placer is also
available to us (at the time we initially interviewed them, they had just received the letter, and
they had not yet met the prospective groom or bride or their parents). A disadvantage is that
we do not observe dowries. Dowries are illegal and frowned upon in this group (middle-class
3We estimate that its circulation represent about one sixth of the literate bengali speaking population of
greater Kolkata.
4Central Statistical Organization, 2006.
urban Bengalis), which made it impossible to collect data on them. However, precisely because
they are not very frequent in this group, dowries are probably not a very important part of
the story.5 More importantly, even if dowries do play a role as equilibrium prices, our analysis
will still be valid. This is because, at the time the respondents decide how to respond to a
particular letter or to an ad, they do not yet know what the dowry would be (dowry demands
are never mentioned in ads or in the letters the respondent receive -except in the case of 7
percent to 10 percent of men who mention at the outset, in the ad or in the letter, that they will
not accept a dowry) only the expected dowry they would have to pay to marry someone with
these characteristics. 6 We argue below that this might allow us to recover their true preferences
over the observed attributes even if expected dowry (or some other unobserved attribute) is
correlated with what they observed.
These alternative ways to estimate the reduced-form preferences for castes versus other
attributes lead to very similar qualitative conclusions. 7 Both women and men prefer educated
partners. Men prefer women who describe themselves as beautiful or very beautiful, and whose
skin tone is lighter. Women prefer men who earn more, or are in higher paying occupations. A
striking result is that the preferences for marrying within one's castes appear to be particularly
strong: for example, we find in one specification that parents of a prospective bride would be
willing to trade off the difference between no education and a master degree to avoid marrying
outside their caste. For men seeking brides, it is twice the effect of the difference between a
self-described "very beautiful" woman and a self-described "decent looking" one. On the other
hand, perhaps surprisingly, we find less clear preference for marrying "above" one's caste, in
particular for women (men do seem to have some preference for marrying up).
These results suggest that castes continue to play an extremely important role in structuring
5 We have so far failed to locate a comprehensive study on dowry in this population. However, we note that
while Kolkata has 12% of the population of the largest metropolitan cities in India, it has only 1.9% of the so
called "dowry deaths" in these cities (about 6,000 in a year, India-wide), which are episodes where a bride is killed
by her in-laws following negotiation failure about the dowry. To the extent that the prevalence of dowry death is
indicative of the prevalence of dowry, it suggests that they are less prevalent in Kolkata than elsewhere.
6In this sense, we are in a similar situation as Hitsch et al. (2006) or Fisman et al. (2006), Fisman et al. (2008)
who examine dating in the US: when considering whether to date an attractive woman or not, their subjects
probably factor in how expensive the meal they will have to pay will be.
7We borrow the term "Reduced-form preference" from Cole et al. (1992). It signals the fact that the preference
for caste may not be a "deep" preference parameter, but a feature of the equilibrium, where caste serves as a
focus point to allocate non-marketed goods.
people's preferences for marriage partners in contemporary India, even among this educated,
relatively affluent, group. But does this necessarily mean that caste has a large effect on marital
matching? Do people end up marrying someone very different (in terms of attributes other than
caste) from those who they would have married absent this regard for caste? In other words do
we actually see the distortion in choices that drives the results in Cole et al. (1992) ?
A simple model, developed in section 2, helps clarify what is at issue here. We show that
in the case where preferences for caste are primarily "horizontal", in the sense that people
care more about marrying someone from the same caste than about marrying "up", preference
for in-caste marriage does not change the equilibrium matching patterns as long as castes are
"balanced" in the sense (made more precise below) that the distribution of male attributes and
female attributes within each caste bear the same relation to the distribution of those attributes
in the overall population.8 This will be true even if the "price" of caste (how much people
are willing to give up in terms of partner quality to marry within caste) is very high. The
reason is that with horizontal preferences people prefer to marry in caste and by the balanced
population assumption anyone they could realistically expect to marry outside their caste, has
a corresponding person within their own caste.
By contrast if caste is primarily vertical, then preference for in-caste marriage or marrying
up in caste affects the entire pattern of who matches with whom. This is will also be the case
if the population is highly unbalanced, because then even though people want to marry within
caste, there may not be any suitable candidates available for them to do so.
Since we can estimate preferences we can actually ask whether the situation on the ground is
closer to the horizontal preference-balanced population world where preference for caste match-
ing does not "matter" very much in equilibrium, or the vertical preference/unbalanced popula-
tion world where it does. To do this we use a Gale-Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962) algorithm
to compute the set of stable matches implied by the preferences we estimate (Hitsch et al. 2006
perform the same exercise for the on-line dating market in the US).
Note that the Gale-Shapley algorithm gives us the set of stable matches implied by these
preferences under the assumption that utility is not transferable, and therefore that an individual
81n other words it is not, for example, the case that all the women from one caste are at the 90th percentile
of the population distribution in terms of the relevant attributes while all the men in that caste are at the 30th.
cannot compensate her partner for being a worst match by paying her a higher price. If in reality
the families could compensate a prospective partner for a "bad" match along the characteristics
we observe with a monetary transfers (i.e. a dowry adjustment), we would observe that the
Gale-Shapley set of stable matches do not look at all like the actual matches. In fact, it is
encouraging that the set of stable matches approximates fairly well the set of actual marriages
we observe in the data, with some exceptions, which we discuss in the paper.
To investigate the role of caste in equilibrium, we perform several exercises with the Gale-
Shapley algorithm. First, we compute the set of stable matches ignoring the caste preferences.
The percentage of intra-caste marriage drops dramatically (showing that caste is not just a proxy
for other characteristics households also care about), but the matches otherwise look very similar
to what they were allowing people to match within caste. Second, in the set of stable matches,
we regress each characteristic to a dummy for whether the match is "within caste". This gives
us an indication of the "equilibrium price" people actually pay to marry within their caste. For
none of the characteristics we look at do we see a significant coefficient: this indicate that, in
equilibrium, there is no cost to marry within one caste, even though household's willingness to
pay to avoid not marrying with the caste is very high. Moreover we observe that these patterns
are also observed in the data on actual marriages, though this (unlike what we observe in the
data generated by our algorithm) can be driven by unobservables. Finally we demonstrate that
this method for estimating the "price" has some power by showing (in the data generated by
our algorithm) that men have to pay in terms of other attribute (e.g. beauty) to marry a more
educated wife.
Thus, while individuals seem willing to pay large amounts in terms of education, beauty,
etc.. to marry within their caste, they do not have to do so in equilibrium. This implies that
caste, operating through marriage, is not a significant constraint on marriage as an institution
to match people with other characteristics. Moreover this explains why the role of caste in
marriage has not been weakened by economic forces - essentially there is no trade-off between
economic wellbeing and caste. This implies that the "aristocratic" equilibrium could be quite
persistent in this context.
And yet, 30 percent of people in our sample do not marry within their caste. They apparently
do not gain much by marrying out of caste, so why do they do it? In part, this comes from
heterogeneity in caste preferences, with some people preferring to marry outside. But there is
something else. A substantial fraction the marriages that are not within caste are "love marriage"
(40 percent of the children of our respondent eventually marry through another channel than
the ads and 20 percent enter into a "love marriage", meaning that they find their spouses
themselves). So the institution that capitalism is not able to destroy may be endangered by
love.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 first sketches a model where
caste and other attributes interact on the marriage market. Section 3.4 presents the data while
Section 2.4 elaborates on the methodology and the results of preference estimation. Section
2.5 highlights the results of the stable matches and Section 2.6 uses these results to derive
conclusions regarding the equilibrium. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section we develop a simple model of marriage. Our goal is to identify some useful
properties of the choice problem faced by decision-makers in the marriage market as well as
the equilibrium matching pattern, in a world where individuals care about the caste of their
partner, as well as some standard characteristics (e.g., education, beauty). These will motivate
our empirical analysis and help us interpret some of the results.
A key modeling decision is whether to assume that we are in a non-transferable utility (NTU)
environment (as in studies of the US matching market studied for example by Hitsch et al. (2006),
Fisman et al. (2006) and Fisman et al. (2008)or the TU environment more traditional in the
literature (e.g., Becker 1973, Lam 1988 or more recently, Anderson 2003). 9
The standard view, mentioned above, is that dowry is not particular important in the pop-
9In contrast, to explain the phenomenon of dowry inflation, Anderson (2003) constructs a model where women
have a strong preference for marrying in an upper caste (and low caste women are not sensitive to income among
high caste men). Dowry inflation follows then from an increase in the heterogeneity of income among men. This
assumption does not appear consistent with what we find in this data set. One possibility is that the preference
we estimate already discount for the expected dowry payment the family of the brides anticipate they will have
to pay if they marry up. Sufficient anticipated dowry payment would make the brides indifferent between higher
and lower caste men.
ulation we study-middle-class Bengalis-which inclines towards the NTU approach.10 This is
consistent with the fact that no one in our data asks for a dowry or offers one, but since dowry
is both illegal and socially frowned upon, it is hardly surprising. Indeed to the extent that
dowry exists in this population it is unlikely to be divulged, and therefore the prevalent view
(that dowry is not very important) may be biased. To not entirely foreclose the possibility of
transfers, we take the following approach: Our estimation of preferences is based on recording
the observable characteristics of those who get chosen (to get a call back or a letter) out of a set
of "applicants". We first observe that as long as there enough people who prefer not to demand
transfers (a not insignificant part of our sample actually spend money (in the form of ad space)
to explicitly mention that they do not want a dowry), it makes sense to first choose everyone
who you would have chosen ignoring the possibility of their asking for a dowry or offering one,
and to actually find out whether or not they want a dowry (or want to offer one) by contacting
them. They can then discard the ones who ask for too much or offer too little based on better
information. Obviously this logic only works if the cost of contacting another person is small
which, given the large numbers people contact, seems plausible. Proposition 1 below makes this
argument explicit for the case where there is one unobservable variable (need not be the dowry
demand/offer) which is potentially correlated with the observables.
Assuming that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, what we observe in the data is people's
true ordering between those whom they consider and those whom they reject. Based on this
ranking we infer people's preferences over a range of attributes. Given these preferences we then
construct the standard "equilibrium" of a NTU matching game, namely the Gale-Shapley stable
match which we compare with the actual matches we observe. On the whole the model performs
well, giving some credence to the NTU assumption. We therefore only model the NTU world,
though the possibility of some transfers is implicitly allowed in the formulation of proposition 1.
2.2.1 Set up
Men and women are differentiated by "caste". Men and women are differentiated by "caste".
The caste of an individual is i E {1, 2}. They are ranked in descending order: i = 1 is the highest
10 0f course the TU environment can be relevant even in the absence of dowries or brideprice, so long as there
is some other "currency" which can be used to make ex ante transfers (e.g., household chores, location decision).
caste, followed by i = 2. We allow some members of both castes being caste-neutral i.e., they
do not put any weight on the caste of their potential partner.
Men and women are assumed to be differentiated according to a "vertical" characteristic that
affects their attractiveness to a potential partner. The characteristic of men will be denoted by
x E [0, B) and the characteristic of women will be denoted by y E [0, B] were B > 0. We can
think of these as education levels of men and women, or, income and beauty. Other things
constant, everyone prefers a higher attribute partner. Following the tradition of Becker, we are
also going to allow these characteristics to be complementary in the payoff of men and women.
The payoffs of men and women are both governed by the quality of the match. We as-
sume that this has two (multiplicatively) separable elements, one governed by the vertical char-
acteristics, f(x, y), and the other by caste, A(i, j). We assume that the function f(x, y), is
twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave with respect to both arguments, and
a positive cross-partial derivative (i.e., it is supermodular). A standard example would be the
Cobb-Douglas: f(x, y) = xayl-a where 0 < a < 1
The function A(i, j) captures the quality of a match for a individual of caste i (man or
woman) who is matched with a partner of type j. This is defined as follows:
A(i, j) = 1 + a{1(2 - j) - y(i - j) 2}
where a > 0. It is readily verified that so long as y > 0 the function displays strict complemen-
tarity with respect to caste: 82A(i > 0.
This caste matching function is flexible, and allows there being a vertical as well as a hori-
zontal component to caste. For example, if 3 = 0 then caste is purely horizontal: people want to
match within those within the same caste. Otherwise, the higher the caste of the partner (lower
is j) the higher is the match specific gain to an individual of caste i. On the other hand, if y = 0
then caste is purely vertical with everyone preferring a higher caste partner. In the marriage
literature, a high 0 will be viewed as the case of hypergamy and a high y will be viewed as the
case of endogamy.
Therefore we have:
A(1,1) = 1 + ap
A(2,2) = 1
A(1,2) = 1-c y
A(2,1) = l+ap/-ay.
Notice that A(1, 1) > A(2, 2) and A(2, 1) > A(1, 2) when 3 > 0 : otherwise caste preferences
are purely horizontal with the same "penalty" ay for any inter-caste marriage. Similarly, if
-y = 0 then one high caste partner in a match raises the payoff from the caste component to
1 + ap. We assume c7 < 1.
We also assume that some members of the population, drawing from both caste-groups, have
caste-neutral preferences. That is, for these individuals, a = 0. These individuals put no weight
on the caste of a potential partner, i.e., for them A(i, j) = 1 for all i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. For
those who are caste-conscious, they value a caste-neutral individual of caste i (i = 1, 2) in the
same way as they would a caste-conscious individual of caste i (i = 1, 2).
Given these two elements that govern the quality of a match, we assume that the payoff of
a man of caste i whose quality is x and who is matched with a woman of caste j whose quality
is y is given by:
uM(i, j, x, y) = A(i, j)f(x, y)
and correspondingly, the utility of a woman of caste j whose quality is y and who is matched
with a man of caste i whose quality is x is given by:
uW(i, j, x, y) = A(j, i)f(x, y).
Several observations are in order.
First, we assume that the non-caste component (or, lets say the standard component) of the
quality of a match, f(x, y) is the same for a man and a woman. This is clearly most relevant to
settings where this aspect of a match is a pure public good (e.g, children, joint activities), or in
a transferable utility world, where a match generates output that can be perfectly divided."
Second, the caste component and the standard component interact with each other: in
particular, a "good" caste-specific match will have higher marginal product of the standard
attributes. This formulation allows the two components (caste and non-caste) to be additive as
well as multiplicative: e.g., f(x, y) = 1 + xayl-a. The purely separable case (i.e., uG(i,j, x, y) =
A(i, j) + f(x, y), G = M, W) turns out not to be very interesting, as we discuss later.
Third, the caste matching function is symmetric for men and women. That is, a man of
caste 1 marrying a woman of caste 2, gets the same payoff that a woman of caste 1 would get
from marrying a man of caste 2.
2.2.2 Adding unobserved characteristics
The model focuses on the case where, other than caste, people differ on a single characteristic.
It is straightforward to extend it to a vector of characteristics for each gender. However, as noted
above, there may be other (payoff relevant) characteristics (such as demand for dowry) that are
not observed by the parties at this stage. For example, suppose men are also differentiated by
the characteristic z which is not observed at the first stage (i.e., in terms of our data, in the ad
or in the response letter), which is correlated with x. Is it a problem for our empirical analysis
that the decision-maker can make inferences about z from their observation of x? The short
answer, which this section briefly explains, is no, as long as the cost of exploration (upon which
z is revealed) is low enough.
For a simple illustration, suppose z E {H, L} with H > L (say, the man is attractive or
not}. Let us modify the payoff of a woman of caste j and type y who is matched with a man
of caste i and type (x, z) to uW(i, j, x, y) = A(j, i)f(x, y)z. Let the conditional probability of z
upon observing x, is denoted by p(zlx). Given z is binary, p(HIx) + p(Lfx) = 1. In that case,
the expected payoff of this woman is:
A(j, i)f(x, y)p(HIx)H + A(j, i)f(x, y)p(Ljx)L.
"In a NTU world, if men and women get very different payoffs from the standard component of a match, it is
hard to provide much in the way of characterization. In any case, our results go through if men and women put
different weights on the standard component of a match but these weights are not very different.
Suppose the choice is between two men of caste i whose characteristics are x' and x" with
x" > x'. If x and z are independent (i.e., p(zlx) = p(z) for z = H, L for all x), or, x and z
are positively correlated, then clearly the choice will be x". Similarly, if it is costless to contact
someone with type x" and find out about z (both in terms of any direct cost, as well as indirect
cost of losing out on the option x') the choice, once again, will be x" independent of how
(negatively) correlated x and z are.
More formally, for this simple case, suppose we allow x and z to be correlated in the following
way: p(Hlx") = pp,p(LIx") = 1 - pp, p(Hlx') = p, and p(LIx') = 1 - p. If p > 1 we have
positive correlation between z and x, if p, < 1 we have negative correlation, and if p = 1,
x and z are independent. Suppose exploring a single option costs c. Let us assume that
Hf(x', y) > Lf(x", y) - otherwise, it is a dominant strategy to explore x" only.
We consider two strategies. One is to explore only one of the two options and stick with the
choice independent of the realization of z. The other is to explore both the options at first, and
discard one of them later.
If the decision-maker explores both options, the choice will be x" if either the z associated
with it is H or if both x" and x' have z = L associated with them. Otherwise, the choice will
be x'. The ex ante expected payoff from this strategy is
ppHf(x", y) + (1 - pp)[(l - p)L f(x", y) + pH f(x', y)] - 2c.
This is obviously more than what he gets by exploring either one alone (f(x', y){pH+(1-p)L}-c
or f(x", y)j{ppH + (1 - plp)L} - c as long as c is small enough for any fixed value of p > 0.
Proposition 5 For any fixed value of p > 0, so long as the exploration cost c is small enough,
x" will be chosen at the exploration stage whenever x' is chosen.
In other words, as long as exploration is not too costly, what people choose to be the set of
options to explore reflect their true ordering over the observables. In other words the indiffer-
ence curve we infer from the "up or out" choices reflects their true preferences over the set of
observables.
2.2.3 The price of caste
In the data we observe the trade-offs people make between caste and other observables in
selecting the set of people they are prepared to explore further. Here we want to develop a
simple notion of the "price" of caste that corresponds to this trade-off, i.e., the extent of partner
quality one is willing to give up to marry within caste. Consider a man of type x who belongs
to caste 1. Suppose the best match he has is a woman of quality y from his own caste. Then
he is indifferent between marrying a woman of quality y within his own caste and a woman of
caste 2 if the attribute of this woman is higher by the margin e given by:
(1 + ap3)f(x, y) = (1 - ay)f(x, y + e). (2.1)
We can solve E(x, y, , -y) from this equation. This can be interpreted as the "supply" price of
caste: this is the price at which a high caste person (here, a man) will agree to marry a low
caste person.
For a = 0, the supply price of caste is zero. Lets consider the case where a > 0. Clearly,
e(x, y, 8, y) is increasing in # and y. It is also increasing in y : if a person already has an attractive
match within his own caste (by concavity of f(x, y) with respect to y) the quality differential
has to be large for this person to want to marry inter-caste. We need more structure on the
function f(x, y) to characterize the effect of x on e(x, y, ,, Y). Totally differentiating (2.1), we
obtain:
Ox f(x, Y) f (x, +e) f(x,y)J
The sign of this expression depends on whether -1T- is increasing in y or not, i.e.,
f(, ()Xfy)
1 0.
If f(x, y) = [xP + yP] with p < 1 (i.e., a member of the CES family) then e is non-decreasing
in x so long as p < 1 (i.e., x and y are not very substitutable). 12 If the function f(x, y) is
12Recall that p = 1 implies x and y are perfect substitutes, p = 0 is the case of the Cobb-Douglass, and p - -oo
implies x and y are perfect complements (Leontief).
multiplicatively separable, then it directly follows that e is independent of x.
Now let us consider a woman of type y' who belongs to caste 2. Suppose the best match she
can find in her own caste group is x'. Then she is indifferent between marrying a man of quality
x' within her own caste and a man of caste 1 if the attribute of this man is not lower than the
margin 6 :
(1 + ap - c7))f(x' - 6, y') = f(x', y').
We can solve 6(x', y', /, 7) from this equation. This can be interpreted as the "demand" price
of caste: this is the price a person of low caste is willing to pay to marry a higher caste person.
As before, for a = 0, the demand price of caste is 0.
Clearly, for a > 0, the demand price is decreasing in / and increasing in y. It is also increasing
in x' : if a woman has an attractive match within her own caste (by concavity of f(x, y) with
respect to x) she can bear the loss of a drop of quality better. As before, the effect of y' on 6 is
ambiguous and depends on the substitution possibilities between x and y.
Observing a high supply price is consistent with both strongly vertical and strongly horizontal
preferences. By contrast a high demand price suggests that preferences are vertical.
Once we have the concepts of demand price and supply price, the following implication is
straightforward:
Observation 1 A inter-caste marriage takes place if and only if e < 6.
That is, the quality gain a man (woman) needs to marry down cannot exceed the quality
loss a woman (man) is willing to tolerate for marrying up.
If we take f(x, y) = xayl-a then we can explicitly solve for E and 6 :
1
and
1
1 + ap -l • Y)
The following implications are straightforward:
Observation 2 If 3 = 0 (a purely horizontal world), 6 < 0 < E, whereas if - = 0 (a purely
vertical world), 65 0, >_ 0 for all 3 > 0.
Observation 3 The supply price of caste is increasing in 0 and y, whereas the demand price
of caste is increasing in , and decreasing in y.
Together, observations 2 and 3 suggest that inter-caste marriages are more likely in a world
where caste is more vertical. We turn to this in more detail in the now.
2.2.4 Matching in a balanced population
Other than preferences, the distribution of the population in terms caste and quality would
clearly affect the equilibrium matching pattern and the associated equilibrium price of caste.
We begin our analysis by focusing only on the role of preferences. For this we assume that the
distribution of x and y within each caste is balanced. For example, in the two-type case, let
x E {L, H} and y e {L, H} with H > L. Let mTI is the number of men of type k (k = L, H)
in caste i and w' is the number of women of type k (k = L, H) in caste i. Then a balanced
population assumption implies that mi = wi for all k = L, H and for all i E {1, 2}. If x and
y are continuous then let FA (x) denote the distribution function of x for men in caste i and
correspondingly, let G' (x) denote the distribution function of y for women in caste i. The
balanced population assumption is Fm(v) = GL(v) for all v E [0, B] and for all i E {1, 2}.
This formulation looks more artificial than it needs to be: rather than thinking of x and y
as the physical values of education and beauty we could see them as the percentile levels in the
population distribution of education and beauty, which would make it more natural for them to
have the same range. Even with this clarification, it remains that this is a strong assumption.
We will come back briefly to what would happen if it fails.
Let the distribution of x and y within each caste be balanced. This is best illustrated by
the two-type case: let x E {L, H} and y E {L, H} with H > L. Then a balanced population
assumption implies that any man whose type is z (z = L, H) in caste i can find a woman whose
caste is i and whose type is z. We begin with the following simple observation:
Observation 4 With balanced population within each caste group, if marriage is restricted to
within caste, the equilibrium displays assortative matching.
Since the thought experiment is to restrict attention to within caste matches only, the result
follows immediately from the assumption of f(x, y) being increasing in both arguments. If a L
type man is matched with a H type woman (or vice versa) somewhere else a H type man must
be matched with a L type woman, and this assignment cannot be stable as a H type woman
and a H type man can form a pair that will make them both better off.13
Next, let us consider the case of preferences that are additively separable in the caste and
the non-caste components. We have the following observation:
Observation 5 With balanced population within each caste group, if preferences are additively
separable, i.e., UG(i, j, x, y) = A(i, j) + f(x, y), G = M, W, then it is not possible to get inter-
caste marriages unless both parties are caste-neutral, i.e., a = 0.
Proof. To see this, consider a L-type person in caste 1 who might want to marry a H-type
person in caste 2. This will be the case i if A(1, 1) + f(L, L) 5 A(1, 2) + f(L, H). To persuade
the H-type person in caste 2, who by assumption of balanced population has a default match of
a H-type, the following condition must hold: A(2, 2) + f(H, H) _ A(2, 1) + f(L, H). A necessary
condition for these two inequalities to be satisfied is A(1, 1) + A(2, 2) + f(L, L) + f(H, H) 5
A(1, 2) + A(2, 1) + 2f(L, H) but that is impossible given that both A(i,j) and f(x, y) satisfy
complementarity. *
From now on we assume that preferences are multiplicative in the caste and non-caste compo-
nent. Let us consider the possibility of inter-caste marriage. We show that when the horizontal
component of caste preferences is as important as the vertical component, we will observe as-
sortative matching in equilibrium, which is also what we would observe if caste were entirely
irrelevant:
Proposition 6 With balanced population within each caste group, if the horizontal component
in preferences, y, is at least as important as the vertical component 0, i.e., y > f :
1 3This is under the assumption of NTU. With TU, as is well known from Becker (1973), to get assortative
matching x and y would need to be complements.
(i) inter-caste marriages can never take place that involve at least one caste-conscious indi-
vidual (a > 0);
(ii) those with caste-neutral preferences are indifferent between marrying within caste or
outside;
(iii) the equilibrium displays assortative matching and so the equilibrium price of caste is
zero.
Proof. (i) Given balanced population within each caste group, for inter-caste marriages to take
place a caste-conscious individual of caste 2 must be keen to marry someone from caste 1 and be
willing to sacrifice some amount of partner quality for this. This cannot occur when y :> 3 as
that implies A(2, 1) !< 1 = A(2, 2), i.e., the demand price of caste is non-positive.
(ii) This follows directly from the balanced population assumption and the fact that a = 0.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii) there is no strict incentive marry outside caste (caste-neutral individ-
uals may be indifferent) and given the balanced population assumption within each caste group,
assortative matching results. This immediately implies that the equilibrium price of caste is
zero: we would not observe an individual sacrificing partner quality in order to marry outside
caste. U
For those who are caste-conscious, with horizontal preferences, there is no strict preference
for marrying outside caste. Within the caste neutral group, given balanced population, people
will be indifferent between marrying some of their own caste vs. someone from another caste
(for the same partner quality). Given this some of the marriages may be inter-caste. 14
We now turn to the case where inter-caste marriages may emerge in equilibrium even with
balanced populations. From the above results we know that for this to happen, it must be the
case where , is relatively large compared to - (i.e., caste is primarily vertical, not horizontal).
Let us begin with an allocation that involves assortative matching within each specific caste
group. A strict Pareto-improvement will result if caste-conscious caste 2 individuals are matched
with caste-neutral caste 1 individuals of the opposite sex who are of the same quality level.
Assuming that the caste-neutral population is small relative to the caste-conscious population
(in particular, the size of the group of caste-neutral individuals of caste 1 is small relative to the
14Since individuals are indifferent, other idiosyncratic factors can play a tie-breaking role and lead to inter-caste
marriages.
size of the group of caste-conscious individuals of caste 2 for each quality level) there will still
be some caste-conscious caste 2 individuals left who were not able to match with a caste-neutral
individual of caste 1 who is of the same quality level. Their next best option would be to match
with a caste-neutral caste 1 individual of lower quality. A caste-conscious H-type person in
caste 2 (say, a woman) would prefer marrying a caste-neutral L-type man of caste 1, if
f(H, H) • A(2, 1)f(L, H).
The latter will be persuaded as
f(L, L) < f(L, H).
Therefore, we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 With balanced population within each caste group, the size of the group of caste-
neutral individuals being small relative to the population of caste-conscious individuals, and the
vertical component in preferences, 0, being at least as important as the horizontal component
0, i.e., -y > 0 inter-caste marriages involving at least one caste-conscious individual (a > 0)
will always take place. If preferences are sufficiently vertical (1 + a ( - ay) (HH) then the
equilibrium price of caste will be positive.
The above Proposition is in stark contrast with the previous Proposition: as long as there
are low caste individuals who value marrying up in caste, and as long as there are some caste-
neutral individuals of the upper caste, there are gains from trade. If the preference for marrying
up in caste is strong enough, then some caste-conscious individuals of caste 2 will be willing to
marry a caste-neutral individual from caste 1 even if that involves sacrificing partner quality.
However, this result gives an incomplete characterization of the matching outcome. For
example, there could be remaining caste-conscious caste 2 individuals, whose choice would be
to stick to someone of the same quality within the caste, or try to match with a caste-conscious
caste 1 individual of lower quality as given the balanced population assumption he/she is not
going to persuade a caste-conscious H-type person in caste 1 to match with him/her. We now
turn to a more complete characterization of this case (f > -y).
Consider a caste-conscious H-type person in caste 2 (say, a woman). As before, she would
prefer marrying a caste-conscious L-type man of caste 1 if
f(H, H) _ A(2, 1)f(L, H).
However, a caste-conscious L-type man in caste 1 will be persuaded if
A(1, 1)f(L, L) A(1, 2)f(L, H).
As a-y < 1 by assumption, A(2, 1) = 1 + ap - a- 1+,3 = with the strict inequality
holding for y > 0. A necessary condition for these two inequalities to be satisfied is 15
(1 + ap) f(L, L) + f(H, H) 5 (2 + ap8 - 2 ay) f(L, H).
Clearly, # has to be high enough relative to y for this to be satisfied: for example, for f3 ! 2-y
the condition is not satisfied as f,y(x, y) > 0.
The two conditions can be combined as
f (H, H) 1 + ac f(L, H)
< 1 + a- ,',/< <
f(L,H) 1- a, - f(L, L)
A necessary condition for this to be satisfied is
f(H,H) f (L,H)
f(L,H) f(L, L)
Clearly, for symmetric production functions (i.e., f(x, y) = f(y, x)), these are equal and so
inter-caste marriages cannot take place.
To obtain a more precise characterization, let us work with f(x, y) = xayl-a .To simplify
notation, let us also set y = 0 (in which case 1 + af - ay = +_ = 1+ ap). Then the condition
simplifies to
Oa < 1 + anp < 01-a.
15In the TU case, this condition is both necessary and sufficient.
where 0 - H We assume a < ½, otherwise this can never hold. Let us define the following two
thresholds for /3:
0a - 1P1
01-a - 1
Now we are ready to state:
Proposition 8 With balanced population within each caste group, purely vertical preferences
(-y = 0), Cobb-Douglass preferences over quality f(x, y) = xayl-a with a E [0, 1], and the size
of the caste-neutral group being small:
(i) inter-caste marriages involving a caste-conscious individual of caste 2 and a caste-neutral
individual of caste 1 who is of lower quality will take place if /3 Ž /1;
(ii) inter-caste marriages involving a caste-conscious individual of caste 2 and a caste-
conscious individual of caste 1 who is of lower quality will take place if 3 E [E1, /2 where
0 < 01 < 02;
(iii) the equilibrium price of caste will be positive and will decrease the greater the share of
caste-neutral individuals;
(iv) Observed inter-caste marriages will take place between low quality men (women) of the
high caste and high quality women (men) of the lower caste. High quality men and women in the
upper caste and low quality men and women in the lower caste will tend to marry within caste.
Proof. The proof of parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from the discussion preceding the Propo-
sition.
(iii) Since there will be non-assortative matching under the conditions stipulated in (i) and
(ii), the equilibrium price of caste will be positive: some high quality individuals of caste 2 will
marry low quality individuals of caste 1. Since we have two quality levels, the effect of the size
of the caste neutral population on the equilibrium price of caste is discrete: as it goes up above a
certain threshold, all caste 2 individuals who want to marry up in caste will find a caste-neutral
caste 1 individual of the same quality and so the price of caste will be zero. Otherwise it will
be positive.
(iv) Clearly high type men and women of caste 1 who are caste-conscious marry each other:
there are no gains from deviation in terms of caste or quality. Now a low quality high caste
woman (man) has the choice of marrying a low quality high caste man, a high quality low caste
man (woman), or a low quality low caste man (woman). The last option is clearly dominated
by the first. Under the parameter assumptions, the second option dominates the first option.
Analogously, for a high quality low caste man (woman), the choice is between marrying a high
quality low caste woman (man), a low quality high caste woman (man), or a low quality low
caste woman (man). Once again, second option dominates. This leaves low caste men and
women of low quality marrying each other. m
The intuition is as follows. Unless caste preferences are vertical up to some minimum level,
there is no reason for a high quality woman of low caste to give up a high quality mate in her
own caste and settle for a low quality mate from the upper caste. However, if caste preferences
are vertical beyond a certain threshold then inter-caste marriages will no longer take place. Now
the price at which a low quality man from the high caste will be willing to marry a high quality
woman from the low caste ("demand price") will be higher than what a high quality woman
from the low caste is willing offer since she values a fall in quality more (her own quality being
high).' 6
Observe that if a is small (men's role in the marital payoff function is minimal) then f1 < 0,
while /2 > 0. Therefore, inter-caste marriages will take place if P3 is not too high in this case.
Also, if men and women both play equally important roles in the marital payoff function
then inter-caste marriages will not take place. The value of caste must be high enough to offset
the loss from having a lower quality husband for a high quality bride, but the loss in terms of
marrying a lower caste woman should not be high enough to outweigh the gain from having
a high quality bride for a low quality high caste man. If both genders play equally important
roles, this double coincidence will not take place.
Proposition 4 has the following implication:
16In a TU world, caste preferences being sufficiently vertical will lead to inter-caste marriages. With free side
transfers, it is as if that caste preferences and quality preferences are separable. In a NTU world, this minimum
threshold will be higher than the TU case, since no side transfers are possible and the only method of compensation
is providing a sufficiently high quality differential to the low quality mate from the high caste to induce him to
marry her.
Observation 6 The equilibrium price of caste for a high (low) caste individual is less (greater)
than the average supply (demand) price of caste in that caste group.
This follows from part (iv) of the Proposition. Recall that the demand and supply prices (E
and 6) are increasing in the quality of the existing match within caste. With balanced population,
only lower quality men (women) will marry someone from the lower caste in equilibrium when
the relevant conditions on parameters apply. This means the equilibrium price of caste will be
lower than the ex ante (or notional) average supply price at which a caste 1 individual would be
willing to marry inter-caste. The same argument applies for a low caste individual in reverse.
Since only a higher quality man or woman will marry inter-caste, for caste 2 individuals, the
equilibrium price of caste will be less than the ex ante or average demand price of caste for caste
2 individuals.
2.2.5 Matching in an unbalanced population
The simple vertical-horizontal dichotomy of the previous section is only possible because we
assumed a balanced population. With balanced population, naturally preferences are the only
determinant of the equilibrium allocation. In the absence of a balanced population, other than
preference parameters, the distribution of the population will affect the equilibrium outcomes.
In this section we explore the implications of this possibility.
With a balanced population, preferences need to be sufficiently vertical for inter-caste mar-
riages to take place (ignoring caste-neutral individuals who are, by definition, indifferent between
marrying inter-caste or not other things being equal). When the assumption of a balanced popu-
lation is relaxed, inter-caste marriages can take place for all types of preferences, including purely
horizontal (0 = 0). With balanced population one always has the option of marrying someone
of the corresponding quality level within the same caste. As a result, inter-caste marriages take
place when a low caste person values marrying up in caste sufficiently to agree to marry someone
of lower quality from the upper caste. With unbalanced population, one is not guaranteed to find
someone of the corresponding quality level within the same caste and this raises the likelihood
of inter-caste marriages. Therefore, we will not observe assortative matching even if we restrict
marriage to within caste only. This creates an additional reason for inter-caste marriages to
take place. Obviously, it needs some complementarities in the quality-specific sex ratios. For
example, if very beautiful low caste women cannot find a suitably qualified low caste men, there
must be qualified men in the upper caste who do not find sufficiently beautiful women from
within their own caste.
To see this point most starkly, consider the case where preferences are purely horizontal (i.e.,
7 > p = 0) so that in a balanced population matches will be assortative, and no inter-caste
marriages will take place. Also, for simplicity, let us assume that everyone is caste-conscious
(a > 0).
As before, suppose there are two quality levels, L and H for both castes. Consider first
individuals in caste 1. H-type individuals who are lucky enough to find H-type individuals from
within the same caste are clearly not going to be interested in inter-caste marriage. Suppose
some of them cannot find a partner of corresponding quality within caste 1. In that case their
option is to marry a L-type individual from within the same caste or a H-type individual of the
opposite sex from caste 2 (L-type individuals from caste 2 are dominated by L-type individuals
from caste 1). The latter is more attractive if:
(1 - ay)f(H, H) > f(H, L).
For f(x, y) = xayl-a this condition simplifies to
where -. Recall that we assumed a7 < 1. As 0 > 1, 0 < 7 < . With purely horizontal
preferences, the demand and supply prices for caste 2 individuals are the same. Therefore this
is the same condition for a H-type person from caste 2 of the opposite sex to agree to marry
this individual. Assuming the payoff from being single to be zero, for a L-type individual in
caste i who cannot find a L-type individual of the opposite sex within the same caste (and,
by transitivity, a H-type person of the opposite sex within the same caste) will be willing to
marry L type individual of the opposite sex from caste j : i. The latter will agree if he/she
too cannot find a L-type match from their own caste group. The payoff of both parties will be
(1 - ac) f (L, L) > 0 (as we assume ay < 1).
Recall that a balanced population assumption implies that mi = w' for all k = L, H and for
all i E {1, 2}. If mI > w' and w' > m' for some k (k = L, H) and i - j then we define the sex
ratio for quality level k to be complementary across the two caste groups. Now we are ready
to state:
Proposition 9 With unbalanced population, and complementary inter-caste sex ratios for at
least some quality level k, inter-caste marriages will take place even with purely horizontal pref-
erences (y > 0 = p) so long as -y 5 7. Inter-caste marriages, if they take place, will be assortative
and the equilibrium price of caste will be zero.
Proof. This follows from the fact that given the assumption y7 - , a H-type man in caste i
prefers to marry a H-type woman in caste j rather than marrying a L type woman in caste i,
and vice versa. Also, as 7 < -, a L-type man in caste i and a L-type woman in caste j prefer
marrying each other rather than staying single. Given this assortative matching directly follows,
and so the equilibrium price of caste will be zero. m
Therefore in the unbalanced population case, so long as sex ratios are complementary across
caste groups for at least some quality level there will be inter-caste marriages even with purely
horizontal preferences. If 3 > 0, that will reinforce this tendency. If sex ratios are not comple-
mentary for any quality level then not a lot can be said in general. Among other factors, the
outcome would depend on the aggregate sex ratio.
The above analysis assumed only two quality levels. The basic intuition goes through with
more quality levels. For example, if there is an intermediate quality level M such that H > M >
L then we will have a richer set of possibilities. Still, with complementary sex ratios, inter-caste
marriages will tend to be assortative: a man of type H from caste 1 will marry someone who
is type M from caste 2 only when he cannot find either a H-type or a M-type woman from his
own caste, which is not very likely.
If these inter-caste marriages take place, which are more likely? By our previous analysis,
the price of caste will be the highest for a H-type since he/she is matched with, at worst, a M
type. Clearly, if they still find it worthwhile to do this, so will M types matched with L types
and L types who are single.
This suggests two reasons why ex ante price of caste will be lower than equilibrium price of
caste.
First, for any given type (say H) if he does marry inter-caste he will be marrying a H-type
given that M was his best match within caste. Therefore, compared with someone of the same
type who was luckier and found a H type within his own caste, his stated price of caste will be
lower (this follows from the fact that e(x, y, #6, y) is increasing in y for the same x).
Second, of all types, the relatively lower types are likely to marry inter-caste. The price of
caste of a x type who is matched with at worst, a x - A type within his/her own caste, to marry
inter-caste and find someone of type x is increasing in x.This is another reason why the average
stated caste prices will be lower than the observed prices of caste.
What kind of type distributions are consistent with the scenario above? It is fair to assume
that beauty is distributed identically across castes but education or income may not be. Suppose
both caste groups have population size normalized to 1 and in both groups there are 1/3 H type
women, 1/3 M type women and a 1/3 L type women. However, if there are lots of qualified men
in one caste (say, more than 1/2) and lots of unqualified men in the other caste (again, more
thanl/2) then we will have a scenario that is similar to the one we described.
Finally, what will happen in a hypothetical world where caste preferences just disappeared
(the A(i, j) function becomes equal to 1 for all i, j) compared to a world where they exist?
With unbalanced population within caste, but balanced population for all castes taken together,
all marriages will be assortative. So if the actual type distribution has many quality levels
(and not just three) and the gaps between these quality levels are small, then very few inter-
caste marriages will take place, unless someone who is a high type is matched with someone
who is considerably lower than him/her within his/her own caste (and finds someone with a
parallel situation from the other caste). Now we can see that taking away caste will lead to full
assortative matching, and so with respect to the intital population lots of inter-caste marriages
will take place.
2.2.6 Discussion
There are two broad implications from the above analysis that are important for interpreting
our empirical results.
First, with horizontal preferences (f < -y), everyone demands compensation to marry outside
caste and as a result, demand price always exceeds supply price for all groups, and so there are
no-intercaste marriages. Moreover, in this case, if everyone became caste neutral (i.e., a = 0
so that for all i and j, A(i, j) = 1) the same pattern of matching will be observed (given the
balanced population assumption).
Compare this with a world where preferences are significantly vertical (i.e., the premise of
Propositions 3 and 5 holds). Now inter-caste marriages will take place. In this case, if everyone
becomes caste-neutral, there will be significant changes in the pattern of matching as now there
will be assortative matching in terms of x and y for the whole population.
Second, in the horizontal world, if we observe intercaste marriages it is because there are
some caste-neutral people. The equilibrium price of caste therefore be zero. If preferences
are sufficiently vertical to observe intercaste marriages outside the caste-neutral group, the
equilibrium price of caste will be positive - people will be willing to "pay" in terms of partner
quality to marry up in terms of caste.
Third, when the population is not balanced, then one can get inter-caste marriages even
with purely horizontal preferences. A sufficient condition for this complementary inter-caste
sex ratios for at least some quality level. In this case, inter-caste marriages will tend to be
assortative and the equilibrium price of caste will tend to be low.
Given these theoretical predictions, the empirical sections that follow will focus on estimating
the magnitude of the caste preferences in our sample and determining whether they are horizontal
or vertical. Then, using these estimates, we will demonstrate the equilibrium consequences that
these caste preferences generate for marital pairing.
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2.3 Setting and data
This section summarizes the way the data was collected and how the variables used through-
out the empirical exercise were constructed.
2.3.1 The search process
The starting point for data collection was the set of all matrimonial ads placed in the Sunday
edition of the main Bengali newspaper, the Anandabazar Patrika (ABP), from October 2002
to March 2003. With a circulation of 1.2 million, ABP is the largest single edition newspaper
in India and it runs a popular special matrimonial section every Sunday. First, the parents or
relatives of a prospective bride or groom place an ad in the newspaper. Each ad indicates a PO
box (provided by the newspaper), and sometimes a phone number, for interested parties to reply.
They then get responses over the next few months (by phone or by mail), and elect whether
or not to follow up with a particular response. Note that while both men and women place
ads, "groom wanted" ads constitute almost 75 percent of all ads placed, and "bride wanted"
ads received four times as many responses. When both parties are interested, the set of parents
meet, then the children meet. The process takes time: in our sample, within a year of placing
an ad, 44 percent of the interview sample were married or engaged (in 29 percent of the case
however, they had placed a single ad). 65 percent of those married are married through an
ad, the rest having met through relatives or, in 20 percent of the cases, on their own (which is
referred to as "love" marriage).
2.3.2 Sample and data collection
The first step was to code the information in all the ads published in the Sunday edition over
this time period (details on the information provided and the way it was coded are provided
below). We refer to this data set of 22,210 ads as the "ad placer sample".
We then selected a random sample from these ads, after excluding ads placed under the
heading "Christian" or "Muslims" in the newspaper. Importantly, we also restricted the sample
to the ads which did not mention a phone number, and requested all responses to be sent at the
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newspaper PO Box or to a personal mailing address. 17 This restriction was necessary to make
sure that the letters received in response to an ad reflect all the relevant information the ad
placer has on the respondent. About 43 percent of all ads included a phone number (sometimes
in addition to a PO Box, sometimes as the only way to contact the ad placer). Comparing the
characteristics of ads with and without phone numbers, we find little differences between those
who include a phone number and those who do not, except in terms of geographical location:
more ad placers with phone numbers were from Kolkata.
From this set, we sampled 784 ads and conducted detailed interviews with the ad placers
(usually the parent, uncle or older brother of the prospective groom or bride). With ABP's au-
thorization, respondents were approached and asked whether they would agree to be interviewed
when they came to collect the answers to their ad at the newspaper PO Box. Only one sampled
respondent refused to be interviewed. The ads placed by the 783 individuals who completed the
survey form the "interview sample".
The interview was conducted in the ad placer's home after a few days. Detailed information
was collected on the prospective groom or bride, his family and the search process for a marriage
partner.18 In particular, ad placers were asked whether they also replied to other ads and, when
they did, to identify the ad they had responded to among the ads published in the past few
weeks. Ad placers were also asked how many letters they received in response to their ad (on
average 83 for male and 23 for female ad placers), and to identify the letters they were planning
to follow up with (the "considered" letters). We then randomly sampled five letters from the set
of "considered" letters (or took the entire set if they had less than five in this category), and ten
(or all of them if they had less than ten in this category) from the set of the "non-considered"
letters, and requested authorization to photocopy them. The information in these letters was
subsequently coded, using the procedure outlined below. We refer to this data set as the "letter
data set".
Finally, a year after the first visit, this original sample was re-interviewed, and we collected
information regarding their current marital status and their partner's choice. Only 33 ads out
17 Only a small fraction of ads included only a personal mailing address (35 out of 783 ads in our random sample,
1796 out of 22,210 in the ad placer sample).
1sThe questionnaire is available on line at http://web.mit.edu/-jlafor/Public/Questionnaire/.
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of the entire sample could not be contacted. Appendix Table 2.A.1 compares the characteristics
of these ad placers compared to those who could be found. There is little evidence of differences
between the two groups. At most, ad placers from Kolkota and women who had not mentioned
their occupation and incomes were more likely to be found in the second round. At the time of
the second round interview, 346 out of the prospective brides or grooms in the original sample
were married or engaged. Out of these, 289 agreed to a follow-up interview and gave us detailed
information regarding their selected spouse, the date of the marriage and their overall search
process including the number of ads posted and the way the match was made. In a very small
number of cases, the ad placer was able to provide either the ad placed by the match or the
letter the match sent by mail. This sample, however, was too small for us to use in the analysis.
Table 2.A.2 compares the characteristics of the ad placers who agreed to an interview to those
who did not. Once more, there appears to be little systematic differences between the two
groups.
2.3.3 Variable construction
Ads and letters provide very rich information, which was coded in the following way.
First, we coded caste information. In the newspaper, most ads are placed under a specific
section for each caste. The text of the ad then typically does not mention the caste of the
ad placer. If an ad was placed under a heading that clearly identified one caste and did not
mention its caste, this ad placer is assumed to be of this particular caste. If caste was explicitly
mentioned in the ad, we used what was mentioned in the ad. The information on castes is
readily available, directly or indirectly, in the overwhelming majority of ads (98 percent). In the
letter, caste is explicitly mentioned in about 70 percent of the cases.
There are numerous castes and sub-castes in India. Ad placers or letters can be more or
less specific in identifying themselves. There is a hierarchy between broad castes groups, but
within each broad group, there is much dispute on the proper ranking. Castes were thus grouped
into eight ordered groups, based on the classifications in Risley (1981) and Bose (1958), with
Brahmin at the top (with the rank of 8, and various schedule castes at the bottom, with the
rank of 1). Appendix Table 2.A.3 presents the classification. We use this coding to construct
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an indication of the distance between the caste of respondent and that of the ad placers. The
summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1. The majority of the ad placers are Kayashta
(more than 30 percent) and Brahmin (more than 25 percent) while Baisya, Sagdope and other
similar castes include each more than 10 percent of the ad placers. The other groups are much
smaller in sizes.
To determine whether a letter writer and an ad placer are from the same caste, we attributed
to each letter or ad the specific sub-caste they mentioned in their ad. If they only mentioned
a broad group, they are assumed to be of any of the specific subcastes. For example, a self-
identified Kulin Brahmin is considered to be from a different caste as a self-identified Nath
Brahmin (though the hierarchical distance between them is set to zero), but is considered to be
of the same caste as someone who simply identified themselves as a Brahmin. In practice, the
distinctions between sub-castes matters most for the lower castes, where the broad groups join
differentiated subgroups, and where people typically identify themselves with a specific narrow
group.
Another relevant information is the stated preferences regarding castes. Among the sampled
ads, more than 30 percent of individuals specify their preference for marrying within their caste
(using phrases such as "Brahmin bride wanted"). Another 20-30 percent explicitly specify their
willingness to unions outside their own caste by the use of phrases such as "caste no bar". The
remaining 40-50 percent do not make any mention of preferences regarding castes.
Second, we coded information provided on education levels. Educational attainment was
classified into 7 categories: less than high school, high school completion, non-university post-
secondary, bachelor's, master's, PhD or professional degree and non-classifiable degree. 19 In ad-
dition, we also coded, when available, the field in which the degree was obtained. We sorted these
into 4 groups: Humanities and Social Sciences (B.A, B.Ed, M.A, etc), Commerce (B.Comm,
MBA), Science (B.Sc., B.Eng, M.Sc., etc) and other fields (Law, religion, etc).
Third, we coded the available information on earnings levels. When provided in the ad,
self-reported earnings were converted into a monthly figure. This value will be referred to as
"income". In addition, when the ad placer or the letter writer provided their occupation, we
19This last group mostly includes degrees in computer science from private institutions that were difficult to
place within the existing ranking.
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used the National Sample Survey of India to construct an occupational score for the occupation
(we referred to this below as "wage"). Note that prospective brides almost never report this
information, and it will therefore be used only for the prospective groom ads and letters.
Fourth, we coded information on the origin of the family (East or West Bengal) and the
current location of the prospective bride or groom (Kolkata, Mumbai, Other West Bengal, or
other -mainly abroad).
Fifth, a very large fraction of prospective bride's ads specify physical characteristics of the
woman, using fairly uniform language and the same broad characteristics. Skin color was coded
into four categories (from "extremely fair" to "dark"). General beauty was divided into three
categories ("very beautiful", "beautiful" and "decent").
Finally, ads occasionally mention a multitude of other characteristics, such as "gotras" (a
group within which one is not supposed to inter-marry), astrological signs, blood type, family
characteristics, family members mentioned, personality traits, female skills, previous marital
history and number of children, specific demands, etc... These were coded as well. However,
each of these is rarely mentioned including or excluding them does not affect our results.
2.3.4 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for both our interview sample and the full set of ads.
Our sample is drawn mostly from the Bengali upper middle class, as evidenced both by the
prevalence of higher caste individuals (a quarter of the sample are Brahmin), and educational
achievement. Education levels are mentioned in the ad by 90 percent of women and 80 percent
of men. 90 percent of both men and women have at least a bachelor's degree. Women rarely
mention their occupation. When they do, their occupational score (5.51) is similar to that of
men and significantly higher than the median urban formal sector occupational score (from
Bargain et al. 2007 and Glinskaya and Lokshin 2005)). This group enters the marriage market
after they have completed their education and (at least for men) found a job: the average age
is 27 for women, and 32 for men.
Around 50 percent of the sample lives or works in Kolkata and slightly less than half consider
their family as originating from West Bengal. While few women provide their income, a few
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include a description of their occupation and although their occupational score is lower than
that of men, the difference (among those who reveal it) is quite small.
Physical characteristics clearly play an important role in the marriage market. Height is
mentioned in the ad by 96 percent of the women and 90 percent of the men. Skin tone is
mentioned in 86 percent of the cases, beauty, in over 70 percent of the ads. There appears to
be little boasting about physical appearance, however: more ads describe the bride as being
"decent" than either "beautiful" or "very beautiful".
Since our sampling strategy excluded all the ads that did not mention a phone number, it is
important to compare their characteristics with the overall sample of ads, to assess the impact
of this selection rule on the make up of our sample. Generally, the interview sample looks very
similar to the overall sample of ad placer. There are three significant differences. First, perhaps
not surprisingly, an individual who is interviewed is more likely to live in Kolkata. This is
probably because ad placers mention a phone number when they cannot collect the letters so
easily themselves. Second, men are much less likely to report their occupation (57 percent of
them do not report it in the interview sample, while 27 percent do not in the general sample),
though their occupational score is similar when they do report it. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, they are much more likely to mention in their ad that they will only marry within
their castes (33 percent versus 10 percent for men; 43 percent versus 9 percent for women). It
is therefore important to keep in mind that our sample is more likely to be a more traditional
sample than the sample of people who place ads in newspaper.
Table 2.2 presents similar statistics for two different samples: the sample of people who wrote
a letter in response to an ad ("the letter writers") and the sample of actual spouses. Note that
the information on the spouse was collected from interviews with the ad placer (few families
could show us the original ad or letter of the spouse). In terms of their characteristics, both of
these samples look very similar to the sample of ad placers. In the few dimensions where the
ad placer and the interview sample differ, the letter looks more similar to the interview sample,
except for the Kolkata location (50 percent to 55 percent of the letter writers mention that the
prospective spouse lives in Kolkata; 15 percent to 20 percent do not mention anything in the
letter). A few prospective grooms (7 percent) explicitly mention that they will not demand a
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dowry. None mentions that they want a dowry.
This table also shows comparisons between the ad placer and the letter they have received,
as well as with their eventual spouse. In this table, as well as in the remainder of the paper, all
differences are presented in terms of the difference between the characteristic of the man and
the characteristics of the woman. Since the sampling was stratified with unequal weights, each
letter is weighted by the inverse of its probability of selection.
We begin by describing how the respondents compare to the ad placers. It is relatively
common to write to someone from a different caste. Two thirds of the letters which mention
castes are from someone from the same caste as the ad placer. 79 percent of the ad placers have
received at least one letter written by someone from another caste among those we sampled.
On average, men tend to write to castes above theirs (the difference in caste between men and
women is negative, indicating that the man is from a higher caste); when they write outside of
castes, women write equally up and down. In 37 percent to 44 percent of the cases, the letter
writer has the same education as the ad placer. When they don't have the same education
as the men they write to, women tend to have less education than them. Men seem equally
likely to write women who are more or less educated than them. Not surprisingly, men write to
somewhat younger and shorter women then themselves, and vice versa. These differences reflect
the average difference in the population.
Turning to the actual matches, we observe somewhat different patterns: First, while there
are still a number of matches that are not within castes, the fraction of within caste marriage is
higher than that of letters that are coming from within the castes: 72 percent of the prospective
grooms and 68 percent of the prospective brides who are married after a year have done so within
their own narrow caste. This fraction increases to 76 percent and 72 percent respectively if we
use the broad classification. Second, men who marry outside of caste tend to marry a lower caste
bride, and women who marry outside of caste tend to marry a higher caste groom. Females tend
to marry grooms who have either the same education (42 percent) or who are more educated
than them (45 percent). Men are more likely to marry similarly or more educated women than
themselves. 72 percent to 75 percent of the brides and grooms are from the same family origin
(West or East Bengal).
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2.4 Estimating preferences
Using this data, we now estimate the preferences for various characteristics, exploiting the
choices made by ad placers and people who replied to their ad. We first discuss our basic
empirical strategy and present the results. We then empirically examine various reasons why
the coefficients we observe may not actually represent households' preferences.
2.4.1 Basic empirical strategy
The first goal of this paper is to estimate relative preferences for various attributes in a
prospective spouse.
We assume that the value of a spouse j to a particular individual i can be described by the
following function:
U(Xy, Xi) = aXy + /f (Xi, Xy) + Pi + eij (2.2)
We use various strategies to attempt to estimate the parameters of equation (2.2).
First, the ad placers provided us with their ranking of each ad. If we assume that the ranking
are truthful, a higher ranking prospective spouse j than for prospective spouse j' must indicate
that i prefers j to j'. A first possible strategy is to estimate an equation similar to (2.2) in the
sample of letters, using the rank provided by the ad placer as the dependent variable. We run
this estimation with ordered probit, and with OLS.
There is a danger that these ranks do not reflect the respondent's true preferences, since
they are just a response to an interviewer. We have however in our data several indications
of individuals' revealed preference for a spouse versus another. First, we know whether an ad
placer is following up with a particular letter or not. We thus have information that he preferred
this letter to the letters he did not consider. Second, for ad placers who have also replied to ads,
we know which ad they decided to reply to (and we of course also know the universe of ads they
could have replied to). Third, we know that a letter writer decided to reply to an ad. Finally,
we also know how many replied an ad received.
Hitsch et al. (2006) show that under the assumption that if an individual i contacted j
rather than j', which was also available to him, it implies that i prefers j to j', the parameters
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of equation (2.2) can be estimated using a fixed effect conditional logit estimation (where the
dependent variable is 1 if individual i contacted individual j, and 0 otherwise) if eij has the
standard logistic distribution.
The regressions we estimate thus take takes the following form:
yij = aXj + Pf (Xi, Xj) + vi + 3ij, (2.3)
where yij is a dummy equal to 1 if ad placer i replied to letter j, for example. In the empirical
exercise, we specify f(Xi, Xj) to include dummies for whether the value of some elements of
the X vector are equal for i and j (for education, caste, location), the difference between the
value of the elements of the vector for some attributes (always normalized such that we take
the difference between men and women), and its square. We estimate equation (2.3) using a
conditional logit with fixed effect for each person i, and OLS with fixed effects. 20
The assumption that choices reflect preferences is of course not innocuous: in particular, it
rules out strategic behavior, for example the fact that an ad placer does not respond to an ad
because they think that person is "too good for them".
We have three variables to perform this exercise: an ad-placer i writes back to a letter writer
j (in the set of letters he receives); and an ad placer i writes to ad j (in the set of available
ads); a letter writer writes to an ad j (in the set of available ads). The last data source is a
data set similar to what we would have obtained if we had run a randomized experiment by
placing fake profiles on a web site, and varying the attributes one by one (similar to Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2004).21 However, this last data set suffers from measurement error, because
we did not sample all the letters received by each ad placer. The two other sources do not suffer
from this problem. The data on ad-placer's responses to the letter has two advantages over
the data on which ad placer replied to each ad. First, we can be sure that the ad placers have
read all the letters they have received, so the set over which choices are made is well defined.
Second, strategic behavior is a-priori less likely in this sample since the letter writer has already
20For linear variables such as age or height, we include only the difference between the value of the variable for
the man and the woman and its square, not the level of age or height for the letter writer: this is because once
we include a fixed effect for the ad-placer, the age of the letter writer and the difference in age are co-linear.21In this case, there would not be huge advantage to running an experiment, however, since we do observe the
same information as a letter writers.
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expressed interest in the ad placer. We will thus present the results from the ad placer response
to the letter in the main text, and the results using the responses of ad placers to other ads
and using the letter writers responses to the ad are presented in appendix. The results are very
consistent, but we will underline the main differences below.
Finally, we also have data on the number of letters an ad placer receives: this can be used
to estimate a count model (which we estimate with a Poisson model and with OLS), but it is
not possible to introduce heterogeneity in preferences in this estimation.
There are three major possible objections to the interpretation of these results in terms of
relative preference particular attributes. First, as we mentioned, behavior could be strategic, in
which case the choices of whom to respond to may not reflect preferences. In a market where
time is important, people could avoid wasting their time by writing to someone who will reject
them, or could write to different people with the view of constructing an optimal portfolio of
prospects (with some high value but unlikely prospects for example, and enough good matches
to ensure at least one acceptable match). Second, ad placers could interpret responses to their
ad as signaling some unobserved quality of the match. For example, if a suitor with very good
observed characteristics is writing to a woman with poor observed characteristics, this woman
could infer that there is something wrong with the person who is writing to them. This creates
a correlation between the error term and the attributes in equation (2.2), even though we have
the same information set as the household. Third, even assuming that the choice reflects actual
preferences, this preference may take into account expected dowry. If this is the case, the trade-
off between different attributes may not be representative of actual preferences. Below, we review
these three objections in more details, and present evidence that, in our view, strengthens the
argument that this strategy probably uncovers actual preferences.
2.4.2 Results: Ad placers's response to letters and letter ranking
Table 2.3 presents the results fixed effects and conditional logit regressions, where the bi-
nary decision of whether or not an ad placer i respond to a letter j is regressed on a set of
characteristics of the letter, and its interactions with the ad placer's.
Columns 1 to 5 present the specifications for the groom wanted ads (these are ads placed
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on behalf of a woman, and letters are sent on behalf of men), and columns 6 to 10 present
the specifications for the bride wanted ad (placed on behalf of a man). Recall that in both
cases, differences are presented in terms of the difference between the characteristics of the man
and the characteristics of the female. A positive difference in education for example, means
that the prospective groom is more educated than the prospective bride.22 Most categorical
variables are dummied out. The excluded categories are "less than high school" for education,
outside of Kolkata for residence, and "decent" for beauty. All variables are set to zero if the
letter did not mention the characteristic, and we include a dummy variable to indicate whether
each variable was missing. All models were estimated with and without including a series of
additional covariates (such as indication on the culture of the family, its wealth level, astrological
sign etc...). To save space we focus on the more parsimonious specification in the tables; the
results are extremely similar when these additional controls are included.
Most attributes have the expected signs in the utility function: both women and men prefer
more educated spouses; science and commerce are the preferred fields. Women prefer men
with higher incomes. Men prefer younger women, and women prefer men their own age. Both
dislike large differences in age. Men prefer women who describe themselves as beautiful or very
beautiful, and seem to have a strong preference for lighter-skin brides. As Hitsch et al. (2006),
we find that looks matters. For example, the OLS estimate suggests that the probability to
be called back would be higher for a very light-skinned woman without an education than for
a dark skin woman with a college degree. Both men and women prefer a spouse who lives in
Kolkata (recall that most of our families are from Kolkata as well), and whose family comes
from the same part of Bengal.
Caste plays a very prominent role. In particular, both men and women seem to have a very
strong preference for marrying within the same caste. The OLS estimate indicate that a woman
is 13 percent more likely to call back a prospective groom if he is from the same caste, controlling
for all other attributes. A man is 17 percent more likely to call back a woman from his caste.
These are large difference, considering that the average call back rate is about 28 percent. These
results also indicate a high preference for caste relative to other attributes. For example, in the
22Also a positive difference between the man's and woman's caste indicate that the man is of a higher caste.
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bride wanted ad the probability to be called back is the same for a man from the same caste
and no education as that for a man from a different caste with a master degree. Men are willing
to sacrifice three shade of skin tones to marry someone within their caste (Column 6). These
ratios are very similar from the logit coefficients.
Particularly important given our theoretical framework, this preference for homogeneity in
caste is stronger than the preferences for marrying "up". Conditional on marrying out of their
caste, women prefer men who are as close to their caste as possible: among men who are of
a higher caste, they prefer the smallest difference possible, among those of a lower caste, they
prefer the highest possible caste. Men prefer the highest caste women possible if they can't find
a match within their caste, particularly if they are of a lower caste than the prospective bride.
The magnitudes of the coefficient on the difference in caste, however, are much smaller than
those for being of the same caste.
One possibility is that several of the variables in these regressions are co-linear proxies for the
same underlying attribute. Specifically, the basic specification includes income (when reported),
education, type of degree, and occupational score (when reported). This may artificially depress
the coefficient of these variables relative to the caste variable. To investigate this possibility,
we estimate in column (4) and (9) a more parsimonious specification. We first constructed a
predicted income, by regressing in the entire data set of letter log income (when reported) on
all the education variables, and the occupational score (including dummies when they are not
reported). We then construct for each ad placer and letter writer a predicted income, and include
this variable instead of all the education, income, and wage variables. Predicted income has a
strong and significant impact on the probability of call back, but this regression does reveal that
caste plays an important role relative to income. Even for males, one's predicted income would
have to be at least 1.5 times larger to compensate being from a different caste.
To display graphically the trade-off between the different attributes. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show
indifference curves, drawn using the conditional logit estimates. They display the age difference,
height difference, education, and income a prospective spouse need to have to keep the ad placer
indifferent when his or her caste changes, expressed in standard deviations. In both cases, the
cost of keeping caste is very marked. To remain indifferent between two prospective brides,
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one of the same caste and one from a caste one below, the second one must have 3 standard
deviation more education, must be 5 standard deviation more closer in age or earn 6 standard
deviation more income. The differences are slightly less marked for female preferences but still
very marked for same caste. For both genders, there seems to be less of penalty attached
to marrying individuals of a higher caste than of a lower one, in addition to the penalty of
marrying outside one's caste. This is somewhat related to the findings of Fisman et al. (2008)
who find strong same-race preferences among female speed daters that is unrelated to physical
attractiveness. Similarly, Hitsch et al. (2006) also find same-race preferences, particularly for
women.
Table 2.4 presents similar regressions, using the ranking of the ad provided by the ad placers
as the dependent variable. 23 The results from these regressions are virtually homothetic to
the ones presented in the previous table, as evidenced by Figures 2-3 and 2-4, which show a
regression of the coefficients in Table 2.3 on those in Table 2.4. Appendix Tables 2.A.4 and
2.A.5 present similar regressions, using the other choice variable at our disposal (letter writer
response to ad; ad placer response to other ads; number of letters received by an ad). In all
these specifications, the importance of caste in the choice is at least as important as in this
table. For example, in Appendix Table 2.A.4 being of the same caste increases the probability
that an ad chooses to reply to another ad by 2-3 per cent. In the same appendix table, being
of the same caste increases the chance that a letter writer replies to an ad placers by about 20
per cent. Turning to the effects of the other variables, there are interesting differences between
these specifications and the ones presented in the main text, which we discuss in more details
below.
2.4.3 Do these coefficient really reflect preferences?
We argue that these estimates provide us with information on the relative preferences for
different attributes. There are two main objections to this interpretation. First, ad placer's
choice to respond to letter j rather than to letter j' may not indicate that she would derive
more utility from being matched to letter j than to letter j', and instead reflect their assessment
23The sample size is a bit smaller, due to the fact that some ad placers refused to provide ranking and the
interviewers did not rank the letters in the same way in the early interviews.
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that they may be wasting their time writing to j', because j' will not write back. We argue
below that there seems to be little evidence of strategic behavior in our sample. Second, and
related, while we observe every characteristic observed by the ad placer, we need to take into
account the inference that the ad placer is making when observing that he is getting a letter
from a specific person. It could be the case, for example, that if someone from a high caste
decides to contact an ad-placer from a low caste, it signals something very negative about this
person. Using our data on the eventual matches of this people, we will look for evidence that
people who write to people outside their own caste are in any way different from those who do
not.
Strategic behavior
A first concern is that ad placers may behave strategically when they choose to which letters
they will respond. For example, they may prefer not replying to a letter that appears to be "too
good" because they think there is little chance of that relationship progressing. As we mentioned
above, this is unlikely to be happening in this setting since the fact that the respondent has sent
a letter to the ad placer already signals his potential interest. An immediate reaction is thus
less likely to occur.
Nevertheless, the issue is further investigated here. We first compute an absolute measure
of "quality" of the letter.
To do so, we regress the probability that a letter in our sample is considered, without any
interactions with characteristics of the ad placer who received the letter. In other words, for Pj
a dummy indicating whether letter j is considered by ad placer i, we run:
Piu = X P + eij
without any fixed effect for the ad placer.
We form two versions of this indicator: with and without including the caste of the letter
writer. The results presented here use those without caste but similar results were obtained
with the caste variables included. The quality indicator is then Qj = XjI. We also predict the
quality of the ad-placer, using the same coefficients Qi = Xji.
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Figures 2-5 and 2-6 plot the probability of considering a letter based on the quality of the
ad placer and that of the letter. If the responses displayed strategic behavior, we would expect
that low quality ad placers would be less likely to consider high quality letters. In fact, Figures
2-5 and 2-6 show little difference in the relative probability of considering letters of different
quality by the quantile of quality of the ad placer, although higher quality ad placers appear to
consider on average a smaller fraction of letters of all quality levels. If anything, lower quality
ad placers seem to respond to a higher fraction of higher quality respondents. Combining this
with the letters received by each ad placer's quality, this implies that the eventual number of
letters considered are about evenly shared among the lowest level of ad placer quality and then
become more and more skewed towards higher quality respondents for higher quality ad placers.
Further evidence is provided by Table 2.5 where similar regressions as the ones presented above
are presented but this time restricting the sample to letters where the quality of the ad placer
and the quality of the letter writers are relatively close. Overall, the behavior of the ad placer
seems to be fairly similar when looking at the overall sample compared to this lower relative
quality one, either in terms of considering letters or ranking them. The preference of prospective
grooms for brides of a similar caste falls slightly but that of women for men increases by a small
fraction. The female preference for science graduates is also lowered. Finally, the preference
for income rises while that for wages falls. Overall, however, the differences are small and not
indicative of any strategic behavior on the part of the ad placers.
Interestingly, the decision to respond to an ad (displayed in the appendix tables) seems to
reflect more strategic behavior than the choice of whether to respond to a letter an ad placer
received. For example, in the decision of whether an ad placer replies to another ad, and in
the decision of whether a letter writer replies to another ad (Appendix Table 2.A.4), education
loses its previous importance and appears to potentially decrease one's attractiveness. Similarly,
a commerce degree now seems to decrease the likelihood of being selected. This seems to be
evidence of strategic behavior at the stage of responding to an ad. Moreover, the fact that
the coefficient of the "same caste" dummy is also higher in this sample may reflect in part
caste-based search.
Likewise, when we estimate the number of letters an ad placers received (Appendix Table
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2.A.5), many results are similar to the ones we find for ad-placers' choices (beauty, skin tone,
education for men and being from a large caste, all increase the number of responses), but
other variables which were previously important become insignificant or change sign (female
education, male income). Finally, when we regress the number of responses received on a
polynomial function of our measure quality Qi (computed as before), we find that the best fit of
the between quality of an add and overall number of response is an inverse-U. This may indicate
that, at the ad stage, higher quality ads are only replied to by people who stand a chance.
Thus, there is evidence that families behave strategically at the point of first contact. This
is perhaps not surprising, as they have to choose between a very large number of ads. While
the average person sees more than 800 ads every Sunday over the 12 months they spend on the
market before getting married, they only respond to on average 16 of these for females and 35
for males. In contrast, it appears each ad placer considers that each of the 40 letters they receive
over the course of their search is a potential prospect, and that they do not behave strategically
whom to respond to (they respond to about 30 percent of the letters they receive).24
What does caste signal?
One of our main empirical result is the fact that families (ad placers as well as people who
write to them) are much more likely to write to, and to follow up with, people from their
own caste. Caste preferences thus display a strong horizontal component. Does this reflect a
preference for caste in itself, or does caste signal something else?
We first explore the possibility that caste is a shortcut for many variables, perhaps unobserved
by the ad placer and us, but reflecting a prospective spouse background and culture. People
would then match within their castes to marry people like them. However, the strong preference
for caste does not seem to be affected by controlling for a host of variables including cultural
variables (ability to sing, etc...) (result omitted to save space, but available from the authors)
and it remains very strong within the four highest caste, who are culturally and economically
quite homogenous (Table 2.6). It therefore does not appear that caste is just a proxy for cultural
similarity. Furthermore, Columns (3) and (8) of the Tables 2.3 and 2.4 also include a dummy
24 This is less costly than an equilibrium where letter writers would send a message to most ads and would leave
the ad placers to strategically consider or not the letters received.
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variable for being from the same big main caste. The results suggest that it is the small caste
which matters for preference. If caste was a proxy for cultural identity, large caste groupings
should be stronger than smaller groups.
A second possibility is the preference of ad placers for letter writers who are from the same
caste as themselves reflects the fact that, in equilibrium, only people with unobservably bad
characteristics write to people who are not in their castes (or who are above them or below
them). Writing "out of caste" would then be a signal of bad quality.
We first look at whether people who write to people from other caste are observationally
different from those who do not, or whether people who receive letter from people from other
castes are observationally different from those who do not. In Columns 1 and 3 of Panel A in
Table 2.7, we show the average quality index Q for ad placers who have indicated to us that they
have written to at least one letter from another caste (or one letter to a caste below them, or
one letter to a caste above them) versus those who have written to only people from their caste.
Each cell is the difference in mean quality between those who satisfy the condition and those
who do not. This table indicates that there does not seem to be observable differences between
people who write out of castes and people who do not. There is also no difference between the
people who receive letters from other castes, and those who don't (panel B).
This of course still leaves open the possibility that they are different along unobservable
dimensions. However, we have an excellent measure of the unobservable (at the time of ad
placing or letter writing) quality of a person: we know their eventual outcome. We compute our
quality index for each ad placer's future spouse, and we contrast the eventual marriage outcomes
of those who have written to at least one person from another caste (or a caste below, or a caste
above) to that of people who have only written within their caste. In an alternative specification,
we also regress the quality eventual mate of an ad placer on the share of ads they replied to that
were not from the same caste. The results (presented in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.7) suggest
that the ultimate marriage outcome of those who write out of castes (or below, or above caste)
are no different that those of those who do not (panel A). Likewise, those to whom people from
other caste write marry with people of the same observable quality (panel B). This is strong
indication that writing out of caste does not sends the signal that something is "wrong" with
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the ad placer.
These results therefore suggest that the fact that ad placers are more likely to follow up with
people from their own caste reflect a true preference for eventually marrying within the same
caste. This preference seems to be related to caste itself, rather than characteristics castes would
be a proxy for. Compared to the other attributes, this preference also appears to be extremely
strong: it appears that the parents of prospective grooms or brides would be willing to give up
a lot to ensure that their child marries within their caste. Furthermore, the preference for caste
appears to be strongly "horizontal" rather than "vertical", as defined above in the theoretical
section.
2.4.4 Do these preferences reflect dowry?
We have so far ignored dowries, for the reasons discussed in some detail in Section 2. None of
those arguments are however entirely water-tight. The argument in Proposition 5, for example,
depends on the assumption that exploring all the potentially attractive options is cheap enough.
One way to check the validity of this argument is to test one of its testable implications:
those who either say that they do not want dowry or say that they will not offer dowry should
get the same responses as everyone else. To verify this conjecture in the data we re-estimate
the preferences in the sample of letters that explicitly mentions not wanting a dowry, and
comparing the overall results. We do this in Table 2.8 where we interact not wanting a dowry
with each characteristic. The full specification is presented in column (1) and (2), and the
parsimonious specification is presented in columns (3) and (4).25 The even columns correspond
to the interaction terms and the odd columns to main effect. The results are noisier for the
interactions than for the main effects given the sample size, but overall, we cannot reject that
the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. Interestingly, caste plays an even bigger role for
this sample (the coefficient of the interaction between not wanting a dowry and being of the
same caste is positive, while it is not significant), while the role of predicted income does not
change. This give us if anything an even larger marginal rate of substitution between caste and
income, which is the opposite of what would have been predicted in our model if families needed
2 5We present these results only for the "bride wanted" sample since only prospective grooms specify whether
or not they will accept a dowry. No prospective bride is advertised as refusing to pay a dowry.
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to compensate a rich groom with a higher dowry (but would not need to do so for caste when
tastes are similar).
In addition, we find that ad placers who either announce that they will not offer a dowry
or state that they will not demand one do not receive more or less letters, their attributes as
mentioned in the letter are valued similarly and the quality of their responses and their eventual
match is not significantly different than others, except for female ad placers who receive slightly
worse applicants when they do not offer a dowry (results not reported to save space, but available
form the authors).
2.5 Stable matching estimates
Following Hitsch et al. (2006), in this section, we compute the set of stable matches implied
by the preferences we just estimated. A stable match is defined, following Gale and Shapley
(1962), as a pairing where nobody who is matched would rather be with another partner who
would also rather prefer being with them than with their current spouse.
2.5.1 Empirical strategy
The pool of men and women attempting to match within this market is defined as the entire
set of ads within the dates of the survey, from October 2002 and March 2003. Although this is
a simplification, it appears to be a good approximation of the actual market: most people both
place and reply to ad (75 percent of our sample had replied to at least one ad). Furthermore,
most people (40 percent) only post an ad once, so that there is no repetition.
We now need to construct ordinal preferences over the entire set of bride (groom) wanted
ads for each man (woman), in the sample.
To do so we use our the parameters in equation (2.2) to construct the predicted "utility"
that each man i in the sample (the set of ads) would get from matching with woman j (and
vice versa for women) using the following equations. We use both the estimates coming from
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the ranking and the decision to consider or not a letter 26
UPý = &mXj + rnf (Xi, X3 ) (2.4)
S = fX + ff (Xi, X3 )Uf xi+ (xxj)
Functions Um and Uf and then transformed into ordinal ranking such that
SUim > U'j > UT"
Ri = n if 2j i
and R , = n - 1  and R =n+ l
Ri = n if Ui, UR• > V.
and R• n -1 and R - =n+l
Applying this methodology for all males and females in the sample, this generates a full set of
ordinal preferences for each ad placer with respect to all ad placers of the opposite gender.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm can be computed in many ways. In most of the results presented
in this section, we assume that men make an offer to women (we later explore how the results
change when women propose to men instead).
When men propose to women, the algorithm works as follows. All men first propose to their
most highly-ranked women. Women consider all the offers they receive and select the best one
(staying single is considered to be a worse option than any marriage). All men who haven't
been retained then select their second choice. If a woman receives a new offer that is preferable
to the one she is currently holding, she releases the old offer and this man must then propose
to the next woman on his list. This continues until all men have been matched. Since they are
the long side of the market, some women will remain single.
In this setting, ties will occur. This is due to the fact that some people are, based on the
characteristics chosen in the main regression, identical one to another. These ties are broken
randomly. However, this is not of great importance in this context (unlike what has been
discussed in other settings, see Erdil and Ergin 2008). Since ties are generated by individuals
26The input required by the stable matching algorithm is a measure of ordinal and not cardinal utility, so fixed
effects can be ignored. This is because the fixed effect of male i for example, simply affects the overall preference
of person i towards all potential mates and not the relative ranking of each mate within his set of preferences.
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who have exactly the same preferences, randomizing who is selected does not create any problem:
if individuals A and B are identical and have the same preferences, it is irrelevant for our purpose
whether person C is matched with A or with B.
In order to obtain confidence intervals for the results of the matching algorithm, preference
estimation from the previous section were bootstrapped. Then, using each of the 1000 iterations
of the bootstrap, the algorithm was separately computed. This resulted in 1000 stable matchings
that define the range of outcomes that could stem from the distribution of preference parameters.
All the stable matching results will present the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of each characteristic
of interest to bound the range of results obtained.
We introduce search frictions in the following way. First, we constrain males to contact
individuals close to their unconstrained optimal choice (within 1000 ranks). Second, at every
offer period, a man may be unable to offer to a particular woman with 75 percent probability
and may thus be constrained to skip this woman and offer to the next preferred candidate. With
search frictions, some males remain unmatched.
Two other important variations were introduced, to explore the role that caste preference
play in equilibrium. In the first case, caste matching was imposed on all individuals. Any
suitor who approaches a female of a different caste is immediately rejected. This provides a
benchmark equilibrium in the case of perfect caste matching. Symmetrically, "caste-blindness"
is also considered by removing any caste-related coefficients from the preference parameters
when computing equation (2.4). This allows us to simulate what the equilibrium would look
like if caste was simply ignored.
Finally, to compare the results of the algorithm to those observed in the data, the summary
statistics for the algorithm results are computed only for the individuals in our original sample.
This was done simply because our overall sample is small and this insure that whatever difference
observed between the algorithm and the observed data does not stem from any difference between
the samples. Results are extremely similar if we compare the algorithm results for the entire set
of ads to the sampled outcomes.
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2.5.2 Results
This section presents the stable matches estimated with the algorithm as described above.
It suggests that the observed outcomes are fairly similar to what is predicted by a Gale-Shapley
algorithm despite the simplifications it imposes.
Who stays single?
Table 2.9 display the mean differences in the value of key attributes between single and
married females in the simulations and in the observed data, that is the difference between the
characteristics of single women and those who are married. Columns 1 and 2 show the values of
the difference at the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent of the distribution in the bootstrap simulation
when we use the preferences parameters estimated with from the "considered" data (Table 2.3).
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the same exercise with the preferences estimated from the "rank" data
(Table 2.4). In all cases, we use the linear model although similar results were obtained with
the non-linear specification. Column 5 present the mean differences in the actual sample with
the confidence interval around that mean shown in Columns 6 and 7.
In most cases, the differences between married and singles observed in the stable matching
have the same signs as the actual differences. Older, shorter, darker skinned, less beautiful and
less educated women are more likely to be single in both the stable matches and the actual data.
Commerce graduates are also less likely to be single. Being from West Bengal, being beautiful
or very beautiful, and occupational wage and income reported in the ad does not affect the
probability to be married or single. For 7 out of the 16 variables, the actual difference between
single and married in our data lies within the confidence interval of the stables matches. In 5
more cases, the confidence intervals overlap.
There are two variables for which the stable matching algorithm gets the sign wrong. The
most important one is the role of caste.27 While we predict that the singles would be of a
lower caste than those who are married, it is not true in the real data, where the singles are, if
anything, of slightly higher castes.
In most cases where the point estimate of the difference in the actual data does not lie
2 7 The other one being whether a woman has a science degree.
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within the bounds of the stable matches estimate, the stable matches overestimate the differences
between the variable. This probably reflects the fact that other factors than these attributes
eventually determines whether or not people decide to marry: this will thus dampen the role of
the variable in the case of actual matches.
As a first pass to investigate this possibility, panel B introduces search frictions. The resulting
characteristics of married and single female is actually quite similar in both scenario (possibly
because the search frictions do not do much). There are now 6 cases where the point estimates
in the data are within the bound of the stables matches, and 6 where the confidence interval
overlap.
Panel C repeats the exercise for males. Since men are the short side of the market, without
any search friction, all men are married. The algorithm results are thus only presented in the
case of search frictions. The signs are now congruent for all the variables, and the observed
means differences between single and married fits within the 95 percent predicted by the stable
matching algorithm in eight out of thirteen characteristics although the algorithm does not
produce very tight predictions. The main characteristics have the expected signs on the change
to be married however: males who are more educated, have a science degree, and report higher
income or wages, are less likely to remain single, both in reality and as the results of the matching
algorithm.
Who marries whom?
We now compare the characteristics of the couples in the stable matches and in our actual
sample. Table 2.10 displays the main results. Columns 1 and 2 present the lower and upper
bound for the stable matches, using the "considered" response to estimate the preferences,
columns 3 and 4 repeat the exercise for the estimates based on ranking. Columns 5 to 7 present
the data for comparing ad placers and the people they consider. Columns 8 to 10 present the
data on the actual matches. All the differences are expressed in terms of the difference between
the husband and the wife.
The stable matching algorithm predicts the characteristics of the couples reasonably well.
For all the statistics we look at, the sample equivalent in the actual marriages fits within the
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range of the stable matches estimate in 14 cases, and the confidence intervals overlap in 15 cases,
even though for many variables, the bounds on the stable matches are quite tight.
Not surprisingly, a dominant feature is the tendency to marry within one's caste. The stable
matching based on the considered data predicts that 77 percent to 87 percent of the couples
will have the same caste, while the estimates based on ranking predicts that 67 percent to 84
percent of the couples will have the same caste. In practice, almost 70 percent of the couple are
from the same caste.
Turning to the other pattern, the prediction regarding age are roughly similar in the simu-
lations and in the data. Husbands are almost 6 years older than their wives on average. Height
differences are slightly underestimated and the correlations are a little bit too high. Both the
data and the simulation suggest that husbands are 10 to 12 centimeters taller than their wives.
For education, we correctly predict the fraction of couples with the same education level and
the correlation between the education of the spouses, although we tend to predict that husbands
will be less educated than their wives, and the opposite is true in the data. This is surprising,
and probably comes from the fact that for women, we only have education in the regression,
while for men, we have education, income, and wage. As we discussed, these three variables
may be colinear, which may lead to underestimating the importance of education in the groom
wanted regression.
Comparing our indices of quality, we find that males have higher quality than females al-
though this measure is slightly overestimated compared to the observed data. These indices are
also positively correlated according to the algorithm and in reality.
The algorithm does not have much to say on predicted wage and income differences. This
appears to stem from the fact that few women report their wage and income and that these
variables are not part of the estimated preferences for males. Finally, we seem to severely
overestimate the correlation in family origins.
Introducing search frictions improves slightly the fit of the algorithm result. Although the
results are not altered greatly, they are modified in a way that usually increases their resemblance
to the observed data. The education and wage differences become more positive with search
frictions than they were without them. Height differences are now including the observed data
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in the case where considered probabilities are used as preference parameters. Family origin
matching is still overestimated when compared to the observed matches.
We also computed the equilibrium under two variants, presented in Table 2.A.6. First, we
computed the equilibrium under the assumption that women propose rather than men. The
equilibrium we obtain is very similar in terms of who marries whom. Furthermore, while not
shown, the characteristics of who remains single and who finds a match are almost identical when
women proposed. This is encouraging, since finding very different results when men and women
propose would have suggested a multiplicity of equilibria in our marriage market. Finally, we
also imposed a balanced sex ratio by randomly selecting a subset of females equal to the number
of male ads in the sample. While this creates some differences in the algorithm, the results are
still fairly similar to the ones presented in the main tables.
2.6 The role of caste preferences in equilibrium
In Section 2.4, we saw that there was a strong preference for marrying within one's caste.
Men were willing to sacrifice up to 4 categories of education and women more than 300 percent
of a man's income in order to remain within one's caste. In section 4, we saw that indeed, about
70 percent of the marriages take place within caste. While individual appear to be ready to
pay a high price to marry within their caste, do they end up paying it in equilibrium? More
generally, does the preference for marrying within caste affects other dimension of matching?
In Section 2.2, the theoretical model emphasized that the equilibrium role of caste crucially
depends on whether preferences for caste are horizontal or vertical. Section 2.4 has then argued
that the estimate we obtain from the estimation of preferences suggest that the desire for en-
dogamy is much larger than that for hypergamy in this context, that is that the preference for
caste is horizontal.
The theoretical model discussed above also suggests that one important element is whether
the distribution of male and female "quality" is balanced across castes. In this context, we
know that there is a surplus of females given that more ad placers are looking for a groom.
However, is there evidence of a difference in the quality distribution across castes that differ by
gender? To evaluate this question, we used the "quality" measure defined above (without any
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caste parameter) and compared the overall distribution of quality by caste for males and females
among the interview sample. We find that the distributions are fairly similar for all major caste
groups (Brahmin, Kayastha, Baisya and Sagdope).but are less similar for caste groups with
fewer observations. These results hold whether one compares the distribution in quality among
the interview sample or among the letter writers.
Finally, the model we elaborated earlier also suggests that the equilibrium price will be low
when there is a group who does not have caste preferences. We find that in our data, between 25
and 30 per cent of individuals are willing to marry outside their caste. This roughly corresponds
to the number of matches observed that are not within one's caste, although not all individuals
who say they would be willing to marry outside their caste eventually do so (and vice versa).
Given these pieces of evidence, what do the algorithm results tell us about the actual role of
caste in the matching equilibrium? Table 2.11 takes one cut at this issue. The first columns of
panel A of Table 2.11 reproduce columns 1 and 2 of the first panel of Table 2.10. The second
panel constrains all marriages to take place within one's caste. Panel C entirely ignores caste
when computing the preference of each ad placer for each prospective bride or groom.
The striking result in this table is that neither of these manipulations affects very much
how matches look like along the other dimensions. As expected, the correlations in age, height,
education increase as the preferences for castes diminishes (they are the highest when matches
are restricted to be within caste, and the lowest when preferences for caste is "shut down"), but
the gradient is fairly low, and very few of the other variables are affected.
Moreover, the proportion of within-caste marriage falls by a large fraction when preferences
are caste-blind. This suggests that castes do not proxy for other attributes. There are many
potential matches for each person, both within and outside her caste.
Columns (3) to (10) present the algorithm results by key caste groups. These results suggest
that the conclusions drawn above are fairly similar across caste groups, despite the fact that the
sub-castes within the Baisya and the Sagdope groups are relatively smaller than those within the
Brahmin. However, imposing caste-blindness appears to affect more importantly smaller castes
than Brahmins or Kayashtas. In particular, the first two groups still marry within caste in 20-40
percent of the cases. Baisya and Sagdope, on the other hand, almost rarely marry within their
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castes once caste preferences are omitted. Some correlations among the Sagdope, in particular
age and education correlations, appear to fall once one imposes within-caste matching.
Overall it seems that once the algorithm removes caste information from the preferences,
the individuals marry almost identical individuals but from another caste. This would suggest
that the equilibrium price of caste ought to be low. To further study this pattern, we look at
the actual matching patterns of our sample. We found no evidence that men or women who
marry outside their caste sacrifice "quality" measured in a variety of ways. However, this could
be due to selection, that is that individuals who have less of a preference for caste would select
to marry outside their caste. Since their "cost" of caste matching is lower, this is what we
would measure in equilibrium. Thus, we turn to the results of the algorithm to attempt to
alleviate this concern since in this context, there is no unobservable taste determinants. To do
so, a regression was run for each iteration of the algorithm. This regression controlled for all
of the ad placer's characteristics and compared various measures of quality of the match for
the pairs that were within caste to those that were not. Table 2.12 presents the mean and the
standard deviation of the coefficients on whether or not the couple was within the same caste.
These results suggest very small, insignificant and often in the wrong direction prices of caste
matching. For example, individuals who marry within their own caste are also more likely to
marry more educated individuals.
As a comparison, the equilibrium price of education is computed as well in a similar fashion.
The left hand panel of Table 2.12 suggests that as opposed to caste, individuals are forced to
make a trade-off between for example beauty and educational level of a female. A man who
marries a female who has more education also marries one who is older, less beautiful and darker
skinned. Little correlation is found between a prospective groom's education and other qualities.
One should note, however, that the tradeoff in equilibrium in this case is still smaller than the
one observed from preferences.
We thus find that the equilibrium price of caste is very small and that altering the way caste
is perceived by individuals does not transform the overall matching equilibrium importantly.
This is consistent with our theoretical model and the estimated preferences we obtained.
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2.7 Conclusion
Our results indicate that while caste is highly valued in terms of preferences, it does not
require a very high price in equilibrium. This is consistent with assuming that preferences are
relatively horizontal and that the populations are close to being balanced. Both these conditions
appear to hold in the data we collected for arranged marriages in West Bengal.
A number of conclusions follow from this: First, there is no reason to expect that economic
growth by itself will undermine caste-based preferences in marriage. Second, caste-based pref-
erences in marriage are unlikely to be a major constraint on growth. Finally one might worry
that when caste becomes less important inequality might increase along other dimensions as we
see more assortative matching. Given that the matching is already close to being assortative
this is probably not an important concern.
2.8 References
Anderson, S. (2003). Why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising
in india. The Journal of Political Economy 111(2), 269-310.
Bargain, O., S. K. Bhaumik, M. Chakrabarty, and Z. Zhao (2007). Returns to education and
earnings differences between Chinese and Indian wage earners. available at http://www. iza.
org/conferencefiles/worldb2007/bargain-o1569.pdf.
Becker, G. S. (1973). A theory of marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81(4), 813-46.
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2004). Are emily and greg more employable than lakisha
and jamal? a field experiment on labor market discrimination. The American Economic
Review 94 (4), 991-1013.
Bose, N. K. (1958). Some aspects of caste in bengal. The Journal of American Folklore 71,
397-412.
Cole, H. L., G. J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite (1992). Social norms, savings behavior, and
growth. The Journal of Political Economy 100(6), 1092-1125.
128
Erdil, A. and H. Ergin (2008). What's the matter with tie-breaking? improving efficiency in
school choice. American Economic Review.
Fisman, R., S. S. Iyengar, E. Kamenica, and I. Simonson (2006). Gender differences in mate selec-
tion: Evidence from a speed dating experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (2),
673-697.
Fisman, R., S. S. Iyengar, E. Kamenica, and I. Simonson (2008). Racial preferences in dating.
Review of Economic Studies Vol. 75(1), 117-132.
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig (2001). Missing women, the marriage market and economic
growth. Unpublished manuscript.
Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The
American Mathematical Monthly 69(1), 9-15.
Glinskaya, E. and M. Lokshin (2005). Wage differentials between the public and the private
sectors in india. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3574 available at http:
//ssrn. com/paper=719121.
Hitsch, G. J., A. Hortacsu, and D. Ariely (2006). What Makes You Click? Mate Preferences
and Matching Outcomes in Online Dating. MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4603-06, available
at http: //ssrn. com/paper=895442.
Lam, D. (1988). Marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods: Theo-
retical results and empirical implications. The Journal of Human Resources 23(4), 462-487.
Munshi, K. and M. Rosenzweig (2006). Traditional institutions meet the modern world: Caste,
gender, and schooling choice in a globalizing economy. American Economic Review 96(4),
1225-1252.
Risley, H. H. (1981). The Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Volume II. Firma Mukhopadhyay.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and 0. Stark (1989). Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage:
Evidence from rural india. The Journal of Political Economy 97(4), 905-926.
129
2.9 Tables and figures
Table 2.1: Summary statistics-Ad placers
Variable Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Full set Interviewed Full set Interviewed
(N=14172) (N=506) (N=8038) (N=277)
Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev.
0.26
0.04
0.02
0.30
0.18
0.13
0.02
0.06
26.68
1.56
2.36
0.06
0.56
0.03
0.06
0.01
0.46
0.29
0.06
0.00
0.66
0.11
0.28
0.01
5.55
9.22
0.44
0.20
0.13
0.46
0.39
0.34
0.14
0.23
3.90
0.04
0.84
0.24
0.50
0.16
0.23
0.10
0.50
0.45
0.24
0.04
0.47
0.31
0.45
0.11
0.36
0.83
22.67 19.84 82.71 76.10
0.44
0.20
0.13
0.48
0.39
0.30
0.13
0.16
3.65
0.04
0.80
0.27
0.50
0.15
0.28
0.04
0.50
0.44
0.22
0.10
0.49
0.33
0.46
0.07
0.35
0.77
0.27
0.03
0.02
0.29
0.20
0.13
0.02
0.05
0.44
0.18
0.13
0.45
0.40
0.34
0.12
0.21
0.25
0.05
0.01
0.32
0.18
0.12
0.03
0.04
0.26
0.04
0.02
0.35
0.19
0.10
0.02
0.03
26.59
1.58
2.30
0.08
0.44
0.02
0.08
0.00
0.49
0.26
0.05
0.01
0.58
0.12
0.30
0.01
5.54
8.75
0.44
0.21
0.12
0.47
0.38
0.33
0.16
0.20
31.58 4.31 32.14 4.45
1.68 0.06 1.70 0.06
0.01
0.07
0.03
0.36
0.17
0.13
0.01
0.12
0.37
0.55
0.02
5.20
9.46
0.12
0.25
0.18
0.48
0.37
0.34
0.08
0.33
0.48
0.50
0.15
0.79
0.75
0.01
0.08
0.04
0.35
0.15
0.18
0.01
0.05
0.40
0.55
0.00
5.61
9.44
0.08
0.27
0.20
0.48
0.36
0.39
0.10
0.21
0.49
0.50
0.00
0.53
0.67
Number of responses
Caste
Brahmin
Baidya
Kshatriya
Kayastha
Baisya and others
Sagdope and others
Other castes
Scheduled castes
Physical characteristics
Age
Height (meters)
Skin tone
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Education and Income
Less than high school
High school
Post-secondary
College
Master's
PhD
Other degree
Humanities/Arts
Commerce
Science
Other field
Log wage
Log income
Location
Calcutta
Other residence
West Bengali
Demands mentioned
Only within caste
Caste no bar
No dowry demanded
Ads which omit...
Caste
Age
Height
Education
Field
Residence
Family origin
Wage
Income
Skin tone
Beauty
0.09 0.29
0.31 0.46
0.03 0.16
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.10
0.27
0.86
0.29
0.83
0.98
0.23
0.25
0.13
0.10
0.19
0.30
0.44
0.35
0.45
0.38
0.13
0.42
0.43
0.43 0.50
0.33 0.47
0.02 0.12
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.08
0.25
0.84
0.23
0.84
0.97
0.21
0.27
0.04
0.12
0.19
0.27
0.43
0.37
0.42
0.37
0.16
0.41
0.44
0.10
0.26
0.12
0.03
0.02
0.10
0.22
0.39
0.70
0.32
0.25
0.78
0.30 0.33 0.47
0.44 0.24 0.43
0.32 0.10 0.31
0.16
0.13
0.30
0.42
0.49
0.46
0.47
0.43
0.41
0.01
0.04
0.11
0.18
0.30
0.52
0.29
0.57
0.74
0.08
0.20
0.31
0.39
0.46
0.50
0.45
0.50
0.44
Statistics are computed only among individuals reporting a given characteristics
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0.51 0.50 0.80 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.76 0.43
0.44 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.49
Table 2.2: Summary statistics-Respondents
Variables Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Letters Matches Letters Matches
(N=5630) (N=158) (N=3944) (N=131)
Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev.
Considered
Caste
Brahmin
Baidya
Kshatriya
Kayastha
Baisya and others
Sagdope and others
Other castes
Scheduled castes
Same caste
Difference in caste
Physical Characteristics
Age
Age difference
Height (meters)
Height difference (m)
Skin tone
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Education and Income
Less than high school
High school
Post-secondary
College
Master's
PhD
Other degree
Same education level
Male is more educated
Humanities/Arts
Commerce
Science
Other field
Log wage
Log income
Location
Calcutta
Same residence
West Bengali
Same family origin
Demands mentioned
No dowry demanded
Letters which omit
Caste
Age
Height
Education
Field
Residence
Family origin
Wage
Income
Skin tone
Beauty
0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45
0.23
0.03
0.01
0.38
0.20
0.12
0.01
0.04
0.66
-0.17
0.42
0.17
0.10
0.48
0.40
0.32
0.08
0.19
0.47
1.37
32.60 4.37
6.25 2.92
1.70 0.06
0.12 0.06
0.00
0.08
0.04
0.51
0.21
0.13
0.03
0.44
0.28
0.13
0.34
0.51
0.02
5.47
9.31
0.55
0.50
0.39
0.75
0.06
0.27
0.19
0.50
0.41
0.33
0.18
0.50
0.45
0.33
0.47
0.50
0.14
0.59
0.73
0.50
0.50
0.49
0.43
0.27
0.04
0.01
0.43
0.15
0.07
0.01
0.02
0.68
0.10
0.45
0.19
0.08
0.50
0.36
0.26
0.11
0.14
0.47
1.43
0.21
0.04
0.02
0.36
0.20
0.11
0.02
0.04
0.64
-0.04
32.49 3.67 26.34
6.61 2.95 5.93
1.71 0.08 1.58
0.13 0.08 0.12
1.41
0.10
0.51
0.00 0.00 0.02
0.06 0.22 0.16
0.03 0.16 0.00
0.35 0.48 0.58
0.25 0.44 0.18
0.32 0.47 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.04
0.42 0.49 0.37
0.45 0.50 0.44
0.52 0.50 0.63
0.11
0.48 0.50 0.25
0.00 0.00 0.01
5.53 0.57 5.50
9.47 0.79 8.85
0.59 0.50 0.54
0.64 0.49 0.44
0.46 0.50 0.41
0.75 0.43 0.71
0.41
0.19
0.14
0.48
0.40
0.32
0.14
0.19
0.48
1.23
3.96
2.65
0.04
0.07
0.77
0.31
0.50
0.12
0.37
0.06
0.49
0.39
0.13
0.19
0.48
0.50
0.48
0.31
0.43
0.12
0.35
0.68
0.24
0.05
0.03
0.37
0.16
0.11
0.01
0.03
0.72
-0.11
0.42
0.23
0.17
0.49
0.37
0.31
0.09
0.17
0.45
1.08
27.33 3.67
4.60 2.84
1.59 0.05
0.12 0.06
0.01
0.08
0.02
0.44
0.34
0.11
0.00
0.46
0.23
0.79
0.21
0.00
5.46
1.75
0.50 0.53
0.50 0.42
0.49 0.42
0.46 0.72
0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00
0.30
0.04
0.13
0.08
0.20
0.15
0.31
0.44
0.66
0.46
0.20
0.33
0.27
0.40
0.36
0.46
0.50
0.47
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.39
0.00
0.03
0.08
0.31
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.49
0.00
0.18
0.28
0.46
0.28
0.03
0.08
0.04
0.25
0.19
0.27
0.86
0.98
0.14
0.36
0.45
0.17
0.27
0.19
0.43
0.40
0.44
0.35
0.14
0.35
0.48
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.79
0.04
1.00
1.00
0.09
0.28
0.12
0.50
0.48
0.32
0.00
0.50
0.42
0.41
0.41
0.00
0.36
3.54
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.45
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.42
0.00
0.00
0.41
0.19
0.00
0.00
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Statistics are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer.
Statistics are computed only among individuals reporting a given characteristics. Ads placed by females (males) received letters
by males (females) : the first four columns refer to prospective and actual grooms, the last four to prospective and actual brides.
Table 2.3: Probability of considering a letter
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Same caste
Same main caste
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male
Same caste*only within
Diff. in caste*only within
Same caste*no bar
Diff. in caste*no bar
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
0.1317***
(0.0329)
-0.0119
(0.0151)
0.0145
(0.0133)
0.0954
(0.1093)
0.0163
(0.0400)
-0.0560
(0.0366)
0.0084
(0.0121)
-0.0019
(0.0047)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
1.2508***
(0.2745)
-3.4695***
(0.9692)
0.0732
(0.1097)
0.1216
(0.1187)
0.1019
(0.1183)
0.2242
(0.1219)
0.2589*
(0.1248)
0.0412
(0.0239)
0.0571
(0.0379)
0.2126
(0.1143)
-0.0035
(0.0047)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
1.3455***
(0.2754)
-3.8398***
(0.9718)
0.0907
(0.1102)
0.1413
(0.1192)
0.1132
(0.1188)
0.2330
(0.1224)
0.2636*
(0.1254)
0.0435
(0.0240)
0.0646
(0.0381)
0.2371*
(0.1148)
0.1347**
(0.0425)
0.0273
(0.0485)
-0.0276
(0.0197)
0.0056
(0.0160)
0.0918
(0.1093)
0.0158
(0.0400)
-0.0549
(0.0366)
0.0098
(0.0121)
-0.0019
(0.0047)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
1.2490***
(0.2745)
-3.4465***
(0.9694)
0.0751
(0.1097)
0.1238
(0.1188)
0.1024
(0.1183)
0.2245
(0.1219)
0.2595*
(0.1248)
0.0413
(0.0239)
0.0571
(0.0379)
0.2140
(0.1143)
0.1395*** 0.8604*** 0.1707***
(0.0330) (0.2068) (0.0351)
0.0108(0.0152)
-0.0103
(0.0134)
0.0968
(0.1097)
0.0188
(0.0402)
-0.0563
(0.0367)
0.0052
(0.0121)
-0.0032
(0.0047)
-0.0008**(0.0003)
1.3028***
(0.2752)
-3.5684***
(0.9709)
-0.0788
(0.0928)
0.1393
(0.0903)
35.1982
(1288.88)
11.6502
(429.6274)
-0.4950*
(0.2187)
0.0528
(0.0786)
0.1647***
(0.0458)
-0.0203***
(0.0035)
8.1805***
(1.7128)
-22.4174***
(5.9882)
0.0770
(0.6478)
0.3391
(0.6995)
0.2708
(0.6942)
0.9356
(0.7154)
1.1708
(0.7319)
0.2482(0.1393)
0.3556
(0.2166)
0.8966
(0.6698)
-0.0175
(0.0170)
-0.0399*
(0.0172)
0.1234
(0.1409)
-0.0024
(0.0596)
-0.0565
(0.0428)
-0.0121
(0.0151)
0.0443***
(0.0083)
-0.0023***
(0.0006)
0.7228*
(0.3329)
-6.2532***
(1.2451)
0.1043
(0.0623)
0.0832
(0.1403)
0.0966
(0.0879)
0.1679
(0.0913)
0.2626*
(0.1031)
0.0174
(0.0307)
-0.0057
(0.0419)
0.2125**
(0.0822)
0.0471***
(0.0083)
-0.0025***
(0.0006)
0.6829*
(0.3348)
-6.1518***
(1.2522)
0.1133
(0.0628)
0.0701
(0.1409)
0.1224
(0.0884)
0.1928*
(0.0918)
0.2835**
(0.1035)
0.0084
(0.0309)
-0.0098
(0.0422)
0.2201**
(0.0828)
0.1769***
(0.0442)
-0.0331
(0.0554)
-0.0099
(0.0232)
-0.0301
(0.0220)
0.1217
(0.1410)
-0.0010
(0.0596)
-0.0574
(0.0429)
-0.0118
(0.0152)
0.0443***
(0.0083)
-0.0023***
(0.0006)
0.7153*
(0.3331)
-6.2375***
(1.2455)
0.1038
(0.0624)
0.0808
(0.1403)
0.0965
(0.0880)
0.1678
(0.0914)
0.2624*
(0.1031)
0.0173(0.0307)
-0.0057
(0.0419)
0.2123**
(0.0823)
0.1800*** 1.0454***
(0.0352) (0.2052)
0.0138 -0.1990
(0.0171) (0.1081)
0.0428* -0.2958**
(0.0173) (0.0990)
0.1162 1.5756
(0.1418) (1.7103)
0.0056 -0.0674
(0.0597) (0.6857)
-0.0629 -0.2599
(0.0430) (0.2424)
-0.0115 -0.1194
(0.0152) (0.0880)
0.0394*** 0.2933***
(0.0082) (0.0545)
0.0023*** -0.0150***
(0.0006) (0.0038)
0.7585* 10.2634***
(0.3339) (2.6758)
6.3265*** -60.1849***
(1.2491) (10.2198)
0.6122
(0.3896)
0.5283
(0.8193)
0.3744
(0.5294)
0.8527
(0.5464)
1.6229**
(0.6068)
0.0296
(0.1636)
-0.1400
(0.2352)
1.2286*
(0.4877)
Continued on next page
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Science 0.1002*** 0.0951*** 0.0999*** 0.5945*** 0.0456* 0.0423* 0.0457* 0.3074**(0.0214)
0.0529*
(0.0222)
0.0332
(0.0518)
0.0734***
(0.0137)
0.0469
(0.0352)
0.0348
(0.0194)
0.0995***
(0.0148)
0.1046***
(0.0144)
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
Same family origin
Log income
Log wage
Skin tone
Beautiful
Very beautiful
Predicted income
N 5628
(0.0215)
0.0525*
(0.0223)
0.0321
(0.0521)
0.0771***
(0.0138)
0.0445
(0.0353)
0.0513**
(0.0194)
0.0953***
(0.0148)
0.1093***
(0.0145)
5628
(0.0214)
0.0526*
(0.0222)
0.0326
(0.0518)
0.0735***
(0.0138)
0.0463
(0.0352)
0.0351
(0.0194)
0.0992***
(0.0148)
0.1050***
(0.0144)
5628
0.0757***
(0.0138)
0.0412
(0.0352)
0.0363
(0.0194)
0.3478***
(0.0193)
5628
(0.1252)
0.3096*
(0.1312)
0.2229
(0.2774)
0.4089***
(0.0777)
0.2988
(0.2060)
0.2641*
(0.1127)
0.6010***
(0.0853)
0.5581***
(0.0837)
5628
(0.0192)
0.0781**
(0.0259)
0.0154
(0.0742)
0.0620**
(0.0190)
-0.0437
(0.0289)
0.0926***
(0.0214)
-0.0506***
(0.0101)
0.0071
(0.0190)
0.0532
(0.0300)
3944
(0.0192)
0.0819**
(0.0260)
0.0162
(0.0741)
0.0588**
(0.0190)
-0.0455
(0.0290)
0.1067***
(0.0214)
-0.0518***
(0.0102)
0.0100
(0.0191)
0.0575
(0.0301)
3944
(0.0192)
0.0785**
(0.0259)
0.0153
(0.0742)
0.0621**
(0.0190)
-0.0438
(0.0289)
0.0932***
(0.0214)
-0.0508***
(0.0101)
0.0071
(0.0190)
0.0533
(0.0300)
3944
0.0591**
(0.0190)
-0.0442
(0.0290)
0.0977***
(0.0215)
-0.0534***
(0.0101)
0.0043
(0.0191)
0.0465
(0.0301)
0.0817***
(0.0228)
3944
(0.1026)
0.4895***
(0.1379)
-0.2174
(0.4218)
0.3915***
(0.1064)
-0.1492
(0.1593)
0.6472***
(0.1246)
-0.3004***
(0.0595)
0.0920
(0.1035)
0.3279*
(0.1569)
3944
All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided
by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location
and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Ads placed by females (males) received letters
by males (females): the first five columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last five to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides. Standard
errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 2.4: Rank of the letter
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Same caste
Same main caste
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male
Same caste*only within
Diff. in caste*only within
Same caste*no bar
Diff. in caste*no bar
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
1.2797***
(0.2933)
-0.0500
(0.1341)
0.1070
(0.1183)
1.1726
(0.9116)
0.4459
(0.3334)
-0.8681**
(0.3258)
0.1021
(0.1071)
0.0345
(0.0405)
-0.0114***
(0.0023)
9.5137***
(2.5694)
-24.5037**
(9.2415)
0.6719
(0.9403)
1.3963
(1.0262)
1.4920
(1.0213)
2.3654*
(1.0533)
2.6963*
(1.0810)
0.5329*
(0.2091)
0.8218*
(0.3315)
1.8538
(0.9855)
0.0255
(0.0405)
-0.0115***
(0.0023)
9.8711***
(2.5757)
-26.3139**
(9.2562)
0.9189
(0.9438)
1.7144
(1.0290)
1.7376
(1.0243)
2.6088*
(1.0564)
2.9129**
(1.0842)
0.5361*
(0.2100)
0.8550*
(0.3327)
2.1751*
(0.9886)
1.1275**
(0.3821)
0.2377
(0.3825)
-0.0179
(0.1437)
0.0767
(0.1280)
1.1737
(0.9117)
0.4471
(0.3334)
-0.8678**
(0.3258)
0.1041
(0.1072)
0.0348
(0.0405)
-0.0114***
(0.0023)
9.4794***
(2.5701)
-24.4011**
(9.2436)
0.6811
(0.9405)
1.4059
(1.0264)
1.4965
(1.0214)
2.3650*
(1.0534)
2.6967*
(1.0811)
0.5340*
(0.2092)
0.8256*
(0.3316)
1.8618
(0.9857)
1.3319*** 0.4314*** 1.2591***
(0.2942) (0.0928) (0.3458)
0.0176
(0.1345)
-0.0784
(0.1188)
1.1670
(0.9163)
0.4552
(0.3350)
-0.8602**
(0.3267)
0.0831
(0.1074)
0.0214
(0.0406)
-0.0110***
(0.0023)
9.8311***
(2.5784)
-25.3582**
(9.2646)
-0.0034
(0.0418)
0.0281
(0.0372)
0.2128
(0.2848)
0.1670
(0.1117)
-0.2911**
(0.1028)
0.0247
(0.0342)
0.0053
(0.0127)
-0.0031***
(0.0007)
3.5492***
(0.8651)
-9.5136**
(3.2019)
0.3796
(0.3366)
0.5588
(0.3629)
0.6384
(0.3635)
0.9383*
(0.3739)
1.0487**
(0.3828)
0.1369*
(0.0662)
0.2317*
(0.1065)
0.7512*
(0.3497)
-0.4707**
(0.1699)
-0.3310
(0.1705)
2.1112
(1.3256)
-0.0183
(0.5781)
-0.8599*
(0.4315)
-0.2092
(0.1521)
0.5215***
(0.0816)
-0.0284***
(0.0057)
7.2790*
(3.2304)
-69.0103***
(12.3135)
1.7107**
(0.6092)
2.5003
(1.4645)
2.7817**
(0.8894)
3.9425***
(0.9236)
4.2363***
(1.0650)
0.2423
(0.2995)
0.3416
(0.4169)
2.6315**
(0.8065)
0.5411***
(0.0820)
-0.0291***
(0.0057)
6.8472*
(3.2517)
-68.9625***
(12.3931)
1.7634**
(0.6140)
2.3729
(1.4709)
2.9152**
(0.8959)
4.0203***
(0.9303)
4.2562***
(1.0720)
0.1380
(0.3013)
0.2331
(0.4194)
2.6192**
(0.8122)
1.5022***
(0.4292)
-0.4295
(0.4490)
-0.5472**
(0.1878)
-0.2548
(0.1882)
2.0985
(1.3257)
-0.0094
(0.5782)
-0.8912*
(0.4328)
-0.2020
(0.1523)
0.5205***
(0.0816)
-0.0282***
(0.0057)
7.2231*
(3.2309)
-68.8785***
(12.3145)
1.7049**
(0.6092)
2.4921
(1.4645)
2.7961**
(0.8896)
3.9590***
(0.9237)
4.2333***
(1.0650)
0.2433
(0.2995)
0.3442
(0.4169)
2.6275**
(0.8065)
1.4072*** 0.3595***
(0.3492) (0.0928)
-O
0
-0
-7(
0.3725* -0.1421**
(0.1710) (0.0461)
0.3626* -0.0976*
(0.1724) (0.0458)
2.1633 0.7029
(1.3420) (0.3674)
0.1361 -0.0874
(0.5843) (0.1582)
-0.9396* -0.2521*
(0.4362) (0.1156)
-0.1763 -0.0734
(0.1538) (0.0409)
.4463*** 0.1457***
(0.0817) (0.0218)
).0263*** -0.0079***
(0.0057) (0.0015)
7.6700* 1.9194*
(3.2590) (0.8796)
0.3860*** -18.7289***
12.4198) (3.3576)
0.4798**
(0.1709)
0.6638
(0.3922)
0.7474**
(0.2434)
1.0457***
(0.2527)
1.2354***
(0.2918)
0.0577
(0.0803)
0.0886
(0.1120)
0.7227**
(0.2225)
Continued on next page
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit Basic No caste Main caste Limited Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
Same family origin
Log income
Log wage
Skin tone
Beautiful
Very beautiful
Predicted income
N
1.0444***
(0.1882)
0.3640
(0.1948)
0.1361
(0.4631)
0.4690***
(0.1204)
0.4846
(0.3086)
0.2665
(0.1710)
0.8761***
(0.1310)
0.9205***
(0.1258)
5094
0.9810***
(0.1887)
0.3573
(0.1956)
0.1378
(0.4654)
0.4953***
(0.1206)
0.4160
(0.3097)
0.3861*
(0.1710)
0.8254***
(0.1308)
0.9451***
(0.1262)
5094
1.0454***
(0.1882)
0.3646
(0.1948)
0.1388
(0.4632)
0.4703***
(0.1205)
0.4831
(0.3086)
0.2656
(0.1710)
0.8782***
(0.1310)
0.9221***
(0.1259)
5094
0.4926***
(0.1206)
0.4077
(0.3094)
0.2767
(0.1718)
3.2430***
(0.1715)
5094
0.3522***
(0.0600)
0.1096
(0.0622)
0.0921
(0.1476)
0.1738***
(0.0383)
0.1181
(0.0959)
0.0712
(0.0538)
0.2906***
(0.0431)
0.2988***
(0.0397)
5094
0.7039***
(0.1928)
1.1107***
(0.2600)
1.1653
(0.7950)
0.6515***
(0.1891)
-0.1912
(0.2876)
0.7190***
(0.2156)
-0.4585***
(0.1005)
0.2045
(0.1885)
0.5376
(0.2934)
3520
0.6512***
(0.1931)
1.1203***
(0.2612)
1.2332
(0.7994)
0.6240**
(0.1897)
-0.2096
(0.2893)
0.8573***
(0.2163)
-0.4657***
(0.1012)
0.2127
(0.1893)
0.5587
(0.2951)
3520
0.7092***
(0.1929)
1.1076***
(0.2600)
1.1686
(0.7950)
0.6501***
(0.1891)
-0.1944
(0.2877)
0.7150***
(0.2156)
-0.4581***
(0.1005)
0.2095
(0.1885)
0.5363
(0.2934)
3520
0.2050***
(0.0516)
0.3257***
(0.0698)
0.3351
(0.2213)
0.1741***
(0.0509)
-0.0551
(0.0777)
0.1903**
(0.0580)
-0.1292***
(0.0271)
0.0404
(0.0505)
0.1614*
(0.0787)
3520
0.6294***
(0.1906)
-0.2105
(0.2906)
0.8015***
(0.2177)
-0.4995***
(0.1014)
0.1762
(0.1907)
0.4229
(0.2965)
0.9296***
(0.2302)
3520
All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided
by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location
and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Ads placed by females (males) received letters
by males (females): the first five columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last five to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides. Standard
errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5%c; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
N 5094 5094
Table 2.5: Responses to "not too good" letters
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Considered 
Rank 
Considered 
Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Same caste 0.1073* 01134** 10817* 12763*** 00884 014 *** * ***
Diff. in caste*
Higher caste male
Diff. in caste*
Lower caste male
Same caste*only within
Diff. in caste*only within
Same caste*no bar
Diff. in caste*no bar
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
Same family origin
Log income
Log wage
(0.0451)
0.0464*
(0.0197)
0.0027
(0.0175)
-0.0906
(0.1408)
0.0036
(0.0492)
-0.0733
(0.0508)
0.0031
(0.0163)
0.0058
(0.0060)
-0.0008*
(0.0003)
0.9198*
(0.4189)
-3.2350
(1.7081)
-0.0930
(0.2237)
0.0173
(0.2323)
-0.0341
(0.2323)
0.0745
(0.2374)
0.1705
(0.2413)
0.0579
(0.0342)
0.0488
(0.0564)
0.0831
(0.2284)
0.0574*
(0.0281)
0.0558*
(0.0279)
0.0839
(0.0881)
0.0441*(0.0205)
0.0715
(0.0468)
0.0336
(0.0265)
0.1641***
(0.0281)
0.0951***
(0.0212)
(0.0364)
0.0253
(0.0166)
-0.0058
(0.0146)
-0.0344
(0.1273)
0.0062
(0.0473)
-0.0527
(0.0415)
0.0069
(0.0135)
0.0053
(0.0051)
-0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.7934*(0.3334)
-2.0427
(1.2791)
-0.0507
(0.1441)
0.0473
(0.1522)
0.0017
(0.1523)
0.1415
(0.1559)
0.1858
(0.1597)
0.0432
(0.0273)
0.0224
(0.0448)
0.0986
(0.1482)
0.0727**
(0.0234)
0.0535*
(0.0238)
0.0639
(0.0684)
0.0601***
(0.0160)
0.0400
(0.0387)
0.0349
(0.0218)
0.1494***
(0.0222)
0.0860***
(0.0168)
(0.4438)
0.2376
(0.1888)
-0.0291
(0.1714)
-1.0448
(1.2780)
0.3854
(0.4439)
-0.9739*
(0.4908)
0.1017
(0.1559)
0.0372
(0.0560)
-0.0097***
(0.0028)
9.2645*
(4.1113)
-25.9230
(16.7790)
-0.0679
(2.0167)
1.0474
(2.1097)
1.3182
(2.1078)
2.1164
(2.1598)
3.2869
(2.1997)
0.3489
(0.3252)
0.2172
(0.5369)
1.3728
(2.0635)
0.9701***
(0.2711)
0.4692
(0.2654)
0.1661
(0.8389)
0.5010*
(0.1957)
0.2603
(0.4501)
0.4720
(0.2558)
1.3992***
(0.2655)
0.8867***
(0.2037)
(0.3404)
0.0389
(0.1524)
-0.1165
(0.1356)
-0.6513
(1.1149)
0.5496
(0.4123)
-1.0054**
(0.3853)
0.1457
(0.1243)
0.0696
(0.0459)
-0.0117***
(0.0025)
6.8037*
(3.2594)
-13.3929
(12.7629)
0.3281
(1.2549)
1.2573
(1.3380)
1.2914
(1.3368)
2.3877
(1.3715)
2.9018*
(1.4062)
0.5761*
(0.2501)
0.5776
(0.4083)
1.6644
(1.2959)
0.9189***
(0.2158)
0.3747
(0.2190)
0.4733
(0.6334)
0.5145***
(0.1468)
0.3765
(0.3577)
0.1820
(0.2019)
1.2974***
(0.2022)
0.8047***
(0.1536)
(0.0489)
0.0570*
(0.0243)
0.0373
(0.0233)
0.1245
(0.1851)
0.0096
(0.0797)
0.0027
(0.0574)
-0.0265
(0.0206)
0.0435***
(0.0120)
-0.0023*
(0.0009)
0.7503
(0.4284)
-6.1195***
(1.4949)
0.1697
(0.1245)
0.3295
(0.2200)
0.1965
(0.1488)
0.3004*
(0.1530)
0.3640
(0.1920)
-0.0065
(0.0496)
0.0116
(0.0611)
0.2916*
(0.1482)
0.0444
(0.0236)
0.0074
(0.0466)
-0.2849
(0.2053)
0.0626*
(0.0287)
-0.0179
(0.0389)
0.0913**
(0.0309)
(0.0418)
0.0186
(0.0203)
0.0431*
(0.0200)
0.1138
(0.1679)
0.0088
(0.0751)
-0.0206
(0.0499)
-0.0066
(0.0175)
0.0436***
(0.0105)
-0.0021**
(0.0008)
0.9038*
(0.3641)
-6.0644***
(1.3248)
0.1437
(0.0766)
0.2195
(0.1573)
0.1959
(0.1041)
0.2742*
(0.1080)
0.3425**
(0.1321)
0.0194
(0.0373)
0.0001
(0.0491)
0.2564*
(0.0999)
0.0406
(0.0209)
0.0618
(0.0356)
-0.0266
(0.1164)
0.0605**
(0.0232)
-0.0207
(0.0331)
0.0691**
(0.0249)
I.L1441
(0.5085)
0.7497**
(0.2536)
0.6135*
(0.2464)
0.4840
(1.8022)
0.5102
(0.7765)
-0.4229
(0.6295)
-0.5458*
(0.2236)
0.5121***
(0.1297)
-0.0270*
(0.0105)
6.2082
(4.3149)
-66.2058***
(15.1818)
2.9543*
(1.2073)
4.5315*
(2.2618)
4.4956**
(1.4671)
5.8510***
(1.5109)
6.2600**
(1.9928)
0.1562
(0.5013)
0.4938
(0.6235)
3.5910*
(1.4593)
0.5336*
(0.2476)
0.5900
(0.5229)
0.6582
(2.3068)
0.9589**
(0.3092)
-0.0462
(0.4131)
0.5997
(0.3307)
1.4484"
(0.4270)
0.4847*
(0.2100)
0.5529**
(0.2060)
0.6478
(1.6123)
0.6311
(0.7210)
-0.9570
(0.5286)
-0.3208
(0.1847)
0.4841***
(0.1103)
-0.0245**
(0.0085)
7.4802*
(3.5929)
-65.7108***
(13.3146)
2.0051**
(0.7601)
2.4932
(1.6627)
2.9271**
(1.0621)
4.1727***
(1.1016)
5.9120***
(1.4177)
0.3351
(0.3735)
0.5975
(0.5000)
2.9083**
(0.9985)
0.7062**
(0.2152)
1.2313**
(0.3771)
1.8935
(1.2467)
0.6954**
(0.2414)
-0.1084
(0.3410)
0.6442*
(0.2602)
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Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Considered Rank Considered Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skin tone -0.0529*** -0.0421*** -0.4603** -0.5388***
(0.0143) (0.0118) (0.1494) (0.1209)
Beautiful 0.0151 0.0170 0.4348 0.1823
(0.0262) (0.0219) (0.2757) (0.2241)
Very beautiful 0.0915 0.0855* 0.4869 0.6153
(0.0505) (0.0419) (0.5124) (0.4259)
Diff. in quality
less than ptile 50th 75th 50th 75th 50th 75th 50th 75th
N 2767 4141 2488 3753 2048 2909 1762 2553
All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter
writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer
and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions
of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Standard errors in parentheses. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males
(females): the first four columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last four to decisions made by males regarding
prospective brides.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 2.6: Responses for letters, top four castes only
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Considered- Considered- Rank Considered- Considered- Rank
OLS Logit OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Same caste
Diff. in caste
Same caste*only within
Diff. in caste*only within
Same caste*no bar
Diff. in caste*no bar
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
0.1636***
(0.0408)
-0.0203
(0.0157)
0.2760
(0.2504)
0.1630
(0.0907)
-0.1214
(0.0774)
-0.0013
(0.0301)
0.0086
(0.0115)
-0.0021**
(0.0008)
1.7176***
(0.4304)
-4.7533**
(1.5071)
0.0893
(0.2058)
0.1455
(0.2204)
0.0994
(0.2228)
0.2457
(0.2286)
0.3103
(0.2335)
0.0698(0.0400)
0.0683
(0.0642)
0.2176
(0.2114)
0.1027**
(0.0339)
0.0690
(0.0356)
-0.0211
(0.0953)
0.0363
(0.0224)
0.1162*
(0.0576)
0.8372***
(0.2017)
-0.0389
(0.0862)
0.1785*
(0.0824)
-0.0237***
(0.0061)
11.5875***
(2.7654)
-32.3551***
(9.5394)
-0.3359
(1.0614)
-0.0292
(1.1724)
-0.1983
(1.1747)
0.6397
(1.2091)
0.9926
(1.2364)
0.3108
(0.2295)
0.3453
(0.3564)
0.5038
(1.0908)
0.6910***
(0.1962)
0.4884*
(0.2064)
0.2345
(0.5211)
0.2345
(0.1239)
0.7043*
(0.3370)
1.6650***
(0.3041)
-0.2100
(0.1274)
4.0097*
(1.6520)
1.5846**
(0.6090)
-1.4500**
(0.4943)
-0.0133
(0.1612)
0.0384
(0.0551)
-0.0124***
(0.0034)
12.8167***
(2.9819)
-36.7084***
(10.5597)
0.3344
(1.0421)
0.9657
(1.1656)
0.9457
(1.1653)
1.7441
(1.2018)
1.9778
(1.2347)
0.5517*
(0.2502)
1.1132**
(0.3964)
1.6034
(1.0982)
1.1189***
(0.2215)
0.2930
(0.2310)
0.1823
(0.5432)
0.4769***
(0.1432)
0.9203*
(0.3757)
0.1047*
(0.0503)
0.0307
(0.0204)
0.2206
(0.1946)
0.0173
(0.0827)
-0.0283
(0.0868)
-0.0526
(0.0347)
0.0424**
(0.0138)
-0.0016
(0.0010)
0.4528
(0.5064)
-5.5546**
(1.8509)
0.1458
(0.1319)
1.0020
(0.7954)
0.1373
(0.1754)
0.2074
(0.1799)
0.3754*
(0.1875)
0.0544
(0.0516)
-0.0048
(0.0727)
0.3889*
(0.1595)
0.0266
(0.0320)
0.0442
(0.0411)
0.0806
(0.1210)
0.0472
(0.0318)
-0.0082
(0.0489)
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0.6521** 0.9490*
(0.2180) (0.4200)
0.1188 0.6039**
(0.0989) (0.1996)
2.5592
(1.5047)
-0.2654
(0.6165)
-0.4768
(0.7489)
-0.2027
(0.2678)
0.2239** 0.5249***
(0.0783) (0.0941)
-0.0075 -0.0296***
(0.0054) (0.0064)
9.9158* 6.4163
(4.2931) (3.8687)
57.2542*** -69.2712***
(16.0106) (14.5440)
0.6317 2.3437**
(0.8511) (0.7957)
2.8634
(1.7153)
0.3398 2.8282*
(1.0892) (1.1618)
0.7712 3.9660***
(1.1094) (1.1982)
2.0243 5.6290***
(1.1387) (1.3764)
0.2778 0.1380
(0.2602) (0.3726)
-0.1850 0.2927
(0.3859) (0.5242)
1.8667 3.6022***
(0.9668) (1.0440)
0.2026 0.4503
(0.1624) (0.2406)
0.2986 0.8302*
(0.2131) (0.3260)
-0.0493 0.4942
(0.7079) (1.0121)
0.2776 0.6114**
(0.1689) (0.2353)
-0.0137 -0.1505
(0.2607) (0.3615)
-5
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Considered- Considered- Rank Considered- Considered- Rank
OLS Logit OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Same family origin 0.0121 0.1294 0.1625 0.0969** 0.6508*** 0.9472***
(0.0311) (0.1733) (0.2085) (0.0344) (0.1945) (0.2728)
Log income 0.1254*** 0.2514* 1.0116***
(0.0222) (0.1185) (0.1564)
Log wage 0.1176*** 0.4247** 0.9331***
(0.0235) (0.1306) (0.1528)
Skin tone -0.0343* -0.2055* -0.5198***
(0.0171) (0.0927) (0.1261)
Beautiful 0.0214 0.1621 0.0731
(0.0313) (0.1644) (0.2377)
Very beautiful 0.0472 0.4497 0.5465
(0.0527) (0.2594) (0.3878)
N 2295 2045 2191 3944 1474 3570
All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics,
age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided
by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and
family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by
an ad placer. Standard errors in parentheses. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females): the first three
columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last three to decisions made by males regarding
prospective brides.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 2.7: Quality indices by caste categories
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Own Match Share Own Match Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: By letters written by ad placers
Any letter to caste above 0.0067 -0.0118 0.2558 -0.0360 -0.0122 0.3673
(0.0147) (0.0413) (0.0365) (0.0139)
Any letter to caste below -0.0072 -0.0526 0.3101 -0.0110 -0.0049 0.3673
(0.0155) (0.0382) (0.0369) (0.0207)
N 123 37 41 23
Panel B: By letters received by ad placers
Any letter from caste above -0.0101 0.0073 0.3981 0.0160 0.0255 0.5158
(0.0066) (0.0191) (0.0111) (0.0197)
Any letter from caste below 0.0001 -0.0138* 0.5771 0.0163 0.0029 0.5860
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0113) (0.0067)
N 285 158 526 131
All cells correspond to a univariate regression of quality on a dummy variable indicating caste relationship.
Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) refer to the quality of the ad placer and Columns
(2) and (4) to the quality of the eventual match. Males (females) who place ads eventually marry females
(males). Columns (2) and (3) are thus referring to quality of males while Columns (1), (4) to quality of
females.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 2.8: Dowries and probability of being considered
Full Regression Parsimonious
Main effects Interaction of Main effects Interaction of
in sample characteristics in sample characteristics
that does not with not requesting that does not with not requesting
mention dowries a dowry mention dowries a dowry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same caste
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
0.0836**
(0.0264)
0.0128
(0.0143)
-0.0258*
(0.0124)
-0.0025
(0.0049)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
1.3842***
(0.2817)
-3.9449***
(0.9871)
0.0776
(0.1100)
0.1334
(0.1191)
0.1239
(0.1187)
0.2513*
(0.1225)
0.2923*
(0.1254)
0.0421
(0.0242)
0.0515
(0.0383)
0.2018
(0.1149)
0.0961***
(0.0222)
0.0467*
(0.0232)
0.0232
(0.0526)
0.0886***
(0.0158)
0.0792***
(0.0143)
0.1363
(0.1080)
0.0089
(0.0463)
0.0801
(0.0458)
0.0031
(0.0190)
-0.0001
(0.0014)
-1.9984
(1.0405)
6.9149
(3.6745)
-0.1167
(0.1386)
-0.2867
(0.2939)
-0.3886
(0.2535)
-0.4281
(0.2641)
-0.6111*
(0.2697)
-0.3778
(0.0638)
0.0639
0.0882
0.0377(0.0809)
0.0654
(0.0827)
0.0253
(0.3418)
0.1042*
(0.0482)
-0.0945
(0.0533)
0.0887***
(0.0265)
0.0144
(0.0144)
-0.0243
(0.0124)
-0.0040
(0.0049)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
1.4127***
(0.2822)
-3.9571***
(0.9880)
0.0821***
(0.0143)
0.0442
(0.0358)
0.1971
(0.1070)
-0.0170
(0.0454)
0.1018*
(0.0450)
0.0110
(0.0188)
-0.0006
(0.0014)
-2.1377*
(1.0249)
8.1506*
(3.5935)
-0.0916
(0.0520)
0.0179
(0.0953)
Continued on next page
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Full Regression Parsimonious
Main effects Interaction of Main effects Interaction of
in sample characteristics in sample characteristics
that does not with not requesting that does not with not requesting
mention dowries a dowry mention dowries a dowry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same family origin 0.0500 0.0535 0.0440* -0.0142*
(0.0358) (0.0977) (0.0199) (0.0570)
Log income 0.0422* -0.1274*
(0.0198) (0.0583)
Log wage 0.1084*** -0.0160
(0.0149) (0.0565)
Predicted income 0.3490*** 0.0018
(0.0198) (0.0747)
No dowry -0.3008 0.1042
(0.5804) (0.7096)
F-test: Same coefficients 1.24 1.34
N 5056 5056
All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each character-
istics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was
provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education,
location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered
letters received by an ad placer. Columns (1) and (2) represent the coefficients of a single regression. Columns (3) and (4)
also represent a single regression. The main effects of each characteristics in the sample that does not mention dowries is
presented in columns (1) and (3). The coefficients in columns (2) and (4) correspond to the coefficient of the interaction
term between the letter stating that it has no dowry demand and each characteristic. Ads placed by females received letters
by males: this table refers to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms. Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 2.9: Difference in individuals' characteristics by marital status
Considered Rank Observed
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 Mean 2.5 97.5
ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Women, without search frictions
Age
Height
Caste
Education level
Arts and Social Science
Commerce
Science
Other field
From West Bengal
Kolkota
Skin rank
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Income
Log wage
"Quality"
Age
Height
Caste
Education level
Arts and Social Science
Commerce
Science
Other field
From West Bengal
Kolkota
Skin rank
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Income
Log wage
"Quality"
0.8759
-0.0246
0.1842
-1.0987
0.1242
-0.1693
-0.2599
-0.0146
-0.1472
-0.5348
0.4877
-0.0858
-0.2190
-11265
-0.0770
-0.1134
0.4462
-0.0240
0.1853
-1.0220
0.1341
-0.2080
-0.2660
-0.0190
-0.1417
-0.4092
0.4921
-0.1042
-0.2086
-1347
-0.1301
-0.1081
2.6992
-0.0063
1.0929
-0.6624
0.3326
-0.0849
-0.0151
0.0318
0.0299
-0.1621
0.8295
0.0059
0.0428
3915
0.0860
-0.0838
0.7551
-0.0279
0.3150
-1.1754
0.1567
-0.1783
-0.2626
-0.0167
-0.1596
-0.4795
0.4159
-0.0895
-0.2097
-1121
-0.0768
-0.1048
2.4377 0.9215
-0.0087 -0.0035
1.3770 -0.0772
-0.8123 -0.1486
0.3597 0.0148
-0.1108 -0.0416
-0.0398 0.0292
0.0131 -0.0023
0.0178 0.0090
-0.1288 -0.0290
0.8036 0.0214
0.0154 -0.0141
0.0477 -0.0188
3915 -6267
0.0966 0.0065
-0.0644 -0.0050
0.2566
-0.0119
-0.4235
-0.3630
-0.0899
-0.1118
-0.0677
-0.0180
-0.1115
-0.2126
-0.1407
-0.0707
-0.1248
-11449
-0.1470
-0.0088
Panel B: Women, with search frictions
2.1565
-0.0079
0.9895
-0.6292
0.3701
-0.0937
-0.0049
0.0294
0.0363
-0.1001
0.7767
0.0016
0.0773
3853
0.0820
-0.0809
0.2880
-0.0264
0.3430
-1.1027
0.1684
-0.2237
-0.2657
-0.0223
-0.1565
-0.3302
0.4204
-0.0931
-0.2020
-1347
-0.1418
-0.0999
1.7310 0.9215 0.2566
-0.0118 -0.0035 -0.0119
1.3190 -0.0772 -0.4235
-0.7500 -0.1486 -0.3630
0.3923 0.0148 -0.0899
-0.1119 -0.0416 -0.1118
-0.0269 0.0292 -0.0677
0.0125 -0.0023 -0.0180
0.0102 0.0090 -0.1115
-0.0840 -0.0290 -0.2126
0.7433 0.0214 -0.1407
0.0176 -0.0141 -0.0707
0.0575 -0.0188 -0.1248
3853 -6267 -11449
0.0861 0.0065 -0.1470
-0.0620 -0.0050 -0.0088
Panel C: Men, with search frictions
Age -1.0919 0.5233 -1.2496 0.3194 0.4175 -0.6997 1.5346
Height -0.0179 0.0125 -0.0179 0.0161 -0.0040 -0.0206 0.0126
Caste -0.1533 2.0519 -0.2714 1.6719 0.1195 -0.3815 0.6205
Education level -1.2680 -0.5757 -1.4264 -0.7888 -0.2399 -0.6066 0.1268
Arts and Social Science -0.0738 0.0811 -0.0736 0.0714 -0.0696 -0.1308 -0.0084
Commerce 0.1040 0.4386 0.1287 0.4776 0.1201 -0.0281 0.2683
Science 
-0.5674 -0.2112 -0.5976 -0.2303 -0.0505 -0.2014 0.1004
Other field -0.0149 0.0224 -0.0156 0.0334 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Family origin -0.2584 0.1309 -0.2580 0.1846 0.0197 -0.1223 0.1617
Calcutta -0.5658 0.2069 -0.2901 0.2087 0.0363 -0.1122 0.1847
Income -8887 -2954 -9171 -2845 -13560 -42033 14912
Log wage -0.9925 -0.4129 -1.0500 -0.5386 -0.1141 -0.3196 0.0915
"Quality" -0.1306 -0.0583 -0.1255 -0.0502 -0.0193 -0.0427 0.0041
Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the estimated confidence
interval. Entries in italic have overlapping confidence intervals with the observed distribution.
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1.5865
0.0049
0.2691
0.0658
0.1195
0.0285
0.1260
0.0133
0.0935
0.1546
0.1835
0.0425
0.0873
-1084
0.1599
0.0187
1.5865
0.0049
0.2691
0.0658
0.1195
0.0285
0.1260
0.0133
0.0935
0.1546
0.1835
0.0425
0.0873
-1084
0.1599
0.0187
Table 2.10: Couples characteristics, simulated and observed
Considered Rank Observed-considered Observed-matched
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 Mean 2.5 97.5 Mean 2.5 97.5
ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Without search frictions
Age diff.
Age corr.
Height diff.
Height corr.
Same caste
Caste diff.
Caste corr.
Same education
Education diff.
Education corr.
Same family origin
Family origin diff.
Family origin corr.
Same residence
Location corr.
Log wage diff.
Log wage corr.
Income diff.
Income corr.
Quality diff.
Quality corr.
Age diff.
Age corr.
Height diff.
Height corr.
Same caste
Caste diff.
Caste corr.
Same education
Education diff.
Education corr.
Same family origin
Family origin diff.
Family origin corr.
Same residence
Location corr.
Log wage diff.
Log wage corr.
Income diff.
Income corr.
Quality diff.
Quality corr.
5.3394
0.7990
0.1043
0.8108
0.8682
0.0444
0.6536
0.2529
-0.5093
0.2368
0.9898
-0.0047
0.9769
0.0000
-1.0000
-0.4990
-0.1670
-11375
-0.6231
0.1299
0.0941
5.2017
0.7700
0.1036
0.7833
0.8869
0.0040
0.6889
0.2325
-0.4397
0.2223
0.9799
-0.0061
0.9524
0.0000
-0.7262
-0.3845
-0.1770
-6000
-1.0000
0.1310
0.0543
6.2323
0.9242
0.1235
0.9085
0.9732
0.4856
0.9600
0.7882
0.0084
0.6001
1.0000
0.0092
1.0000
1.0000
0.4891
-0.0826
0.4222
10300
1.0000
0.1554
0.4640
6.2993
0.9167
0.1241
0.8920
0.9874
0.4286
0.9915
0.7870
0.1527
0.6350
1.0000
0.0149
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0484
0.4803
188000
1.0000
0.1653
0.4191
5.3812
0.8540
0.1032
0.8187
0.764 6
0.1626
0.4668
0.2527
-0.4060
0.1597
0.9773
-0.0058
0.9502
0.0000
-0.4985
-0.4941
-0.1542
-6000
-1.0000
0.1377
0.1143
5.3119
0.8369
0.1014
0.7846
0.7513
0.1013
0.5025
0.2029
-0.2729
0.1207
0.9715
-0.0109
0.9346
0.0000
-0.5000
-0.3982
-0.2289
-6750
-1.0000
0.1405
0.0688
6.2363
0.9419
0.1221
0.9023
0.9389
0.6931
0.8318
0.7495
0.0164
0.5543
1.0000
0.0153
1.0000
1.0000
0.4961
-0.0804
0.4106
18800
1.0000
0.1638
0.4730
5.9032 5.8191 5.9873
0.8331 0.8144 0.8507
0.1201 0.1178 0.1223
0.3825 0.3473 0.4188
0.7506 0.7333 0.7679
0.0916 0.0504 0.1328
0.8450 0.8202 0.8682
0.4487 0.4299 0.4675
0.3385 0.3120 0.3823
0.4202 0.3778 0.4620
0.7839 0.7655 0.8024
0.0054 -0.0154 0.0263
0.5407 0.4959 0.5814
0.4687 0.4346 0.5028
0.0441 -0.0393 0.1195
0.1375 0.0811 0.1939
0.0687 -0.0720 0.2017
9277 -3842 22397
0.5760 0.4923 0.8139
0.1026 0.0983 0.1069
0.0386 -0.2434 0.3383
Panel B: With search frictions
6.3414 5.9032
0.9379 0.8331
0.1220 0.1201
0.8904 0.3825
0.9464 0.7506
0.6970 0.0916
0.8790 0.8450
0.7515 0.4487
0.1772 0.3385
0.6053 0.4202
1.0000 0.7839
0.0189 0.0054
1.0000 0.5407
1.0000 0.4687
0.5080 0.0441
0.0424 0.1375
0.4747 0.0687
238001 9277
1.0000 0.5760
0.1783 0.1026
0.4390 0.0386
5.8191 5.9873
0.8144 0.8507
0.1178 0.1223
0.3473 0.4188
0.7333 0.7679
0.0504 0.1328
0.8202 0.8682
0.4299 0.4675
0.3120 0.3823
0.3778 0.4620
0.7655 0.8024
-0.0154 0.0263
0.4959 0.5814
0.4346 0.5028
-0.0393 0.1195
0.0811 0.1939
-0.0720 0.2017
-3842 22397
0.4923 0.8139
0.0983 0.1069
-0.2434 0.3383
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5.6993
0.6521
0.1237
0.3880
0.6937
-0.0071
0.7599
0.4380
0.2902
0.3564
0.7644
0.0433
0.5147
0.4831
-0.0566
0.2462
0.1855
28374
0.4474
0.1202
0.1950
5.6993
0.6521
0.1237
0.3880
0.6937
-0.0071
0.7599
0.4380
0.2902
0.3564
0.7644
0.0433
0.5147
0.4831
-0.0566
0.2462
0.1855
28374
0.4474
0.1202
0.1950
5.3476
0.5700
0.1146
0.2875
0.6396
-0.1584
0.6873
0.3778
0.1393
0.2383
0.7060
-0.0208
0.3932
0.3834
-0.2246
0.1349
-0.1284
-16
0.0837
0.1069
0.0714
5.3476
0.5700
0.1146
0.2875
0.6396
-0.1584
0.6873
0.3778
0.1393
0.2383
0.7060
-0.0208
0.3932
0.3834
-0.2246
0.1349
-0.1284
-16
0.0837
0.1069
0.0714
6.0510
0.7341
0.1328
0.4886
0.7478
0.1443
0.8324
0.4982
0.4410
0.4746
0.8229
0.1073
0.6361
0.5829
0.2142
0.3575
0.4993
56764
0.8110
0.1336
0.3187
6.0510
0.7341
0.1328
0.4886
0.7478
0.1443
0.8324
0.4982
0.4410
0.4746
0.8229
0.1073
0.6361
0.5829
0.2142
0.3575
0.4993
56764
0.8110
0.1336
0.3187
Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the estimated confidence interval. Entries in italic
have overlapping confidence intervals with the observed distribution.
Table 2.11: Couples characteristics and the impact of caste, by caste
All castes Brahmin Kayastha Baisya Sagdope
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5
ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile ptile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Without restrictions
Age diff. 5.3394 6.2323 5.4830 6.3200 5.3668 6.1957 5.5092 6.2090 5.4749 6.1827
Age corr. 0.7990 0.9242 0.8677 0.9515 0.8697 0.9512 0.7453 0.8808 0.8018 0.9160
Height diff. 0.1043 0.1235 0.1086 0.1276 0.1035 0.1227 0.1057 0.1196 0.1065 0.1208
Height corr. 0.8108 0.9085 0.8590 0.9303 0.8466 0.9214 0.7170 0.8425 0.7740 0.8790
Same caste 0.8682 0.9732 0.7340 0.9899 0.9661 0.9991 0.9229 0.9946 0.7696 0.9790
Same education 0.2529 0.7882 0.2187 0.8429 0.2055 0.8016 0.3053 0.7483 0.2652 0.7877
Education diff. -0.5093 0.0084 -0.5910 0.0262 -0.6129 -0.1270 -0.5431 -0.1430 -0.4906 -0.0257
Education corr. 0.2368 0.6001 0.3086 0.6688 0.2840 0.6453 0.2693 0.5692 0.2372 0.5628
Log wage diff. -0.4990 -0.0826 -0.3596 -0.1905 -0.3894 -0.2215 -0.5133 -0.2609 -0.3747 -0.1432
Log wage corr. -0.1670 0.4222 0.0651 0.2787 0.0120 0.2131 -0.0285 0.2019 -0.0442 0.2387
Quality diff. 0.1299 0.1554 0.1286 0.1512 0.1375 0.1513 0.1266 0.1488 0.1203 0.1452
Quality corr. 0.0941 0.4640 0.1419 0.4386 0.1034 0.3954 0.1456 0.3845 0.1365 0.3860
Panel B: With forced caste matching
Age diff. 5.3814 6.2504 5.3744 6.5029 5.2848 6.2702 5.2521 6.4215 4.9047 6.2835
Age corr. 0.7856 0.9130 0.8176 0.9438 0.8413 0.9483 0.6697 0.8998 0.7200 0.9207
Height diff. 0.1050 0.1237 0.1050 0.1278 0.1033 0.1247 0.1012 0.1254 0.1039 0.1294
Height corr. 0.7998 0.8978 0.8624 0.9426 0.8350 0.9399 0.6714 0.8734 0.6927 0.9031
Same caste 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Same education 0.2612 0.7835 0.2034 0.8487 0.2127 0.8216 0.2959 0.7273 0.2143 0.8148
Education diff. -0.4933 -0.0132 -0.6792 0.0508 -0.6028 0.0202 -0.5000 0.0556 -0.3333 0.4037
Education corr. 0.2538 0.6059 0.2106 0.7548 0.1849 0.6601 0.1375 0.5903 -0.1395 0.7290
Log wage diff. -0.5338 -0.0920 -0.6701 0.0481 -0.7318 0.4171 -0.8300 -0.1611 -0.7702 0.3437
Log wage corr. -0.1424 0.4106 -0.4029 0.4733 -0.8488 0.8865 -0.1616 0.9073 -0.9447 0.9537
Quality diff. 0.1297 0.1562 0.1218 0.1702 0.1118 0.1514 0.1286 0.1719 0.1040 0.1671
Quality corr. 0.0980 0.4547 0.0327 0.5188 0.0353 0.4921 0.0893 0.4734 -0.0952 0.5946
Panel C: Caste-blinded
Age diff. 5.3867 6.2850 5.2343 6.2655 5.4810 6.4838 5.2844 6.3530 5.2500 6.3714
Age corr. 0.8818 0.9611 0.8382 0.9536 0.8706 0.9624 0.8910 0.9714 0.8947 0.9741
Height diff. 0.1039 0.1234 0.1031 0.1245 0.1037 0.1235 0.1004 0.1225 0.1026 0.1280
Height corr. 0.8937 0.9529 0.8887 0.9605 0.8849 0.9573 0.8900 0.9630 0.8797 0.9658
Same caste 0.1552 0.2357 0.1829 0.3690 0.2165 0.3904 0.0000 0.0862 0.0000 0.1622
Same education 0.2019 0.8503 0.2047 0.8731 0.2043 0.8507 0.2222 0.8969 0.1430 0.8846
Education diff. -0.5890 0.0268 -0.6240 0.0842 -0.6621 0.0299 -0.5911 0.1031 -0.5963 0.3513
Education corr. 0.2913 0.6902 0.2479 0.7807 0.2161 0.7153 0.2584 0.7994 -0.0391 0.7909
Log wage diff. -0.4723 -0.0717 -0.6604 0.0217 -0.6750 0.3825 -0.7236 -0.0225 -0.6789 0.4324
Log wage corr. -0.1366 0.4105 -0.3681 0.5017 -0.6788 0.8421 -0.2646 0.7928 -0.8874 0.8542
Quality diff. 0.1284 0.1562 0.1315 0.1780 0.1091 0.1529 0.1304 0.1775 0.0834 0.1501
Quality corr. 0.0888 0.5048 0.0301 0.5254 0.0588 0.5425 0.0929 0.5813 -0.0936 0.6616
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Table 2.12: Distribution of costs of...
Keeping caste Education
Male Female Male Female
Education -0.0757 0.0373
(0.3816) (0.3033)
Height difference -0.0001 0.0083 0.1488 2.7930
(0.0090) (0.0106) (2.6600) (2.2407)
Age difference 0.2053 -0.1221 -0.0667 -0.1878
(0.6059) (0.5748) (0.0571) (0.0364)
Income -2628.65 36.7885 -0.0025
(35954.27) (629.96) (0.0080)
Wage -0.1232 0.0836 0.2847
(0.2368) (0.4030) (0.1802)
Very beautiful -0.0134 -0.3645
(0.1166) (0.1175)
Beautiful 0.0671 -0.1266
(0.2069) (0.0940)
Skin tone -0.0684 0.1472
(0.3362) (0.0885)
Standard deviation of the distribution in parameters in parentheses. Bold
entries mark significance at 5% or more.
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Figure 2-1: Indifference curve of males
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Figure 2-3: Correlations between coefficients of the considered and rank
regressions, ads placed by females
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Figure 2-4: Correlations between coefficients of the considered and rank
regressions, ads placed by males
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Figure 2-5: Proportion of considered letters by quality of the letter and ad placer,
ads placed by females
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Figure 2-6: Proportion of considered letters by quality of the letter and ad placer,
ads placed by males
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2.A Appendix tables
Table 2.A.1: Characteristics of ads by attrition status in second round interviews
Variable Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Means Difference Means Difference
Found Not found Mean Sd. Error Found Not found Mean Sd. Error
23.004 18.000 5.00 4.65 79.874 89.071 -9.20 19.88
0.27
0.04
0.02
0.35
0.19
0.10
0.02
0.02
26.55
1.58
2.30
0.08
0.44
0.02
0.09
0.00
0.53
0.28
0.06
0.01
0.57
0.13
0.30
0.01
5.56
8.68
0.21
0.16
0.00
0.21
0.21
0.16
0.00
0.05
27.67
1.59
2.36
0.20
0.53
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.50
0.33
0.06
0.00
0.75
0.06
0.19
0.00
5.41
9.16
0.06
-0.12
0.02
0.14
-0.03
-0.06
0.02
-0.03
-1.12
-0.01
-0.06
-0.12
-0.09
-0.03
0.04
0.00
0.03
-0.05
0.00
0.01
-0.18
0.06
0.11
0.01
0.15
-0.48
0.10
0.05
0.03
0.11
0.09
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.88
0.01
0.22
0.07
0.13
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.12
0.11
0.06
0.02
0.13
0.08
0.12
0.02
0.14
0.60
0.25
0.05
0.02
0.31
0.18
0.12
0.02
0.05
0.29
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.14
0.14
0.07
0.00
-0.03
0.05
0.02
-0.04
0.04
-0.02
-0.05
0.05
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.13
0.11
0.09
0.04
0.06
32.17 31.50 0.67 1.32
1.70 1.68 0.03 0.02
Number of responses
Caste
Brahmin
Baidya
Kshatriya
Kayastha
Baisya and others
Sagdope and others
Other castes
Scheduled castes
Physical characteristics
Age
Height (meters)
Skin tone
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Education and Income
Less than high school
High school
Post-secondary
College
Master's
PhD
Other degree
Humanities/Arts
Commerce
Science
Other field
Log wage
Log income
Location
Calcutta
West Bengali
Demands mentioned
Only within caste
Caste no bar
No dowry demanded
Ads which omit...
Caste
Age
Height
Education
Field
Residence
Family origin
Wage
Income
Skin tone
Beauty
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.46
0.23
0.31
0.00
0.09
0.27
0.64
0.00
5.61
9.22
0.01
0.10
0.06
-0.04
-0.05
-0.09
0.01
-0.05
0.14
-0.09
0.00
0.00
0.23
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.14
0.11
0.12
0.03
0.07
0.15
0.16
0.00
0.21
0.39
0.82 0.60 0.22 0.18 0.78 0.40 0.38 0.19
0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.13 0.38 0.56 -0.17 0.17
0.10
0.32
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.08
0.25
0.84
0.23
0.85
0.98
0.21
0.27
0.05
0.42
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.11
0.05
0.16
0.74
0.21
0.63
0.89
0.26
0.21
0.05 0.07 0.09
-0.10 0.11 0.24
-0.04 0.03 0.10
0.00
-0.04
-0.07
0.03
0.10
0.11
0.02
0.22
0.08
-0.06
0.06
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.10
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.04
0.10
0.10
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.19
0.30
0.51
0.28
0.57
0.73
0.07
0.29
0.14
0.00
0.14
0.14
0.07
0.21
0.64
0.36
0.50
0.79
0.02 0.08
-0.05 0.12
-0.04 0.08
0.01
-0.11
-0.04
0.12
0.09
-0.13
-0.08
0.07
-0.05
0.02
0.05
0.09
0.11
0.13
0.14
0.12
0.14
0.12
Differences in italics are significant at 10 %, those in bold, at 5%.
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0.01
0.10
0.06
0.42
0.18
0.22
0.01
0.04
0.41
0.55
0.00
5.61
9.45
Table 2.A.2: Characteristics of ads who agreed and refused second round interview
Variable Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Means Difference Means Difference
Agreed Refused Mean Sd. Error Agreed Refused Mean Sd. Error
Number of responses 25.643 18.844 6.80 3.51 85.551 71.217 14.33 17.17
Caste
Brahmin
Baidya
Kshatriya
Kayastha
Baisya and others
Sagdope and others
Other castes
Scheduled castes
Physical characteristics
Age
Height (meters)
Skin tone
Very beautiful
Beautiful
Education and Income
Less than high school
High school
Post-secondary
College
Master's
PhD
Other degree
Humanities/Arts
Commerce
Science
Other field
Log wage
Log income
Location
Calcutta
West Bengali
Demands mentioned
Only within caste
Caste no bar
No dowry demanded
Ads which omit...
Caste
Age
Height
Education
Field
Residence
Family origin
Wage
Income
Skin tone
Beauty
Diffcrcnccs in italics arc significant
0.25
0.04
0.03
0.39
0.18
0.07
0.02
0.03
25.88
1.58
2.30
0.10
0.42
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.51
0.29
0.07
0.01
0.59
0.13
0.28
0.01
5.53
9.39
0.25
0.06
0.00
0.31
0.16
0.16
0.03
0.03
26.53
1.59
2.23
0.00
0.58
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.53
0.37
0.07
0.00
0.42
0.27
0.31
0.00
5.73
8.52
0.00
-0.02
0.03
0.08
0.03
-0.09
-0.01
-0.01
-0.65
-0.01
0.07
0.10
-0.15
0.01
0.06
0.01
-0.02
-0.08
0.00
0.01
0.17
-0.14
-0.03
0.01
-0.21
0.87
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.60
0.01
0.16
0.06
0.11
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.10
0.09
0.05
0.02
0.11
0.08
0.10
0.02
0.12
0.28
0.23
0.06
0.03
0.28
0.21
0.13
0.03
0.02
0.36
0.08
0.00
0.28
0.12
0.04
0.00
0.12
-0.13
-0.02
0.03
0.00
0.09
0.09
0.03
-0.10
0.09
0.05
0.03
0.10
0.09
0.07
0.03
0.04
31.92 32.45 -0.53 0.98
1.71 1.70 0.01 0.02
0.01
0.10
0.04
0.42
0.22
0.20
0.01
0.07
0.38
0.55
0.00
5.66
9.52
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.37
0.16
0.37
0.00
0.06
0.28
0.67
0.00
5.57
9.49
0.01
0.05
-0.01
0.05
0.07
-0.17
0.01
0.02
0.10
-0.12
0.00
0.09
0.04
0.02
0.07
0.05
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.02
0.07
0.12
0.13
0.00
0.15
0.33
0.88 0.60 0.28 0.18 0.78 0.64 0.14 0.14
0.42 0.30 0.11 0.11 0.40 0.26 0.13 0.12
0.09 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.08
0.34 0.31 0.02 0.09 0.27
0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.10
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.08
0.25
0.84
0.24
0.83
0.97
0.22
0.27
at 10 %,
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.19
0.84
0.28
0.88
0.97
0.06
0.19
those in bold,
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.06
0.00
-0.04
-0.05
0.01
0.16
0.08
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.07
0.03
0.08
0.08
0.01
0.02
0.11
0.15
0.26
0.51
0.31
0.54
0.74
0.04
0.08
0.08
0.00
0.12
0.20
0.24
0.28
0.56
0.24
0.44
0.72
0.04 0.06
0.19 0.09
0.02 0.06
0.01
-0.10
-0.09
-0.09
-0.02
-0.05
0.07
0.10
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.07
0.08
0.10
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.10
at 5%
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Table 2.A.3: Caste groupings
Brahmin
Kulin Brahmin
Sabitri Brahmin
Debnath Brahmin
Kanya Kubja Brahmin
Baidya
Rajasree Baidya
Kshatriya
Poundra Kshatriya
Rajput Kshatriya
Kayastha
Kulin Kayastha
Kshatriya Kayastha
Kshatriya Karmakar
Baisya
Baisya Saha
Baisya Ray
Baisya Kapali
Baisya Teli
Rajasthani Baisya
Barujibi
Baisya Barujibi
Sutradhar
Baisya Sutradhar
Tantubai
Baisya Tantubai
Sadgope
Kulin Sadgope
Kshatriya Sadgope
Yadav (Gope)
7.
Kaibarta
Jele
Napit
Rajbanshi
Rajbanshi Kshatriya
Malo
Mathra
1. Brahmin
Kshatriya Brahmin
Nath Brahmin
Rajput Brahmin
Gouriya Baishnab*
2. Baidya
Lata Baidya
3. Kshatriya
Ugra Kshatriya
Malla Kshatriya
Barga Kshatriya
4. Kayastha
Rajput Kayastha
Pura Kayastha
Mitra Mustafi
5. Baisya and others
Suri
Suri Saha
Rudra Paul
Modak
Modak Moyra
Banik
Gandha Banik
Kangsha Banik
Khandagrami Subarna Banik
Subarna Banik
Shankha Banik
Swarnakar
6. Sadgope and others
Yadav
Yadav Ghosh
Goyala
Gope
Rudraja Brahmin*
Baishnab Brahmin*
Baishnab*
Nath*
Kulin Baidya
Rajput (Solanki) Kshatriya
Jana Kshatriya
Kayastha Karmakar
Karmakar
Mitra Barujibi
Teli
Ekadash Teli
Dadash Teli
Tili
Ekadash Tili
Dsadah Tili
Marwari
Malakar
Tambuli
Rajak
Kasari
Baisya Tambuli
Mahishya
Kumbhakar
Satchasi
Other (mostly) non-scheduled castes
Rajak Paramanik
Bauri Jelia Kaibarta
8. (mostly) Scheduled castes
Namasudra K
Sagari Si
Sudra O
Baisya Rajbanshi
aran
BC
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Table 2.A.4: Probability of writing to a particular ad
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
Ad placer selection Respondent selection Ad placer selection Respondent selection
LP Logit LP Logit LP Logit LP Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Same caste 0.0206*** 3.4296*** 0.1080*** 2.1627"** 0.0319*** 2.3853*** 0. 1 9 5 6 *** 2.2002***
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male
Diff. in castc*Lowcr caste malc
Same caste*only within
Diff. in caste*only within
Same caste*no bar
Diff. in castc*no bar
Diff. in age
Squared diff. in age
Diff. in height
Squared diff. in height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
Same education
Male more educated
Non-rankable degree
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
Same location
Same family origin
Log income
Log wage
Skin tone
Beautiful
Very beautiful
(0.0013)
-0.0013
(0.0014)
-0.0011
(0.0014)
0.0029
(0.0038)
0.0004
(0.0008)
-0.0046**
(0.0015)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0003***
(0.0001)
-0.0000**
(0.0000)
0.0435**
(0.0167)
-0.1922***
(0.0528)
0.0013
(0.0022)
-0.0010
(0.0035)
-0.0006
(0.0021)
0.0024
(0.0023)
-0.0005
(0.0027)
0.0022
(0.0012)
0.0016
(0.0016)
-0.0031
(0.0131)
0.0004
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0012)
0.0013
(0.0035)
0.0097***
(0.0017)
-0.0007
(0.0026)
0.0053***
(0.0008)
-0.0012**
(0.0004)
-0.0011
(0.0007)
0.0008
(0.0015)
(0.3504)
-1.7058
(1.1849)
-2.0820
(1.1721)
13.0267
(770.0985)
-0.0170
(368.9421)
-1.4258***
(0.3972)
-0.1701
(0.1420)
0.2974***
(0.0562)
-0.0234***
(0.0043)
17.6596**
(5.9477)
-75.6526***
(20.1851)
0.7340
(0.8006)
0.2473
(1.0634)
0.1855
(0.7795)
0.8934
(0.8084)
0.3537
(0.8864)
0.5264
(0.2759)
0.4578
(0.4240)
-13.2632
(4420.5696)
0.0622
(0.1794)
0.2188
(0.2561)
0.0839
(0.7779)
1.7482***
(0.4223)
0.0442
(0.5239)
1.3955***
(0.2287)
-0.3719**
(0.1179)
-0.2338
(0.1671)
0.0304
(0.3025)
(0.0022)
0.0001
(0.0009)
-0.0092***
(0.0007)
0.0042***
(0.0002)
-0.0005***
(0.0000)
0.3241***
(0.0256)
-1.2001***
(0.0747)
0.0176***
(0.0040)
-0.0159*
(0.0065)
-0.0115***
(0.0035)
-0.0101*
(0.0039)
-0.0151**
(0.0045)
0.0191***
(0.0019)
0.0014
(0.0030)
-0.0242*
(0.0098)
-0.0013
(0.0013)
0.0013
(0.0018)
-0.0053
(0.0066)
-0.0043
(0.0038)
0.0051
(0.0029)
0.0194**
(0.0012)
-0.0033***
(0.0007)
0.0016
(0.0012)
0.0047
(0.0024)
(0.0672)
0.0609*(0.0308)
-0.3236***
(0.0254)
0.4822***
(0.0158)
-0.0395***
(0.0011)
13.3879***
(1.0314)
-50.3339***
(3.3084)
0.4294***
(0.1206)
-0.7547**
(0.2810)
-0.2506*
(0.1125)
-0.1507
(0.1256)
-0.1832
(0.1425)
0.5524***(0.0575)
0.0406
(0.0915)
-0.5629
(0.4140)
0.0553
(0.0395)
0.0450
(0.0539)
-0.0701
(0.1701)
-0.1346
(0.1150)
0.2150*
(0.0889)
0.4990***
(0.0364)
-0.0927***
(0.0219)
0.0264
(0.0369)
0.0523
(0.0683)
(0.0014)
-0.0004
(0.0013)
-0.0020
(0.0012)
-0.0059
(0.0033)
0.0011
(0.0007)
-0.0010
(0.0016)
0.0007
(0.0004)
0.0005***
(0.0002)
-0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0452***
(0.0099)
-0.2013***
(0.0414)
-0.0001
(0.0029)
0.0020
(0.0033)
-0.0017
(0.0029)
0.0034
(0.0033)
0.0048(0.0035)
0.0032*
(0.0013)
0.0021
(0.0020)
-0.0018
(0.0049)
0.0022(0.0012)
-0.0015
(0.0013)
0.0085**
(0.0032)
0.0097***
(0.0012)
-0.0051
(0.0032)
0.0058***
(0.0009)
0.0024**
(0.0009)
0.0041***
(0.0005)
49025 49025 147546 144543 70337
(0.2043)
0.2302
(0.3532)
-0.7402*
(0.3519)
14.5443
(984.4139)
0.2650
(324.9982)
-0.4298
(0.2442)
0.3169**
(0.1003)
0.4746***
(0.0546)
-0.0398***
(0.0044)
9.7321"**
(2.0036)
-43.4930***
(8.3431)
13.1424
(702.6814)
14.0290
(702.6813)
13.2529
(702.6813)
13.9488
(702.6813)
14.0380
(702.6813)
0.7805**
(0.2434)
0.5918
(0.3213)
13.2663
(702.6816)
0.2396
(0.1661)
-0.3376
(0.1743)
1.0443**
(0.3378)
1.1826***
(0.1721)
-0.4259
(0.4468)
0.8628***
(0.1545)
0.2556*(0.1187)
0.8576***
(0.1070)
69617
(0.0049)
0.0236***
(0.0016)
0.0014
(0.0018)
0.0085***(0.0005)
-0.0005***
(0.0000)
0.3539***
(0.0413)
-1.9223***
(0.1723)
-0.0135
(0.0098)
0.0117
(0.0118)
-0.0360***
(0.0095)
-0.0378***
(0.0109)
-0.0229*
(0.0111)
0.0448***
(0.0047)
0.0324***
(0.0062)
-0.0534
(0.0281)
-0.0084
(0.0055)
-0.0186***
(0.0055)
-0.0602***(0.0178)
0.0062
(0.0049)
0.0088
(0.0046)
0.0259***
(0.0027)
0.0044(0.0037)
0.0010
(0.0020)
53043
(0.0895)
0.5106***
(0.0353)
-0.0809*
(0.0380)
0.6196"**
(0.0228)
-0.0484***
(0.0017)
6.0564***
(0.8609)
-32.4783***
(3.8381)
-0.1717
(0.2239)
-0.1526
(0.2490)
-0.6465**
(0.2180)
-0.7335**
(0.2379)
-0.5667*
(0.2423)
0.8407***
(0.0864)
0.7051**
(0.1133)
-0.5984
(0.4275)
-0.0976
(0.0939)
-0.2452**
(0.0945)
-0.5009
(0.2599)
0.0029
(0.0871)
0.1428
(0.0822)
0.3742***
(0.0463)
-0.0708
(0.0683)
0.0260
(0.0352)
52407
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All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the
respondent/ad placer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the respondent/ad placer
and a dummy for both individuals not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. Ads placed by females (males) received
letters by males (females): the first four columns refer to decisions made by males regarding which ad placed by females they should write to, the
last four to decisions made by females regarding which ads placed by males they should contact. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%;
** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
52407
Table 2.A.5: Number of responses received to an ad
Ads placed by females Ads placed by males
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baidya
Kshatriya
Kayastha
Baisya
Sagdope
Other non-scheduled castes
Scheduled castes
Age
Height
High school
Post-secondary
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD/Professional degrees
Non-rankable degree
Science
Commerce
Other field
Calcutta
From West Bengal
Log income
Log wage
Skin tone
Very beautiful
Beautiful
N
0.0199
(0.0554)
-0.3880***
(0.1017)
0.1941***
(0.0242)
-0.2298***
(0.0313)
-0.0900*(0.0360)
-0.5491***
(0.1107)
-0.0659
(0.0670)
-0.0401***
(0.0031)
1.5551***(0.2196)
-0.1107
(0.0761)
-0.4580
(0.2403)
-0.0769
(0.0774)
-0.1423(0.0808)
-0.2741**
(0.0926)
-1.0200***
(0.1777)
0.0463
(0.0253)
-0.0520
(0.0346)
-0.6742*
(0.2846)
0.4087***
(0.0684)
0.1941***
(0.0228)
-0.2570***
(0.0166)
0.2804***
(0.0369)
0.0147
(0.0243)
5788
1.4363
(4.5688)
-6.4094
(7.0018)
4.8539*
(2.2215)
-4.2818
(2.5611)
-2.0499
(3.2275)
-8.1897
(7.2236)
-1.2732
(5.5995)
-0.8096**
(0.2490)
35.4319
(19.5507)
-1.8582
(6.5589)
-10.6578
(20.2488)
-1.2923
(6.7409)
-2.8572
(7.0390)
-5.4127
(7.8143)
-14.9420
(10.7632)
1.2457
(2.2666)
-1.1006
(3.0170)
-5.9297
(14.3313)
8.6102
(5.3780)
4.6963*
(2.0787)
-5.1665***
(1.2562)
9.0867*
(3.8408)
0.3033
(2.1623)
5788
-0.4018***
(0.0387)
-0.4774***
(0.0746)
0.1565***
(0.0176)
-0.0679**
(0.0214)
-0.0344
(0.0253)
-0.6427***
(0.0673)
-0.5098***
(0.0421)
0.0119***
(0.0016)
-0.4142***
(0.1239)
0.8501***
(0.1762)
1.6886***
(0.1781)
1.5513***
(0.1756)
1.8182***
(0.1768)
1.7035***
(0.1767)
1.2666***
(0.1896)
0.2546***
(0.0421)
-0.0265
(0.0433)
0.1608***
(0.0164)
0.4275***
(0.0271)
-0.2129***
(0.0180)
0.0190(0.0200)
4075
-32.5365
(22.6938)
-32.4609
(38.5897)
14.8425
(12.0916)
-6.3319
(13.7648)
-3.5924
(15.8213)
-28.3260
(30.0856)
-39.0446
(23.3959)
0.8895(1.0717)
-17.6774
(79.5235)
19.0770(55.5553)
82.9122
(61.3144)
67.2765
(56.9136)
89.1902
(58.7970)
77.3746
(58.3160)
40.0588
(69.6573)
22.4205
(26.3598)
-1.1862
(26.8366)
20.7122
(13.4021)
29.7894
(15.4041)
-16.0723
(11.4682)
3.6086
(13.2790)
4075
154
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include dummies indicating non-response for each
characteristics. *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 2.A.6: Couples characteristics, variances of the algorithm
Women propose Balanced sex ratio
2.5 ptile 97.5 ptile 2.5 ptile 97.5 ptile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age difference
Age correlations
Height difference
Height correlations
Same caste
Caste difference
Caste correlation
Same education level
Education difference
Education correlations
Same family origin
Family origin difference
Family origin correlations
Same residence
Location correlations
Log wage difference
Log wage correlations
Income difference
Income correlations
Quality difference
Quality correlation
5.4765
0.8079
0.1049
0.7752
0.8439
0.1111
0.5680
0.2090
-0.5250
0.2591
0.9893
-0.0067
0.9766
0.0000
-0.7986
-0.3380
-0.2233
-491999.30
-1.0000
0.1566
0.0785
Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the
estimated confidence interval.
observed distribution.
Entries in italic have overlapping confidence intervals with the
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6.4272
0.9376
0.1222
0.8955
0.9556
0.6316
0.9296
0.8019
-0.0098
0.6586
1.0000
0.0064
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0815
0.3461
40416.89
1.0000
0.1758
0.4057
4.5947
0.7370
0.1128
0.7536
0.8598
-0.0743
0.5714
0.3248
-0.0656
0.3659
0.9579
-0.0064
0.9079
0.0000
-0.8419
-0.4980
-0.1700
-0.02
-1.0000
0.1662
0.2705
5.3435
0.8997
0.1297
0.8742
0.9631
0.1620
0.9756
0.7812
0.4133
0.7289
1.0000
0.0347
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
-0.0539
0.3497
14500.29
1.0000
0.1887
0.5355
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Chapter 3
Why Wait? Male and Female
Marriage Timing and Fertility
3.1 Introduction
In 1965, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended
that no member state allow marriages below the age of fifteen. This was due to the perception
that youthful marriages lead to negative consequences. For example, teenagers who get married
have lower socio-economic status than those who marry at a later date. An important part of
the policy debate surrounding this issue, both in the United States and in developing countries,
is the link between these early marriages and fertility. It is often assumed that young women
who marry will have more children than those who delay marriage to a later date. However,
this may not necessarily be the case: early marriages could simply lead to having children at
an earlier age. If early marriages have less stability, they could eventually lead to lower fertility
through divorce. Are we then to assume that early marriages increase the number of children
born?
This question is not easy to answer because of the obvious endogeneity of the marriage timing
decision. Marrying earlier or later may very well be influenced by unobservable factors which
may in turn determine one's fertility decisions. This paper attempts to solve this endogeneity
problem by using changes in United States laws restricting young adults' capacity to marry.
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These varied by state over the course of the twentieth century. The changes in these restrictions
by state over time offer a source of variation that is plausibly unrelated to individual fertility
decisions. Furthermore, these laws varied by gender as well: males and females generally faced
different minimum ages and rules pertaining to females were often modified at different moments
than those for males. This setting thus offers an opportunity to differentiate the impact of early
marriages on males from that on females.
This paper first presents a simple model which highlights why legislations that affect only
one gender may also affect a jointly decided outcome, such as fertility, through its effect on
the other spouse. It is a simple model where there's a trade-off in the amount of information
one learns about a potential partner by delaying marriage and the loss of marital output this
delay entails. When a legislation imposes a delay on one side of the market, that gender delays
marriage which affects the eventual outcome. However, it may also very well alter the age at
which one's spouse enters the union. It could even modify the matching patterns through the
fact that this imposed delay increases the amount of information about the quality of potential
spouses. This model thus frames the empirical strategy that follows.
Secondly, this study presents a comprehensive set of state legislations on ages of consent to
marriage. Information on state rules from 1890 to 1980 were collected without interruption for
almost all states. This is a much larger time period than the laws documented by Blank et al.
(2007) who restrict their attention to the period from 1950 to 1980. It is also more inclusive
than the set presented by Dahl (2005) which restricted itself to only one type of such laws in a
restricted number of states and only for females.
These legal limitations are complex but can be classified into three distinct categories. First,
most states set an age at which individuals can marry without the authorization of their parents.
I will refer to these as "no-consent" ages. Second, most states also set a minimum age under
which a teenager cannot get married, even with the consent of the parents. These ages will be
called "consent" ages. Finally, many states offer exceptions to these rules if authorized by a
judge. Only a few other states have a third set of laws restricting the power of judges to grant
marriage licenses to individuals below a particular age. This study collected detailed information
on the first two sets of laws only.
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These rules suggest that there was wide variation in the limits imposed by each state. Some
states continued to use for a long period into the twentieth century the common-law ages of 12
and 14 in place since colonial times. Others increased these ages before the beginning of the
twentieth century. Interestingly, there are both increases and decreases in the ages of consent
to marriage. While Blank et al. (2007) emphasize that from 1950 to 1980, the no-consent ages
converged to a similar level among all states, there are other periods where divergence occurred.
More importantly for the empirical strategy used, these laws varied by gender both in level and
in the timing of the legislative changes.
Using this data set of laws, I measure their influence on ages at first marriage in a difference-
in-difference framework. These laws are highly correlated with the age at which individuals
enter into their first union as measured retrospectively by the United States Census. This study
uses this data source rather than the Vital Statistics because the latter has been shown to be
potentially biased by avoidance behavior (see Blank et al. 2007). An increase in one year in the
consent age limit leads to a fairly small increase in the age at which individuals marry (about
0.02 to 0.04) and is particularly weaker for males than for females. No-consent age limits appear
to have a stronger influence, particularly for males. Increasing that age limit leads to an increase
in the marriage age of about 0.05. The effects are not perfectly linear, however. Increasing the
minimum age from 14 to 18 has larger effects than raising it from 18 to 21, for example. The
first stage is mostly robust to the introduction of state-specific linear trends and to the addition
of other state-specific controls. It does not appear to depend on the inclusion of a particular
state. It is stronger over the period of tighter legislations and lower average ages. It also appears
more binding for Whites than for Blacks.
What is particularly interesting is that these laws also appear to have altered the age at
which one's spouse enters the union. The effects are, of course, much weaker than for one's own
laws. Increasing the minimum legal age for girls leads to an increase in the age at first marriage
of boys of about 0.04 for consent laws but none for non-consent. Legal restrictions on male ages
translate into delayed marriages of girls of about 0.02 years for an increase of one year in the
no-consent age. These results are fairly robust to specification changes and to the inclusions of
additional controls but fairly dependent on the time period used.
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In addition to affecting marital ages, these laws also appear to have had a significant effect
on fertility decisions. Increasing the minimum age for marriage decreases the number of children
born to females by about 0.05 children for a change in the female consent laws and of about
0.05 for male non-consent laws. The effect size is slightly lower when looking at the children
currently living in the household. Raising the minimum age with parental consent for females
leads to observing about 0.01 fewer chidren, about 0.02 fewer children for an increase in the
male no-consent laws. The effects are larger for males but less precisely estimated. The effect
of these laws on fertility timing are not very precisely estimated, but suggest that the increased
fertility is driven by the fact that earlier marriages continue to have children for a longer period.
The reduced form effect of the laws is robust to the inclusion of state-specific trends and of
compulsory schooling laws. It also does not depend on the periods observed. Also, it is only
significant for individuals for whom the law is likely to bind. A change in the laws does not
appear to affect the behavior of women with some college education and those who marry past
age 25. It also only affects the behavior of White women: over this period, their age at first
marriage was in general lower than that of minority women. It could also be that non-marital
fertility was not frowned upon in the African-American community as much as it was among
Whites.
These laws are then used as instruments for both female and male ages at first marriage.
For each individual, two sets of laws are assumed to affect age at first marriage. The laws that
limited one's own behavior are combined with those that would have been likely to affect one's
spouse, given that there is, on average, a three year age difference between spouses over this
period. With this strategy, one finds that only the age at which a female enters a relationship
significantly influences fertility decisions. A delay of one year in the female age at first marriage
translates into 0.35 fewer children ever born and a similar fewer number of children in the
household. The age at which a male marries has a smaller and insignificant effect. This appears
to be driven by the fact that women who marry earlier continue to have children for a longer
period. Men who marry later, on the other hand, delay both the birth of the first and the last
child. Finally, delaying marriage also leads to increased labor force participation and higher
wage income, particularly for females. These results are robust to a variety of specification
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changes.
Interestingly, if one were to assume that these laws only affect the behavior of the gender
limited by the legal change and use these laws as an instrument for own age at first marriage,
the magnitude of the estimated effect would be much larger. This would suggest that delaying
one's first union by one year translates into a decreased fertility of about 0.7 children, a much
larger estimate than what was previously found in the literature and also significantly larger
than the OLS estimate of 0.1.
Few works have so far documented a causal relationship between marital timing and fertility.
The only available evidence is provided by Field (2004) as well as Field and Ambrus (2006).
Those papers use variation in the age at menarche in Bangladesh as an instrument for age at
first marriage of women. They find that a delay in the age of marriage for females decreases
fertility, increases their schooling and literacy level as well as the quality of their marital life.
Their estimate of the effect of marriage delay on fertility is slightly smaller but similar to the
one estimated here (about 0.27).
The type of variation here employed was first explored by Dahl (2005). He uses changes over
a shorter period (1935-1969) and only looks at the effect of consent ages for females. His results
imply that postponing marriage after adolescence leads females to be 28 percent less likely to
be poor as adults. The channel through which this may be occurring, however, is yet to be
explored. If delaying marriage leads to decreased fertility and decreased fertility raises one's
standard of living, then our results may be complementary.
Theoretically, little work has been devoted to the relationship between marriage and fertility
timing. Most existing models that attempt to explain the current trends in delay in marriage
and fertility of women model both decisions as simultaneous (see for example Mullin and Wang
2002, Olivettti 2006, Gustafsson 2001 and Conesa 2000). A few models allow for a difference
in the age at first marriage and that at first birth (for example Hotz and Miller 1988 and more
recently Caucutt et al. 2002) but their focus is on explaining the link between these timing
decisions and human capital/labor market outcomes rather than the link between marriage and
fertility. Models of marriage timing, on the other hand, usually ignore fertility as a potential
outcome (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993 and Oppenheimer 1988).
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On the other hand, many descriptive and correlation studies have highlighted how delayed
marriages translate into better socio-economic outcomes. Studies have documented the recent
rise in marriage ages and its potential effect on labor supply, fertility and matching patterns
(Goldstein and Kenney 2001, Qian 1998 and Oppenheimer et al. 1997). In the United States,
the negative consequences of early marriages on fertility outcomes have been well documented
(Kalmuss and Namerow 1994, Martin 2004 and Kiernan 1986). For example, married teen
mothers are 40 percent more likely to have a second birth within 24 months of their first birth
compared to unmarried teen mothers. Women who marry before the age of 19 are 50 percent
more likely to drop out of high school and four times less likely to obtain a college degree
(Klepinger et al. 1999). In developing countries, youth marriages are considered particularly
problematic for girls. Jensen and Thornton (2003) provide an overview of the various problems
that are associated with younger marriages: lower schooling, less reproductive control, higher
rates of pregnancy-related mortality and domestic violence.
This study contributes to the existing literature by first exploring the role these laws limiting
the marriage capacities of teens may have on fertility. This can be particularly important for
developing countries where such policies could be implemented to curtail youthful marriages.
The results suggest that modifying the absolute minimum age for girls (with parental consent)
is particularly important while it appears the no-consent laws may be more likely to affect the
behavior of boys. It also highlights the potential effect of these laws on fertility.
Second, this paper provides some evidence that such an intervention may not only affect the
behavior of girls themselves but also who they marry. This is an important conclusion for the
study of other policies that may alter the entire marriage market equilibrium through imposing
restrictions and changes to only one gender. This could even become important in randomized
trials that attempt at estimating the causal effect of delaying marriage age of girls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 first elaborates a model which
describes why laws that restrict one gender may also modify the behavior of the other. This
motivates the empirical framework presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the data
employed in this analysis while the following section details the evolution of the laws restricting
the marriage of teenagers. The next section presents the results while Section 3.7 concludes and
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discusses policy implications.
3.2 Model
To better understand the effect of age of consent to marriage legislation, a simple illustrative
model is here presented. It highlights how a change in the minimum legal age for marriage may
have other effects than simply modifying the age at which individuals marry.
3.2.1 Basic set-up
Assume that we have a set of males and females (of equal measures) in an economy. Each
agent has a given quality level qi which is distributed uniformly for both men and women over
the unit space.
Agents live for 2 periods and can marry in either period. Assume for simplicity there is no
divorce so that if one marries in the first period, one remains married in the second. Finally,
while one knows one's own quality at birth, it is unobservable to others in period 1 but fully
observable in period 2.
Individuals who are single earn nothing. One married, individuals receive a pay-off that is
a function of their own quality (qi), and of that of their spouse (qj). Assume that the pay-off is
given by
f (qi, qj) = qiqj
which is super-modular such that male and female quality are complements. The discount factor
is given by 1.
Proposition 10 Without government intervention, there exists an infinite number of symmetric
equilibria where all individuals of quality less than a given level will marry in the first period and
the others will delay until the second.
Proof. At the beginning of period 2, all remaining single individuals have their quality revealed.
Given that the pay-off function is supermodular and that the distribution of quality is identical
across males and females, perfect positive assortative matching will be observed. This implies
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that a male of quality qi should match with a female of the same quality level. Thus, an
individual anticipate that if he postpones marriage until period 2, his pay-off in that period will
be given by
f (qi, qi) = q9.
Given that knowledge, who will decide to marry in period 1? The pay-off of delaying marriage
for an individual of quality qi is given by
f (qi, qi) .
The pay-off given to an individual who marries in period 1 is
2E (f (qi, qj))
where the expected value is taken with respect to qj.
Assume an individual believes that all individuals of the other gender with quality less than
q will marry in the first period. This individual will decide to marry if
2 qiE (qj) > qi
qji > q2
9 > qi
Thus, if one believes that all agents of the other gender with quality less than q will marry in
the first period, they will marry in the first period as long as their own quality is less than q.
There will thus be an infinite number of equilibria where all individuals of quality less than a
given level will marry in the first period and all others will delay until the second. *
3.2.2 Effect of minimum marriage age legislation
Assume there is an equilibrium where q is positive and the government imposes that females
cannot marry in the first period.
All women are now forced to delay marriage but males may still prefer to marry in the first
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period with females who are now older than themselves. Would women in the second period be
willing to marry younger men? They must compare the value of marrying with an individual
for which they know the quality for sure with one where it will be a gamble. The gamble will
only be attractive to women who would marry a very low quality male and are thus very low
quality themselves. Now, this low quality pool will not be attractive. Thus, males will delay
marriage as well.
In addition to imposing a delay on males' age at marriage, this policy would also affect the
type of partners that women who used to marry in the first period before the policy change
would marry. In this case, while couples would have formed randomly when marrying in the
first period, they would match assortatively once the policy is enacted.
This simple model is meant as an illustration of the various channels through which a law
which imposes a legal restriction on the age of marriage for one side of the market may affect
the overall matching equilibrium. First, such a law modifies the age at which both males and
females marry. It could even alter the type of spouses one marries in a context with imperfect
information. Evidence of this is explored in the following sections.
3.3 Empirical strategy
Having established the model framing the analysis, this details the empirical strategy em-
ployed to capture the causal effect of marriage delay on fertility outcomes by using the legal
environment restricting youthful marriages as an exogenous source of variation.
3.3.1 General framework
The main equation of this paper is one where a fertility outcome (Yist) of an individual i
born in state s, at time t, is related to the age at first marriage of the individual (xist) and that
of his or her spouse (xjs,t,). That spouse may have been born in a different state (s') and in a
different year (t'). The equation will then be
Yist = a* xist + 3 * xjst, + 4 * Xist + St + 4t + Eist (3.1)
165
where 0, and 6t represent state of birth and year of birth fixed effects, Xist represent individual
controls which in the main specification will include Census year and race fixed effects and Eist
captures idiosyncratic variation by individual.1 Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
state.
3.3.2 Instrumentation
Obtaining consistent estimates of a and 3 in equation (3.1) is unlikely through OLS. That is
because it is likely that unobserved factors influencing the age at which one marry or the age at
which one spouse's marry may also alter fertility decisions, thus leading to a correlation between
xist or xjs,'tand Eis~.
Thus, one must pursue an instrumental variable strategy. The laws limiting one's behavior
offer a potential solution to this problem. First, xi,t can be instrumented using the minimum
legal age at which an individual born in state s in year t may marry (both with and without the
consent of his parents). This is a valid instrument in this difference-in-difference framework if
trends over time in ages at first marriage would have been parallel, had there not been differences
in minimum legal ages.
For each year of birth, state of birth and gender, the minimum age at which an individual
could legally marry was computed by comparing the consent and no-consent ages at each year
between the ages of 12 and 21. The smallest age at which one was allowed to marry based on this
computation was recorded. For example, for an individual who was 19 when the no-consent age
was raised from 18 to 21, the minimum no-consent age would be 18. However, if an individual
was 19 when the no-consent age was reduced from 21 to 18, then the minimum age at which he
could marry would be 19 because he was already passed the new minimum age when that law
was modified. These laws are detailed in the next section.
Year of birth was computed as the difference between the Census year and one's age at the
time of the survey. Some measurement errors may have been introduced by this computation
but this should be minimal. In the same way, the laws were not coded by month but only by
year in which they became a law. It is thus possible that an individual would have turned one
'This is equivalent to adding a linear function of age. An alternative using dummies for each age was explored
with very similar results.
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year older after the actual statute became law.
State of birth is, in this analysis, used as a proxy for the state in which one would have
been residing in their teenage years. Pre-teen migration would simply introduce noise in the
estimation.
Instrumenting for Xjs,t, is slightly more challenging. The laws in place for a person from
state s' born in year t' are only valid instruments if one includes fixed effects for s' and t'. Not
only would this increase significantly the number of fixed effects, but it would also imply that
both the year of birth of the respondent and that of his spouse would be included as controls
in the regression. For individuals who married only once and report accurately their age at
first marriage, Xist and xjslt are then colinear since i's year of birth plus Xist correspond to
the year the first union was celebrated and thus should be equal to j's year of birth plus Xj,'t'.
Furthermore, the state of birth and age of a spouse may very well be endogenous to the timing
decision if, for example, delaying leads to marry spouses with a smaller age difference.
Instead, this paper uses the fact that the average age difference over this time period between
a man and a woman is 3 years. Thus, for each individual i, born in state s in year t, one can
construct a "potential spouse" j who is born also in state s but in year t = t + 3 if i is a male
and in year t = t - 3 if i is a female.
Thus, the first stage of this instrumentation strategy will thus be
Xist = * NCAst + p * CAst + - * NCAi + 1 * CA,- + al Xist & +r s -+ KI1 + pio.2)
xjs't, = t 2 * NCAst + p2 * CAt + 72 • NCAst + 62 * CAs, + 0 2 * X*st + 2 + 't + Vi(3.3)
where the rls, Kt are fixed effects for state and year of birth, Xist is defined as above and NCAkl
and CAkl respectively represent the minimum no-consent and consent ages to marry for an
individual born in state k in year 1. Again, standard errors will be clustered at the state level.
These regressions should be run on individual outcomes to obtain the appropriate estimate
of the variance-covariance matrix. Nevertheless, the sample size was too large for this to be
possible in a timely manner. Each estimation was thus performed at the level of a cell which
were divided by age, year of Census, year of birth, state of birth, gender and race. The sum of
sample-line weights were used to weight each cell of the regression.
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3.3.3 Selection issues
Equation (3.1) must be estimated on currently married individuals who both reported their
age at first marriage. If legal restrictions affected either the probability of being married or the
probability of remaining in a relationship, this strategy will be invalid.
This paper explores this particular issue through a variety of methods. First, both the first
stage and the reduced form will be presented for individuals currently married and for the entire
sample. Secondly, the probability of being currently married was regressed on the instruments
and no effect was found, thus suggesting little potential effect of selection on the results.
3.4 Data
The previous section detailed the empirical strategy used in this paper in order to relate the
ages at first marriage of males and females to fertility-related outcomes. The present section
explains how each of these variables was constructed.
3.4.1 Age at first marriage
This paper measures the age at which females and males first entered into a marital rela-
tionship by using the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from 1960, 1970 and
1980 Census files. These samples are the only ones in which both spouses provided their age at
first marriage. The samples are fairly consistent. All ever-married individuals were surveyed.
In 1960 and 1970, all individuals above the age of 14 were questioned, in 1980, all those older
than 15. Only respondents older than 21 will be included in the analysis so these changes in the
sample will be irrelevant for the current analysis.
In all these Census extracts, the question asked for the month and the year of the first
marriage and the age is derived from using that date and the date of birth. Only the age is
available to IPUMS users.
The information collected through this method is self-reported and may thus be subject
to the usual caveats concerning misreporting and measurement errors potentially important to
retrospective data. One would expect that this type of error would be more likely among younger
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marriages since those might have been of shorter duration or simply might have occurred further
from the moment of the interview. I find little evidence that youthful marriages are under-
reported. If anything, as individuals age, they are more likely to report marrying at younger
ages (after controlling for year of birth fixed effects) although the magnitude of the effect is fairly
small. Blank et al. (2007) discuss the issue of reliability of self-reported information concerning
the age at first marriage and conclude that the source of data employed here appears more
accurate than that obtained from the Vital Statistics as the latter may have been altered to
falsely comply with the marriage license requirements imposed by each state.
Finally, one should note that this variable has been bottom and top-coded at different values
over the various Census extracts. While it is mostly irrelevant for this analysis how marriages
occurring after one's ninetieth birthday are coded, censoring of youth marriages may be more
of a concern. In 1980, all marriages entered at an age younger than 12 were coded at 12 years
old. In 1960 and 1970, it was all unions performed before one's 14th birthday that were coded
at 14. It was not found that this difference was very important throughout the analysis but it
should be explored further.
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the evolution of the median and mean age at first marriage. This
figure suggests that contrary to popular beliefs, individuals born in the nineteenth century were
not likely to marry at very young ages. Actually, the median and the mean age at first marriage
fell dramatically for both genders over this period. If one accounts for the difference in the age
at the time of the interview, a fairly similar picture arises. The main difference is that rather
than observing a plateau at the end of the period, one would observe a slight increase in both
the mean and the median age for both genders.
3.4.2 Outcome measures
Measures of fertility were also obtained from the same Census extracts. First, the number of
children born to a woman is provided in all three samples. In 1960, only ever-married females
provided a figure, while in 1970 and 1980, it was asked of all females. This will be the main
measure of fertility employed in this study. For males and females, however, one can also measure
the number of own children living in the same household. This information is available for every
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single year and individual. To measure fertility timing, it would have been ideal to measure the
age at which the first child was born. Unfortunately, that information is not collected by the
Census. Nevertheless, this study will use the age of the eldest and youngest own child in the
household as proxies for fertility timing. This will be a good approximation as long as many of
these children are still living with their parents at the time of the survey. Given that the average
age in this sample is well into their 40s, absence of children from the household will potentially
be a problem.
Finally, to relate these results to those presented elsewhere, educational attainment (highest
grade obtained), employment status and wage income (measured in 1980 constant dollars) will
also be employed.
Table 3.1 presents the summary measures of each of these variables for men and women
over this period for two distinct samples. One sample includes all men and women; the other,
only currently married individuals for which both female and male ages at first marriage were
collected. In both cases, the sample is restricted to individuals aged 21 and above to ensure
that no individual is still potentially limited by the law. The table highlights that individuals
in our sample are mostly White (even more so among currently married) with a large majority
of men (0.85) and of women (0.89) having entered at least once into a marriage contract. Men,
on average, over this period, married at age 24 and women, at age 21. Among those currently
married, the age difference is on average 3 years. Females had on average about 2.4 children by
the moment of the interview and about 2.6 children once the sample is restricted to currently
married women. The average number of children in the household for both males and females is
much smaller, however. Only about one child in the household was found on average: this figure
rises to 1.5 among currently married couples. The oldest child in the household (among those
for whom a child was found) was about 13.5 years old for couples currently married but about
16 for all males and almost 20 for all females. Similarly, the youngest child in the household
was about 10 years old among currently married couples but 13 for all males and almost 17 for
all females. The difference by gender is probably due to the fact that more widowed mothers
were living with their adult child than widowers. The sample has completed, on average, a few
years of high school with the mode of the distribution having obtained a high school degree.
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Men and women are similarly educated, in particular once the sample is restricted to currently
married individuals. However, men are much more likely to work, in particular among married
men, while the opposite is true for females. This translates into large differences between male
and female wage income, a difference which is exacerbated among married individuals.
3.5 Legal restrictions on youthful marriages
The instrumentation strategy described above requires that the minimum age at which
teenagers and young adults are allowed to marry varied by gender over time by state. When
the thirteen colonies became independent in 1776, they inherited the common law regulations
of the British Empire on the age at first marriage. Boys and girls were respectively allowed to
marry without parental consent at the ages of 14 and 12. Males were given a higher minimum
age based on differential ages at puberty. These laws were kept in place in the newly formed
United States much longer than they did in Britain. Grossberg (1985) argues low minimum ages
continued to prevail because there were no dowries exchanged in the new Continent. Because
of this, there was no need to raise the age of marriage without parental consent to protect a
father's investment in his daughter from being claimed by an unsanctioned suitor. Shammas
(2002) argues that the lack of official registry of marriages (linked to the absence of a state
church) made it impossible for states to enforce and monitor restrictions on marriage and thus
did not attempt to do so. Whatever the reason might have been, most states continued the
tradition of allowing children to marry at very young ages. Many simply never stipulated a legal
minimum age before the twentieth century making the common-law ages of 12 and 14 ipso facto
the minimum legal ages.
It is important to note that a marriage that did not respect these legal restrictions was not
void but simply voidable. If a couple married while one of the parties was too young to give his
or her consent but continued to cohabit after this age of consent was achieved, the union was
considered legal and valid. The effect of these laws was thus first to allow adolescents who had
married without legal authorization and regretted their decision to be able to annul the union.
Secondly, it would also make it more cumbersome for teenagers to obtain a marriage license.
In so far as laws were at least partially enforced, they increased the costs related to youthful
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marriages, as avoidance mechanism (travel, misrepresentation of age) would imply additional
efforts.
3.5.1 Data collection
This paper collected information regarding the historical rules determining legal ages at
marriage for all 51 states over the period 1882 to 1980, providing a set of legal rules for the
longest period yet collected. This is a much larger data set than Blank et al. (2007) who focused
on the changes over the 1950-1970 period. This is also more comprehensive than Dahl (2005)
who focused only on consent laws, for about 40 states, over the period 1935-1969.
Data collection involved the careful analysis of various secondary sources. Many compendium
of marriage laws were published over this period and contained information regarding the laws
(including the age of consent to marriage) pertaining to marriage in each state. This constituted
the primary source of information over time. This was then supplemented by various sources
such as treatises on the status of women, marriage manuals for ministers, etc. Many of them
not only reported the current legal age but also the date at which changes took place. If two
sources less than five years apart had the same age and quoted the same law, it was assumed
that there had been no change in the law over that period. If a change occurred between two
data sources and only one legislative change was recorded over the period, it was assumed that
the minimum age changed at that point. For any point where uncertainty remained, searches
of the legal statutes in Westlaw and LexisNexis were then employed to resolve them. However,
as compared to Blank et al. (2007), I could not only resort to legislative search given the long
time period studied.
For most states, this generated a set of legal rules for the entire period from 1885 (or their
admission to the Union) to 1980. For a few states and time periods, I could not resolve some
uncertainties and thus kept those years as missing. All sources employed in this exercises are
listed in Appendix 3.A.
These documents were preferred as a source to the World Almanac as used by Dahl (2005)
for a few reasons. First, that source only started to publish information regarding age of consent
to marriage in 1935 and even within that period, many states were not included. Second, several
172
inconsistencies were found between that source and other sources described above and verified
through searches in the statutes through Westlaw or LexisNexis. Finally, the World Almanac
focuses mostly on consent laws and provided little information on no-consent laws.
3.5.2 Legal history
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the rules in place over this period by state. As discussed
before, this paper focuses on two different types of laws. The first columns refer to the minimum
age at which individuals are allowed to enter into a marriage contract without the authorization
of their parents. States differed in the way they set these limits. Sometimes, the law simply
prevented individuals younger than the age of majority to marry without parental consent. In
that case, changes in state-level age of majority immediately affected no-consent ages. Other
statutes specified ages specifically for consenting to marriage. Over time, these laws have not
changed dramatically for females over this period. Twenty-one states did not change the no-
consent ages over the entire time period. Most states used a minimum age for females of 18 years
old but some have also employed 21. A few states had lower ages in the beginning of the twentieth
century but those rapidly disappeared. For males, no-consent ages evolved dramatically over
time. A majority of states had established a minimum age for males of 21. This was gradually
lowered to 18 over the second half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, a few states also
had much lower ages in the beginning of the period and increased them into the beginning of
the twentieth century. Overall, these laws increased their bindingness over the first-half of the
century and then became more and more lax over the subsequent period. While the increase is
comparable between males and females, the decrease after 1940 is particularly marked for males.
These changes altered the variance in laws faced by teenagers over this period. As shown by
the last row of Table 3.2, age of consent to marriage without parental consent experienced a
substantial homogenization, as emphasized by Blank et al. (2007), over this period. However,
as each state moved towards the new standard of 18, there was a marked increased in variance
between 1960 and 1970 (not shown).
The last columns show the consent ages, that is the minimum ages at which a teenager can
get married with the consent on his or her parents. Parental "consent" could be demonstrated
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through various ways, sometimes in person, other times in writing as well. A few states never
allowed parents to authorize unions of minors without a court appearance. For those, the
minimum age at which a child can marry if he or she secures parental approval and court
sanction is then recorded. Many other states also allowed marriages below the consent ages if a
judge authorized it. 2 However, most of these rules are left to the discretion of a judge without
relevance to age and so are not reported here. As shown in the last columns Table 3.2, these
laws varied considerably over the period of study, in particular for females. The patterns of
evolution of the consent laws are fairly different than those of the no-consent laws. First, it is
obvious that many states modified one type of law but kept the other unaltered. Second, as in
the case of no-consent laws, the legislation increased the minimum age with parental consent
for males over the first half of the period and then decreased it over the remaining 40 years.
However, contrary to the evolution of the consent laws, this following decrease was minimal
and the average legal age in 1980 remained well above that in 1900. On the other hand, these
minimum ages were consistently raised for females over the same period, with a more substantial
increase in the beginning of the twentieth century than in the second half of it. The variance
in the laws across states also changed over this period. While one observes more and more
homogeneity in the laws between 1900 and 1940, after 1940, the variance rises for females. For
males, while homogenization continues until 1980, it is much less drastic after 1940 than before.
In addition to an increased homogenization of the laws across states, female and male ages
differed in level throughout most of the period. The Supreme Court ruling on Stanton and
Stanton (1975) ruled that child support payments should expire at the same age for boys and
girls and thus imposed some degree of gender equality in State legislations. Many authors
argue that this was an important reason behind the homogenization between female and male
no-consent laws which occurred at the end of the period. Arkansas is the only state with a
difference in their no-consent laws by 1980. Nevertheless, there was much less homogenization
across males and females for the consent ages than for the no-consent rules. In 1980, fifteen
states still had different minimum age of consent for marriage (with parental consent) between
20One common exception is that many states allow a pregnant woman to be married even if younger than the
legal age, sometimes only if she is marrying the father of the child, sometimes irrespective of the identity of the
groom.
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girls and boys. While this is substantial, it is still much less than in 1900 or even in 1940 where
more than forty states had differences between genders.
These trends in age at first marriage presented above are thus in sharp contrast with the
trends in the consent and no-consent ages presented here. This suggests that the laws had the
most "bite" on the behavior of individuals born between 1900 and 1940 because those were the
cohorts for which high ages were still in place and for which lower ages at first marriage were
experienced.
A first look at the distribution of ages at first marriage across states over time should provide
some evidence of the bindingness of the laws restricting teenagers marriages. Figures 3-3, 3-4,
3-5 and 3-3 explore how binding each set of laws were. They graph the distribution of age at
first marriage, by gender, by minimum age imposed. Each graph may include a variety of states
and time periods over which the same combination of consent and no-consent laws were in place.
Graphs made for the evolution of the distribution of age by state as a function of changes in
minimum ages over time produced very similar conclusions.
In Figure 3, states are classified into 3 panels by the minimum age at which one can marry
with parental consent. It then shows in each panel, how the distribution of ages change as
the minimum age without parental consent evolves. One finds in panel A and B that states
which imposed higher no-consent laws had distributions of ages that were shifted to the right.
It also highlights that these laws tended to be more binding when placed at or above 18. Panel
C suggests that in states where marriages were not allowed until age 18, even with parental
consent, there is little difference in cases where the no-consent law was placed at 18 or at 21.
Figure 4 plots the same data for females. While it appears that the no-consent laws affected
the distribution of ages in this case also, the effect tends to be much more muted than for boys.
The distribution of ages when the no-consent minimum age is 21 rarely differs from that when
it is 18.
Figures 5 and 6 explore the relationship between the laws setting consent ages and the
distribution of marital ages. For males, the effect of consent laws is much less important than
that of no-consent minimum ages. In particular, there is little difference in cases where the
minimum age is 14 and that when it is 16. However, overall, state-time cells that have larger
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minimum age appears to have experienced higher ages at first marriage. Figure 6 highlights that
these consent laws did bind the behavior of girls as larger minimum ages were accompanied by
a shift of the distribution to the right.
All these graphs suggest some degree of bindingness in the laws as the distribution appears
to be censored by the legal environment. Nevertheless, these graphs also imply some degree of
evasion and lax enforcement as the number of marriages below the imposed minimum is not
zero.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 First stage
The first step in this analysis is to demonstrate that the age of consent laws modified the
age at first marriage of individuals in the sample. Both Blank et al. (2007) and Dahl (2005)
demonstrated that the laws diminished the propensity of individuals to marry at a young age
for the period they studied. This paper focuses on the interaction of own and spouse's age and
the role of the legal environment in that determination.
The results of the regression equations (3.2) and (3.3) are presented in Table 3.3 and Table
3.4. Table 3.3 presents the results for males and their spouses while Table 3.4 focuses on females
and their spouses. In both tables, the first panel introduces the legal rules by separate dummies
for each minimum age while Panel B uses a linear measure of the minimum age. The reference
category for females is a minimum age of consent of 12 while that for males is a minimum age
of 14. The first columns of both tables correspond to the estimation of equation (3.2). The
first column corresponds to the estimates of -y and pl while the second reports estimates of
71 and 01. Similarly, Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates of equation (3.3), with Column
(5) reporting estimates of T2 and 02 and the regression estimates of -y2 and p2 can be found in
column (6).
The regressions suggest that the laws did in fact influence the age at which individuals
married. Males appear to marry at a later age when their own consent age increases and when
the consent minimum age of their potential spouse is being raised as well. On the other hand,
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the own minimum consent age and the no-consent laws likely to affect one's spouse appear to
have little influence on the age at which males marry, if not a negative effect. Once one allows for
non-linearity in the functional form, spousal rules for no-consent ages appear to be influential.
The results for these male's wives are mirroring the previous results. These women marry later
when their predicted consent minimum age rises and when the no-consent minimum age of their
spouse goes up. Their own no-consent laws also increases their marriage age, even if not by a
very large margin.3 The F-test on the joint significance of the instruments are fairly large and
larger in the case of spouse's rules in both cases. They are also larger for males (for which we
have the exact laws) than for their wives (where we approximated the laws by the state of birth
of the male and the average age difference).
Columns (3) and (4) present, for comparison, the effect of male laws without the addition of
the female rules. Consent laws do not appear to change the age at which males marry but are
now at least positively correlated. No-consent laws are more strongly causing delay in marriage
of males. Similarly, having only spousal consent or no-consent laws-as shown in Columns (7)
and (8)- strengthens the relationship. The effect of consent laws is now strongly significant and
the effect of the no-consent laws becomes larger and more precisely measured.
Table 3.4 suggests a similar pattern once we look at females. As before, women are strongly
influenced by their own consent minimum age and slightly less so by their own no-consent
laws. Only the no-consent rules affecting their potential spouse's influence the timing of their
marriage. The regression for the age of first marriage for these females' husbands is weaker.
Results suggest that the no-consent law we predict would be, on average, likely to influence
them, is the most important determinant of their marriage timing. The female consent and
no-consent laws both positively contribute to the decision of delaying. Once more, restricting
the regressions to only own laws suggest that for females, both consent and no-consent laws
are influencing their decision while for their spouses', only the no-consent minimum age are
limiting the behavior. Usually, the inclusion of spousal constraints diminish the magnitude of
the estimated impact of own laws on the age at first marriage.
In both tables, the effects appear overall to be non linear. First, some smaller cells appear
3Since the effect of the laws are smaller on a spouse's age at first marriage than on one's own age, this suggests
that these laws are thus also potentially altering age differences between spouses.
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to generate strong coefficients such as in the case of a minimum age of 13 or 15 for females.
However, grouping these smaller cells with similar ages or dropping observations with those ages
does not affect the results significantly. Secondly, it appears that a one year increase in the
minimum age does not always translate into the same impact. The male no-consent minimum
age, for example, influences marital ages less when increased from 20 to 21 but much more at
lower ages. This then explains why, in Panel B, once we turn to linear estimates, the precision of
our estimates falls substantially and are very often only significant at 10 percent. These linear
estimates suggest that increasing the minimum age without parental consent by one year leads
males and females to delay marriage by 0.45 years. The effects of laws with parental consent
are slightly smaller, where an increase in one year would lead to a delay in marriage of 0.2 for
males and 0.3 for females.
Table 3.5 and 3.6 explore how robust these results are to changes in the specifications and
samples. Only the results for the effect of the laws on own ages are reported but similar
results were obtained for spousal age regressions. Columns (1) and (2) present the results with
state-linear trends. The next columns present the first stage for the full sample (including not
currently married individuals). Finally, columns (5) and (6) introduce as additional covariates
compulsory schooling laws from Oreopoulos (2007). This reduces somewhat the sample as the
number of years and states for which this variable was available is less than those for which I
have legislation info regarding marriage rules.
Comparing the first two columns of Table 3.3 to Table 3.5, one finds a fair level of similarities.
Adding state-trends strengthens somewhat the effect of no-consent minimum ages for males
although the standard error on the linear coefficient increases. However, adding those controls
weaken the effect of spousal consent laws. Males consent minimum age appear now much
more effective than before while little change can be found in the no-consent minimum ages
for spouses. Including all ever married in the sample changes the estimates only slightly. This
suggests little possibility of selection bias. Finally, adding schooling laws renders the no-consent
minimum age dummies for males and the consent minimum age dummies for females more
significant although less linearly related, which leads the linear coefficients to fall and become
less significant. However, this is entirely due to the change in sample rather than the introduction
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of compulsory schooling laws. Compulsory schooling, in itself, increases marriage age by 0.06
years.
Comparing Table 3.6 and the estimates provided in the first two columns of Table 3.4, one
finds very similar results for female age at first marriage. Adding state linear trends weakens
the first stage more significantly in this case. The effect of female consent ages and spouse
no-consent ages are now much less significant than before. On the other hand, little difference
is observed by computing the first stage on the full sample although the effect of spousal rules
is somewhat smaller than in the currently married sample. Schooling laws alter much less the
coefficients in this case but do somewhat increase the standard errors of the linear model.
While not reported, other tests of the first stage were conducted. Past and future laws were
included in addition to contemporary ones and the contemporary ones retained their significance.
Also, past and future laws were not significant, giving credentials to the hypothesis of parallel
trends. The largest states were dropped one at a time to check that none of them are driving
the results and this was confirmed. Each of the Census regions were also dropped and results
remained broadly consistent although some regions were more important than others for the
estimates. However, the first stage is dependent on the period studied. Excluding the oldest
cohorts substantially increases the standard errors on the relationship presented above.
3.6.2 Reduced-form effects
Having demonstrated that the legal restrictions on youthful marriages influence the age at
which individuals eventually marry, let me now turn to exploring how these laws affect fertility
and other economic outcomes. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the reduced form effects of the laws
on various fertility-related outcomes. Once more, the odd columns show the coefficients on one's
own laws while the even ones display the estimates of the effects of spousal laws. Each pair of
columns, however, corresponds to only one regression model. In panel A, each law is dummied
out while panel B presents the linear coefficients.
The first columns present the effect of minimum age legislation on the number of children
in the household. This will be a good measure of fertility for individuals who still have children
living with them. For that variable, the dummied out coefficients are rarely significant but
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the linear model suggests that an increase in the consent minimum age of females and the
no-consent minimum age of males both reduce the number of children in the household. This
mirrors the findings of the first stage presented above. Effects are relatively small. An increase
of one year in the consent minimum age imposed on a female reduces the number of children in
the household by about 0.01 while a similar increase in the no-consent minimum age imposed
on males decreases the number of children living in the household by about 0.02. Female no-
consent ages and male consent ages do not appear to be very influential and are their effects are
very imprecisely measured. Looking at the number of children born, the effects are now more
significant and much larger as well but for the same variables as the ones for the number of
children in the household. The linear model suggests that an increase of one year in the consent
age laws of females and one in the no-consent age of males both lead to an decrease in the number
of children ever born of about 0.05. The pattern is fairly linear for the consent minimum age of
females but much less for the spousal no-consent rules. Overall, non-linearities highlighted above
are again visible in this table. For children born, the fertility effects are particularly marked for
increasing the minimum consent age from 17 to 18 compared to an increase from 12 to 17.
Effects of the laws on fertility timing (as captured by the ages of children within the house-
hold) are much less clear. The dummied coefficients are all very large and very significant
suggesting large differences between the ages of children living with their parents in states and
time periods where the minimum age is 12 or 14 and those in periods where the ages were
larger. However, none of these coefficients are very well aligned, making the linear estimates
very noisily estimated. If any conclusions can be drawn, the laws restricting female behavior
appear to lead to an increase in the age of both the eldest and the youngest child present in the
household. It indicates that these laws did not delay fertility, as measured by this proxy. It also
suggests that the laws led to shorter fertility periods with mothers having fewer young children
at home when laws restricted the age at which they could marry. This is also visible in the fact
that the reduced form effects on fertility are particularly marked when looking at older females
compared to younger ones. This suggests that the measured decrease in fertility is not linked to
a mechanical relationship. For example, this is not in accordance with a model where a delay in
marriage decreases fertility because females have children as soon as they marry and continue
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to do so until menopause. This is also in contrast to findings in Field (2004) for Bangladesh
where most of the decreased fertility was due to a delay in the timing of the first birth.
Table 3.9 performs a series of validity checks for the reduced form using the number of
children born. Although not reported, the same pattern was observed for the other outcomes
previously presented. The format of this table is the same as before. Adding state linear trends
- as in Columns (1) and (2) - decreases the magnitude of the effect of female consent ages
and particularly that of male no-consent ages. On the other hand, estimating the regression
over the entire sample (including those never married) reduces somewhat the estimates of the
effect by very little. However, if one estimates the reduced form onl the sample of never married
individuals, the laws are found to have no effect on fertility behavior. Including controls for
changes in the compulsory schooling laws reduces the size of the coefficients but does not modify
their significance, as presented in Columns (5) and (6). Compulsory schooling laws are found to
slightly reduce fertility (as shown by Leon 2004) but the effect in this case is insignificant.
As a falsification test, one would like to show that females who were unlikely to be affected
by the change in the consent laws also do not appear to alter their fertility decision in response
to changes in these laws. While it would have been ideal to use some family characteristics to
attempt to proxy the likelihood of being limited by these laws, those were not available in the
Census extracts used for this paper. The last four columns of Table 7 focuses on two groups
which should not have been influenced by these laws: women who married past the age of 25
and women who completed more than 12 years of schooling (that is attended college). These
do not constitute a perfect placebo test because consent and no-consent age legislation could
have altered the schooling decisions of females as well as potentially postpone their marriage
past the age of 25. The likelihood of these two events, however, is probably small. In particular,
there is no evidence that the probability of marrying after age 25 is modified by these laws.
Columns (7) and (8) suggest that female rules are not affecting fertility decisions of females who
married after age 25. The magnitude of the linear effect is extremely small. The dummies for
no-consent laws are very significant but do not follow a logical pattern. However, the effect of
the male no-consent age, albeit reduced, is still visible and the linear effect is just short of being
significant at the 5 percent level. A very similar pattern arises in Column (9) and (10) when
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looking at college attendees. The effect of female laws disappears when looking at this particular
sample while an increase of one year in the male no-consent age appears to lead to a reduction
in fertility of about 0.03.
3.6.3 Instrumental variable results
Combining the reduced form results presented above and the first stage, one can then es-
timate the causal effect of delaying the age of marriage on fertility outcomes, as presented in
Table 3.10. The first three columns include the outcomes for males and the last four, those
for females. Because each regression includes a control for one's own year of birth, once age at
first marriage is included, the spouse's age at first marriage captures both the effect of having a
spouse who delays marriage and having one who is older. Thus, the larger that variable is, the
older one's spouse is compared to one's own age and the later this person married.
The top panel presents the results of an OLS model. These estimates suggest that individuals
who marry one year later have on average about 0.2 more children in the household, but having
a wife who delayed decreases that number while having a husband who married later increases
it. Children ever born, however, are negatively correlated with a female's age at first marriage
but positively with a husband's age. The estimated correlation is -0.075. Households with
husbands who married later have children who are older but the relationship between marriage
and fertility timing is more complex for females, since when females marry earlier, their eldest
child in the household is younger but their youngest child. older. On the other hand, a male
with an older wife has older children. As mentioned before, these differences in the correlations
between the measures of fertility suggest that many in our sample are too old to have all their
children living with them, making the use of the age of children in the household to measure
fertility timing potentially problematic.
The second panel introduces the instrumental variable (IV) results. First, the effect of
marriage timing on fertility, as measured by the number of children born, is presented in Column
(7). These results suggest that a female delaying by one year her first union will have about
-0.35 fewer children. This is significant at 10 percent. Marrying a man who marries one year
;ater will further reduce this by -0.27 children. The effects on the other measures of fertility
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are more difficult to comprehend. The number of children in the household is reduced by 0.01
for a delay in male and their spouse's marriage. Both of these estimates are very imprecisely
estimated, however. For females, it appears that having an older husband is what leads to a
decrease in the number of children living in the household. Finally, my estimates of fertility
timing are very large but suggest that delaying marriage for a female leads to having older kids
in the household while a delay in a male's marriage timing leads to the opposite result. These IV
results were obtained by instrumenting both age at first marriage using dummies for each legal
restriction. Similar magnitudes were obtained by using the linear instruments but the precisions
of those estimates were much weaker.
Table 3.11 explores various robustness checks for the effect of marriage timing on children
born. First, one could introduce state linear time trends, as is done in Column (1). The results
for female marriage timing is barely altered by this change but the coefficient for males changes
sign. Being married to an older man now causes an increase in the number of children born.
Column (2) then introduces education as an additional covariate and instruments that covariate
using compulsory schooling laws. This reduces the magnitude and the precision of the effect of
delaying female marriage. This effect appears to be due, however, more to the change in samples
than to the introduction of the new variable. Furthermore, the effect of delaying marriage is
larger than that of education (although not statistically significantly so). This may suggest
that part of results in Leon (2004) may be explained by the effect of compulsory schooling
laws on delayed marriage rather than on education itself. The last two columns highlight that
this delay in fertility is visible only among Whites and not among Blacks. The magnitude for
Whites is slightly larger at about -0.4 but falls dramatically when only restricting the sample
to African-American females. This could be because these laws were not very binding on non-
White behavior (the first stage is not significant for Blacks). It could also be due to the fact that
issues surrounding legitimacy of children might have been more important for White females
over this period than for minorities.
Other checks of the robustness of this strategy were also performed. I attempt to correct for
selection by adding a variable for not being married and setting one's age at first marriage and
that of one's spouse to zero when that dummy is equal to one. Little evidence of selection was
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found using this strategy. This is not surprising given that the probability of being married or
currently married was not found to be influenced by the instruments.
The first stage and reduced form have highlighted how minimum age laws not only affected
the gender that was impacted by them but also the behavior of the other gender who would
be likely to marry them. If this is true, one would expect that assuming that the laws only
modify outcomes through delaying marriage of the gender affected would lead to overestimating
the causal effect of marriage timing (in absolute value). This would be supported by the model
presented in Section 3.2. This hypothesis is explored in Table 3.12 which reproduces Table 3.10
but only includes as an endogenous variable one's own age at first marriage and instruments
for that variable only with the laws impacting that individual. These results suggest that in
most cases, both the OLS and the IV would be larger in magnitude in this strategy than in the
one presented above, supporting the hypothesis that the laws are influencing more than only
one's own age at first marriage. With that strategy, one would have concluded that delaying
marriage for females would lead to a decrease in fertility of -0.7, about twice the size of the
current estimate.
Table 3.13 then produces the same comparison for a set of additional economic outcomes.
They present the OLS and the IV as in Table 3.10 and then that as in Table 3.12 for three
outcomes: highest grade achieved, employment status and wage income. The correlations are
interesting in their own right. While delaying marriage is correlated with more human capital
for both females and males (and their spouses), the pattern for employment and wage income
is more intriguing. Males who delay marriage are more likely to work while females are less
likely to do so. The correct IV suggests a few elements. First, there is little evidence that
delaying marriage leads to higher human capital accumulation. The coefficients on own age at
first marriage is negative but not significant for both males and females. On the other hand,
it appears that marrying an individual who is older increases human capital accumulation for
both males and females (significant for females at 5 percent but only at 10 percent for males).
Females who delay marriage by one year are 4 percent more likely to work and to earn about 473
more dollars per year. No effect on male labor supply is found and the wage income regressions
only suggest that for a male to marry a female who is one year older would reduce his wage
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income by about 1,300 dollars.
If one was to ignore the potential effect of these laws on the other gender, Panel C suggests
that one would then overestimate the effect of marriage delay by a substantial fraction. One
would conclude that delaying marriage for males leads to about 0.8 more years of education and
about 2,400 fewer dollars of wage income. The female effect of marriage timing on labor supply
would now be about 6 percent and that on wage income close to 570 dollars.
Overall, the results suggest that marriage delay reduces fertility and could affect other socio-
economic outcomes. Furthermore, they highlight the role of these laws as affecting not only the
gender that is constrained but also the gender that is anticipating to marrying that particular
age group. This is somewhat in contrast to Field and Ambrus (2006) who theoretically argue
that their estimate (which uses variation at the individual level) can be used to infer market-wide
effects of imposing limits on marriage age.
Finally, the IV estimates remain fairly large and very often well above the ones from the
OLS model (although not significantly so). While I've attempted to capture the effect that
these laws may have on market equilibrium by looking at both genders simultaneously, there is
a possibility that other mechanisms than age are at play. For example, the model suggests that
not only ages of both genders would be affected but also potentially the quality of their spouse.
The latter effect is not captured by the above strategy and this could potential explain why the
estimates are still relatively large.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that laws constraining the marriages of young adults and teens in-
fluence the average age at which individuals and their spouses marry. It has also shown that
these laws appear to modify the fertility decisions of females. The IV estimates suggest that if
a female delays marriage by one year, this will reduce the number of children born to her by
about 0.35 children, an estimate only slightly larger than that of Field (2004). It also appears
to increase her labor force attachment and her wage income. These results particularly demon-
strate that given the matching process involved in marriage markets, legal restrictions imposed
on one gender also modify the decisions of the other and that not accounting for this leads to
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serious overestimated effects of marriage delay.
These findings are useful in order to better understand the potential impact of imposing
minimum ages at marriage in developing countries where youthful marriages are more common.
They suggest that such policies may be able to reduce fertility, although their effect on fertility
timing is more difficult to predict. Furthermore, they emphasize that such a rule could also
influence the overall market equilibrium through changes in matching patterns. This analysis
highlights the potential role of that secondary channel.
These results also emphasize the role for a better understanding of the relationship between
marriage timing and matching patterns. No theoretical framework currently emphasizes the
potential impact of delaying marriage on the type of spouse one may eventually marry. While
it is possible one would remain with the same partner but simply delay the official ceremony, it
is also possible that imposing a ban on youthful marriages can alter who individuals will marry.
It would be particularly interesting to evaluate how assortative matching patterns may evolve
because of this and the consequences of such changes in matching patterns. This is left to future
research.
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3.9 Tables and figures
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Males Females
All Currently All Currently
married married
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Demographics
Age
White
Black
Other race
Marriage
Ever married
Age at first marriage*
Age difference with
spouse
0.85 0.36
24.27 2.11
1.00
24.20
3.00
0.00
5.62
4.87
0.89 0.31 1.00
21.59 1.74 21.40
2.99
Fertility
Children ever born
Number of children in
hhd
Age of eldest child#
Age of youngest
child#
Other outcomes
Highest grade attained
Employed last week
Wage income (1980$)
1.16
16.06
12.62
11.07
0.79
12525
2.37 0.89 2.56 1.97
0.88 1.52 1.56 1.18 0.94 1.51 1.57
9.46 13.42 7.74 19.68 12.51 13.69 7.80
9.95 9.26 8.04 16.58 13.48 9.49 8.16
1.82
0.24
5776
11.16
0.83
14097
3.50
0.37
12770
10.99
0.42
3620
1.49
0.20
2248
11.21
0.38
3067
2.86
0.48
5225
N 5100514
All summary statistics are weighted by Census
*Only available for individuals ever married.
2491207
sample-line weights.
#Only available for individuals with own children in the household
189
45.12
0.90
0.09
0.01
15.02
0.30
0.29
0.09
46.54
0.92
0.08
0.01
13.76
0.28
0.27
0.09
46.71
0.89
0.10
0.01
15.81
0.32
0.31
0.09
44.15
0.92
0.08
0.01
13.54
0.28
0.27
0.09
1.00
5.15
4.94
4436765 2380419
Table 3.2: Age of consent to marriage, by state, 1885-1980
State "No consent laws" "Consent laws"
Male Female Male Female
1900 1940 1980 1900 1940 1980 1900 1940 1980 1900 1940 1980
Alabama 21 21 18 18 18 18 17 17 14 14 14 14
Alaska 21 21 18 18 18 18 NA 18 16 NA 16 16
Arizona 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 18 16 12 16 16
Arkansas 21 21 21 18 18 18 17 17 17 14 14 16
California 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 16 18
Colorado 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 16 16 12 16 16
Connecticut 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 16 16 12 16 16
DC 21 21 18 16 18 18 14 18 18 12 16 16
Delaware 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16
Florida 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 18 16 12 16 16
Georgia 17 17 18 18 18 18 17 17 16 14 14 16
Hawaii NA 20 18 NA 20 18 17 18 16 14 16 16
Idaho 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 14 16 12 12 16
Illinois 21 21 18 18 18 18 17 18 16 14 16 16
Indiana 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 16 16 17
Iowa 21 21 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 14 14 16
Kansas 15 21 18 12 18 18 15 18 14 12 16 12
Kentucky 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 16 14 12 14 12
Louisiana 21 21 21 21 21 21 14 18 18 12 16 16
Maine 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 14 16 12 16 16
Maryland 21 21 18 16 18 18 14 18 16 12 16 16
Massachusetts 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 18 18 16 16 18
Michigan 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16
Minnesota 21 18 18 18 16 18 18 18 18 15 15 16
Mississippi 21 21 21 18 18 21 14 14 17 12 12 15
Missouri 21 21 18 18 18 18 15 15 15 12 15 15
Montana 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 16
Nebraska 21 21 19 18 21 19 18 18 17 16 16 17
Nevada 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 16
New Hampshire 14 20 18 13 18 18 14 14 14 13 13 13
New Jersey 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 18 16 12 16 16
New Mexico 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 15 16 16
New York 18 21 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 18 14 16
North Carolina 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 14 16 16
North Dakota 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 15 15 16
Ohio 21 21 18 18 21 18 18 18 18 16 16 16
Oklahoma 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 15 15 16
Oregon 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 15 15 17
Pennsylvania 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 16 16 12 16 16
Rhode Island 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 18 18 12 16 16
South Carolina 14 18 18 12 18 18 14 18 16 12 14 14
South Dakota 21 21 18 18 21 18 18 18 NA 15 15 16
Tennessee 16 18 18 16 18 18 14 16 16 12 16 16
Texas 21 21 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 14 14 16
Utah 21 21 18 18 18 18 16 16 14 14 14 14
Vermont 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 16 16 12 16 16
Virginia 21 21 18 21 21 18 14 18 16 12 16 16
Washington 21 21 18 18 18 18 14 14 17 12 15 17
West Virginia 21 21 18 21 21 18 18 18 18 16 16 16
Wisconsin 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 15 15 16
Wyoming 21 21 18 21 21 18 18 18 16 16 16 16
Average* 20.00 20.51 18.13 18.24 18.72 18.10 16.03 16.98 16.50 14.09 15.23 16.09
Std. Dev.* 3.39 1.30 0.35 3.36 1.84 0.26 3.01 1.38 1.17 3.93 0.99 1.22
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Bold entries identify the state, gender and type of laws for which there were no change in the legal age over the entire period
1882 to 1980 or the period for which there are non-missing entries. The full time-series is available from the author upon request.
*Weighted by the population of each state by year.
Table 3.3: First stage-Basic specification, male respondents
Own age at first marriage Spouse's age at first marriage
Full specification Only own laws Full specification Only own laws
Own Spouse's Consent No Own Spouse's Consent No
laws laws consent laws laws consent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
13
14
No
13
-0.238**
(0.075)
-0.187
(0.139)
-0.332*
(0.158)
-0.120
(0.141)
consent minimum age
0.511
(0.517)
1.099
(0.573)
0.734
(0.526)
1.142*
(0.558)
0.986
(0.516)
F (own instruments)
F (all instruments)
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
0.896***
(0.164)
0.192
(0.132)
0.397**(0.130)
0.168
(0.122)
0.528**
(0.197)
0.415*
(0.164)
4.523***
(0.215)
-0.990
(0.554)
-1.272*
(0.524)
-0.621
(0.532)
-1.305*
(0.530)
-1.440*
(0.539)
-1.400*
(0.542)
-1.355*
(0.533)
2.97** 77.34***
639.34***
-0.016
(0.040)
0.044*
(0.021)
N. of cells
0.038
(0.024)
-0.013
(0.028)
19096
-0.011
(0.120)
-0.028
(0.101)
-0.085
(0.141)
0.088
(0.111)
-0.434***
(0.045)
0.170
(0.279)
-0.198*
(0.075)
0.152
(0.295)
0.030
(0.124)
1.410***
(0.227)
0.303
(0.181)
0.399*
(0.156)
0.320
(0.183)
0.600**
(0.210)
0.602**
(0.196)
-1.650***
(0.246)
0.007(0.300)
-0.136
(0.270)
0.298
(0.286)
-0.290
(0.257)
-0.359
(0.297)
-0.329
(0.289)
-0.215
(0.285)
-0.069
(0.096)
-0.348*
(0.162)
-0.418
(0.236)
-0.254
(0.206)
0.028
(0.273)
0.599*
(0.284)
0.382
(0.255)
0.701**
(0.258)
0.610*
(0.249)
0.65 35.59*** 4.65*** 36.55***
901.16***
Panel B: Linear regressions
0.021
(0.029)
0.062
(0.033)
0.046** 0.023
(0.013) (0.040)
19402 19299
-0.043
(0.052)
0.018
(0.035)
19096
1.573***
(0.128)
-0.009
(0.132)
0.189*
(0.081)
0.079
(0.074)
0.325*
(0.131)
0.391***
(0.102)
-1.800***
(0.113)
0.284**
(0.088)
0.093
(0.102)
0.547***
(0.112)
0.151
(0.077)
0.261
(0.139)
0.239
(0.190)
0.296
(0.164)
1884.01*** 55.14***
0.040*
(0.017)
19491
0.043
(0.029)
19330
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and for males. All regressions
include state, age and year of birth fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in
each cell. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 3.4: First stage-Basic specification, female respondents
Own age at first marriage Spouse's age at first marriage
Full specification Only own laws Full specification Only own laws
Own Spouse's Consent No Own Spouse's Consent No
laws laws consent laws laws consent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
0.331
(0.169)
0.414**
(0.142)
0.294
(0.175)
0.569**
(0.186)
0.658**
(0.200)
No consent minimum age
15 -2.524***
(0.676)
16 0.080
(0.454)
17 -0.542
(0.435)
18 0.167
(0.440)
19 -0.417
(0.445)
-3.243***
(0.488)
F (own instruments)
F (all instruments)
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
-0.052
(0.095)
-0.339
(0.175)
-0.524*
(0.258)
-0.306
(0.203)
1.373***
(0.196)
0.361
(0.457)
0.738
(0.457)
0.485
(0.467)
1.926***
(0.538)
0.293
(0.609)
1.310***
(0.132)
0.008
(0.140)
0.191*
(0.072)
0.044
(0.075)
0.293**
(0.105)
0.364**
(0.112)
-0.038
(0.197)
0.043
(0.147)
-0.131
(0.149)
0.024
(0.137)
-2.685***
(0.359)
0.114
(0.373)
-0.510
(0.393)
0.173
(0.387)
-0.256
(0.371)
-0.162
(0.385)
1.864***
(0.390)
1.955***
(0.218)
-0.058
(0.335)
0.274
(0.318)
0.094
(0.329)
1.426***
(0.373)
0.367
(0.405)
0.935**
(0.349)
0.073
(0.149)
0.165
(0.142)
0.056
(0.118)
0.283*
(0.122)
0.114
(0.153)
-0.822*
(0.372)
0.746*
(0.327)
0.504
(0.319)
1.564***
(0.327)
0.553
(0.319)
3.977***
(0.364)
43.50*** 43.07*** 17.51*** 408.10*** 49.51*** 155.95***
0.087
(0.173)
0.116
(0.095)
-0.039
(0.107)
0.110
(0.082)
1.884***
(0.157)
0.377*
(0.156)
0.822***
(0.151)
0.613***
(0.159)
1.990***
(0.179)
0.843
(0.444)
0.91 287.87***
839.68***
Panel B: Linear regressions
-0.058
(0.052)
0.022
(0.029)
0.030
(0.016)
0.008
(0.034)
0.045 0.046
(0.026) (0.024)
19236 19084
0.016
(0.027)
0.012
(0.024)
18873
0.026
(0.021)
0.066***
(0.019)
19162 19065
192
1083.30***
0.060
(0.033)
0.026
(0.028)
N. of cells 18873
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and for males. All regressions
include state, age and year of birth fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in
each cell. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 3.5: First stage robustness checks, male age at first marriage
With state-trends Full sample With schooling laws
Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
13
14
No
13
0.024
(0.057)
0.055
(0.067)
0.065
(0.081)
0.076
(0.084)
consent minimum age
0.306
(0.446)
1.262*
(0.490)
0.908*
(0.451)
1.085*
(0.478)
1.089*
(0.437)
F (own instruments)
F (all instruments)
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
20.471***
(5.224)
0.070
(0.064)
0.094
(0.092)
0.135*
(0.062)
0.294*
(0.117)
-0.065
(0.092)
4.365***
(0.201)
-1.336**
(0.454)
-1.289**
(0.436)
-1.040*
(0.441)
-1.412**
(0.441)
-1.477**
(0.449)
-1.412**
(0.462)
-1.412**
(0.445)
-0.254***
(0.072)
-0.097
(0.136)
-0.286
(0.151)
-0.065
(0.132)
0.597*
(0.288)
0.261*
(0.104)
0.649*
(0.265)
0.485***
(0.143)
0.445**
(0.134)
0.192
(0.133)
0.373**
(0.139)
0.141
(0.116)
0.322
(0.170)
0.387*
(0.163)
-0.849***
(0.235)
-1.100"**
(0.165)
-0.556***
(0.204)
-1.109***
(0.172)
-1.181***
(0.209)
-1.152***
(0.215)
-1.130***
(0.199)
-0.202*
(0.092)
-0.219
(0.125)
-0.318*
(0.155)
-0.113
(0.140)
0.687*
(0.341)
0.366**
(0.084)
0.703*
(0.314)
0.592***
(0.165)
0.530***
(0.132)
11.63*** 106.20*** 4.16*** 51.78*** 4.22***
214.13***
0.018
(0.022)
0.048
(0.027)
N. of cells
58.37***
Panel B: Linear regressions
0.021
(0.018)
-0.021
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.038)
0.048*
(0.018)
19096
0.036
(0.024)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.006
(0.041)
0.037
(0.024)
20887
0.224
(0.137)
0.426**
(0.127)
0.189
(0.123)
0.537**
(0.191)
0.435**
(0.341)
-0.287*
(0.110)
0.360***
(0.093)
-0.257*
(0.117)
-0.407*
(0.187)
-0.428*
(0.184)
-0.334*
(0.166)
27.40***
2345.21***
0.032
(0.024)
-0.004
(0.029)
16115
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and
for males, 14. All regressions include state, age and year of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the
sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.6: First stage robustness checks, female age at first marriage
With state-trends Full sample With schooling laws
Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum
13
14
15
16
17
18
age
73.726***
(9.232)
0.065
(0.051)
0.018
(0.056)
0.123*
(0.046)
0.088
(0.108)
-0.042
(0.073)
0.116
(0.065)
0.093
(0.064)
0.128
(0.092)
0.005
(0.060)
0.235
(0.161)
0.324*
(0.126)
0.229
(0.160)
0.422*
(0.166)
0.447*
(0.181)
-0.053
(0.135)
-0.190
(0.177)
-0.429
(0.227)
-0.220
(0.186)
1.811*
(0.687)
0.392*
(0.149)
0.478***
(0.132)
0.304*
(0.148)
0.595**
(0.181)
0.668***
(0.171)
-0.049
(0.089)
-0.333*
(0.148)
-0.515*
(0.241)
-0.271
(0.173)
No consent minimum age
13
-3.187***
(0.266)
-0.418*
(0.193)
-0.738***
(0.194)
-0.411*
(0.186)
1.379***
(0.117)
0.686***
(0.192)
-0.642*** 0.870***
(0.168) (0.168)
1.915***
(0.218)
-3.775*** 0.858*
(0.203) (0.363)
-1.154***
(0.294)
0.552**
(0.173)
-0.371*
(0.149)
0.168
(0.176)
-0.234
(0.180)
1.679
(0.273)
-0.178
(0.273)
0.346
(0.198)
0.111
(0.142)
1.268***
(0.260)
-0.107
(0.358)
0.254
(0.197)
-0.600*** 0.927**
(0.072) (0.311)
0.075 1.313***
(0.075) (0.323)
-0.446** 1.013**
(0.140) (0.311)
2.391***
(0.373)
0.854
(0.654)
-0.380 1.113***
(0.208) (0.316)
F (own instruments)
F (all instruments)
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
56.64*** 219.33*** 68.99*** 29.91*** 29.99***
7076.55***
0.018
(0.020)
0.012
(0.020)
N. of cells
4658.29***
Panel B: Linear regressions
0.004
(0.018)
0.004
(0.030)
18873
0.056
(0.030)
0.020
(0.025)
-0.050
(0.045)
0.037
(0.026)
31.26***
1439.20***
0.051
(0.031)
0.028
(0.033)
22166
-0.040
(0.049)
0.026
(0.031)
16121
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and
for males, 14. All regressions include state, age and year of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the
sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; ***
significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.7: Reduced-form estimates, male fertility outcomes
Children in hhd Age of eldest child Age of youngest child
Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
13
15
16
17
18
No
13
-0.020
(0.034)
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.052
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.027)
consent minimum age
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
0.030
(0.062)
-0.038(0.073)
-0.037(0.061)
0.001
(0.062)
0.037
(0.057)
0.003(0.009)
-0.022
(0.012)
N. of cells
0.033
(0.040)
0.044(0.028)
-0.042
(0.026)
0.024
(0.042)
0.012
(0.035)
0.097
(0.078)
0.044
(0.090)
0.107
(0.077)
-0.057
(0.089)
-0.014(0.075)
-0.027
(0.090)
0.052
(0.099)
-0.013
(0.074)
-0.355*
(0.175)
-0.667**
(0.236)
-0.830*
(0.322)
-0.453
(0.279)
-1.443
(1.012)
-1.697
(1.069)
-1.393
(0.993)
-1.354
(1.077)
-1.092
(1.065)
-0.441
(0.350)
0.503
(0.256)
0.516*
(0.247)
0.270
(0.291)
0.455
(0.295)
1.632***
(0.417)
-7.401***
(0.506)
2.540*
(1.024)
3.007**
(1.019)
2.670*
(1.011)
2.675**
(0.974)
2.737**
(1.010)
2.766**
(1.008)
2.983**
(1.002)
-0.324
(0.189)
-0.680*
(0.299)
-0.734
(0.386)
-0.448
(0.319)
-2.676*
(1.076)
-2.383*
(1.078)
-2.129*
(1.043)
-2.081
(1.087)
-2.058
(1.116)
Panel B: Linear regressions
-0.014*
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.045
(0.071)
-0.047
(0.044)
19096
0.023
(0.072)
0.089
(0.054)
-0.051
(0.081)
-0.020
(0.048)
16845
195
-0.183
(0.449)
0.567
(0.323)
0.489
(0.281)
0.437
(0.345)
0.615
(0.344)
2.036***
(0.530)
-5.989***
(0.645)
2.567*
(1.085)
3.032**
(1.091)
3.573**(1.083)
3.141**
(1.032)
3.380**
(1.093)
3.383**
(1.089)
3.607**
(1.079)
0.075
(0.090)
0.147*
(0.067)
16845
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12
and for males 14. All regressions include state, year of Census and year of birth fixed effects and
are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 3.8: Reduced-form estimates, female fertility outcomes
Children in hhd Age of eldest child Age of youngest child Children in hhd
Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
-0.020
(0.034)
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.052
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.027)
No consent minimum age
Minimum age
Consent
No consent
0.030
(0.062)
-0.038
(0.073)
-0.037
(0.061)
0.001
(0.062)
0.037
(0.057)
0.003
(0.009)
-0.022
(0.012)
N. of cells
0.033
(0.040)
0.044
(0.028)
-0.042
(0.026)
0.024
(0.042)
0.012
(0.035)
0.097
(0.078)
0.044
(0.090)
0.107
(0.077)
-0.057
(0.089)
-0.014
(0.075)
-0.027
(0.090)
0.052
(0.099)
-0.013
(0.074)
-0.014*
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.008)
19096
-0.355*
(0.175)
-0.667**
(0.236)
-0.830*
(0.322)
-0.453
(0.279)
-1.443
(1.012)
-1.697
(1.069)
-1.393
(0.993)
-1.354
(1.077)
-1.092
(1.065)
-0.441
(0.350)
0.503
(0.256)
0.516*
(0.247)
0.270
(0.291)
0.455
(0.295)
1.632***
(0.417)
-7.401***
(0.506)
2.540*
(1.024)
3.007**
(1.019)
2.670*
(1.011)
2.675**
(0.974)
2.737**
(1.010)
2.766**
(1.008)
2.983**
(1.002)
-0.324
(0.189)
-0.680*
(0.299)
-0.734
(0.386)
-0.448
(0.319)
-2.676*
(1.076)
-2.383*
(1.078)
-2.129*
(1.043)
-2.081
(1.087)
-2.058
(1.116)
-0.183
(0.449)
0.567
(0.323)
0.489
(0.281)
0.437
(0.345)
0.615
(0.344)
2.036***
(0.530)
-5.989***
(0.645)
2.567*
(1.085)
3.032**
(1.091)
3.573**
(1.083)
3.141'*"
(1.032)
3.380**
(1.093)
3.383**
(1.089)
3.607**
(1.079)
0.048
(0.043)
0.045
(0.039)
-0.034
(0.033)
-0.022
(0.039)
0.015
(0.033)
-0.007
(0.034)
-0.040
(0.029)
-0.057
(0.036)
0.016
(0.029)
-0.074
(0.061)
-0.141* -0.016
(0.066) (0.062)
-0.003 0.092**
(0.055) (0.029)
-0.049 0.018
(0.070) (0.033)
-0.144* 0.022
(0.056) (0.034)
-0.094
(0.057)
-0.114 0.087
(0.068) (0.043)
Panel B: Linear regressions
-0.045 0.023 -0.051
(0.071) (0.072) (0.081)
-0.047 0.089 -0.020
(0.044) (0.054) (0.048)
16845
0.075
(0.090)
0.147*
(0.067)
16845
-0.014*
(0.006)
0.005
(0.007)
0.010
(0.009)
-0.024
(0.013)
18873
196
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and for males 14. All
regressions include state, year of Census and year of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the sum of sample-line
weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.9: Reduced form robustness checks, children ever born
Females
With Full With Married College
state-trends sample schooling laws after 25 attendees
Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's Own Spouse's
laws laws laws laws laws laws laws laws laws laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Dummy regresssions
Consent minimum age
13 -42.374*** -0.476* -0.183 -0.236
(5.051) (0.184) (0.192) (0.135)
14 -0.025 -0.019 -0.114 0.057 0.073
(0.047) (0.148) (0.098) (0.050) (0.040)
15 -0.026 0.004 -0.090 0.056 -0.129 0.040 0.019 0.034 0.085* 0.008
(0.063) (0.051) (0.104) (0.098) (0.074) (0.077) (0.049) (0.027) (0.040) (0.049)
16 -0.070 -0.062 -0.080 0.011 -0.110* 0.023 0.062 -0.045 0.010 -0.024
(0.046) (0.051) (0.077) (0.084) (0.048) (0.067) (0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036)
17 -0.159*** -0.048 -0.174 0.095 -0.251*** 0.118 -0.412 -0.074 0.017 -0.055
(0.040) (0.058) (0.106) (0.120) (0.071) (0.095) (0.049) (0.027) (0.071) (0.044)
18 -0.263*** 0.060 -0.368** 0.108 -0.403*** 0.095 -0.130* 0.030 -0.064 0.069*
(0.062) (0.051) (0.122) (0.084) (0.109) (0.057) (0.050) (0.273) (0.042) (0.027)
No consent minimum age
13 -0.718** -1.306*** -1.951***
(0.252) (0.179) (0.094)
15 -0.512*** -0.444 -0.734*** -0.564*** -0.795*** 0.189 -0.335
(0.120) (0.353) (0.200) (0.148) (0.092) (0.265) (0.083)
16 -0.089 -0.210* -0.191 0.123 0.154*** -0.070 -0.501** 0.144 0.160 -0.475
(0.192) (0.095) (0.331) (0.291) (0.053) (0.186) (0.136) (0.099) (0.257) (0.249)
17 0.053 0.137 -0.351 -0.332 0.054 -0.549** -0.383*** 0.196
(0.190) (0.195) (0.347) (0.298) (0.030) (0.201) (0.137) (0.266)
18 -0.030 -0.354 -0.180 -0.010 -0.437* -0.663*** -0.111 0.064 -0.563*
(0.194) (0.329) (0.297) (0.110) (0.184) (0.137) (0.110) (0.257) (0.250)
19 -0.169 -0.106 -0.460 -0.715** -0.279* -0.396
(0.189) (0.179) (0.326) (0.231) (0.126) (0.253)
20 -0.301 -1.548*** 0.038 -0.302 -0.785*** 0.046 -0.360
(0.193) (0.314) (0.310) (0.278) (0.169) (0.143) (0.222)
21 -0.294 0.046 -0.298 -0.213 -0.032 -0.424* -0.597*** -0.034 0.154 -0.538*
(0.226) (0.245) (0.327) (0.297) (0.142) (0.196) (0.141) (0.103) (0.260) (0.251)
Min. age Panel B: Linear regressions
Consent -0.029** 0.022 -0.042** 0.029 -0.037** 0.025 -0.004 0.006 -0.012 0.026
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
No consent -0.006 -0.016 -0.007 -0.047 -0.016 -0.050** -0.009 -0.034 0.023 -0.032
(0.013) (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016)
N. of cells 18873 32810 16121 425768 579914
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Reference category for females is 12 and for males 14. All regressions include state, year of
Census and year of birth fixed cffects and are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.10: OLS and IV results, fertility outcomes
Males Females
Children Age of Age of Children Age of Age of Children
in eldest youngest in eldest youngest ever
hhd child child hhd child child born
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS
Age at first marriage
Own 0.210*** -0.181*** -0.812*** 0.116*** 0.189** -0.145** -0.075***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.058) (0.016) (0.064) (0.049) (0.009)
Spouse's -0.088*** 0.097* 0.339*** 0.023* -0.300*** -0.461*** 0.027**
(0.007) (0.041) (0.049) (0.008) (0.048) (0.067) (0.010)
Panel B: IV (Dummies as instruments)
Age at first marriage
Own -0.019 -0.268 -0.163 0.063 0.856 1.250 -0.350
(0.094) (0.302) (0.307) (0.055) (0.758) (0.763) (0.200)
Spouse's -0.018 0.898* 1.377*** -0.193* -1.177 -1.252 -0.271
(0.088) (0.343) (0.391) (0.078) (0.775) (0.819) (0.294)
N. of cells 19096 16845 16845 18873 16096 16096 18873
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, year of Census
and year of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
Table 3.11: OLS and IV robustness checks, children ever born
Females
State-specific With Whites Blacks
trends education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV (Dummies as instruments)
Own age at first marriage -0.372 -0.291 -0.418 -0.137
(0.197) (0.203) (0.218) (0.175)
Spouse's age at first marriage 0.085 -0.296 -0.212 -0.151
(0.171) (0.322) (0.317) (0.181)
Highest grade achieved -0.034
(0.121)
N. of cells 18873 16121 8387 5241
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include
state, year of Census and year of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the sum of
sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.12: OLS and IV results, own age at first marriage
Males Females
Children Age of Age of Children Age of Age of Children
in eldest youngest in eldest youngest ever
hhd child child hhd child child born
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS
Own age at first marriage 0.015"*** -0.412*** -0.488*** 0.014 -0.338*** -0.382*** -0.101***
(0.004) (0.028) (0.026) (0.007) (0.021) (0.018) (0.006)
Panel B: IV (Dummies as instruments)
Own age at first marriage -0.231 1.328 2.935 -0.075 0.244 0.838 -0.657**
(0.153) (1.362) (1.673) (0.093) (0.890) (0.811) (0.195)
N. of cells 19206 16944 16944 18873 16096 16096 18873
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, year of Census and year
of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Table 3.13: OLS and IV results, other outcomes
Males Females
Highest Employed Wage Highest Employed Wage
grade income grade income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Own age at first marriage 0.050*** 0.030*** 614.810*** 0.079*** -0.008*** -66.572**
(0.009) (0.003) (78.933) (0.011) (0.002) (21.025)
Spouse's age at first marriage 0.083*** -0.007*** -156.946*** 0.034** 0.022*** 178.137***
(0.012) (0.002) (39.278) (0.011) (0.002) (19.503)
Panel B: Double IV (Dummies as instruments)
Own age at first marriage -0.065 0.003 -317.695 -0.274 0.039 473.296*
(0.205) (0.014) (490.424) (0.215) (0.021) (183.889)
Spouse's age at first marriage 0.451 0.013 -1300.729* 0.716* -0.001 -120.868
(0.265) (0.010) (636.832) (0.329) (0.034) (339.544)
Panel C: Single IV (Dummies as instruments)
Own age at first marriage 0.809 0.021 -2375.675* 0.148 0.059** 570.409**
(0.615) (0.017) (907.359) (0.226) (0.021) (187.249)
N. of cells 19096 19096 19096 18873 18873 18873
Standards errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All regressions include state, year of Census and year
of birth fixed effects and are weighted by the sum of sample-line weights of individuals in each cell.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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Figure 3-1: Mean and median age at first marriage, males
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Figure 3-2: Mean and median age at first marriage, females
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Figure 3-3: Distribution of age at first marriage, males by no-consent age
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Figure 3-4: Distribution of age at first marriage, females by no-consent age
Figure 3-5: Distribution of age at first marriage, males by consent age
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Figure 3-6: Distribution of age at first marriage, females by consent age
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